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l)PROJECT-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, MONETARY INCENTIVES 
AND PERFORMANCE IN STRATEGIC R&D ALLIANCES
A growing number of firms rely on strategic R&D alliances to develop new products. In
these alliances, firms use various kinds of governance mechanisms for incentive align ment.
Project-level governance, i.e., the daily control of alliance activities by firms’ alliance re pre -
 sen tatives such as steering committee members, alliance managers, and project managers,
and performance-based monetary incentives, i.e., potential payments tied to the perfor -
mance of partners, are two governance mechanisms, increasingly used in practice yet over -
looked in the strategic alliances literature. In this dissertation, I examine the antece dents
and performance outcomes of these two governance mechanisms in the biopharmaceutical
industry setting.
The results of this dissertation suggest that project-level governance and monetary
incentives offset each others’ effects on alliance innovation performance in the context of
startup-incumbent alliances. In other words, offering  greater monetary incentives to start -
ups has minimal positive effect on the development success, if incumbents exercise intense
project-level governance by their controllers at the same time. On the other hand, the
results suggest that greater monetary incentives result in higher abnormal stock returns to
startup firms following alliance announcements. I also find that greater project-level
gover nance positively influences the contractual detail, which in turn increases the like -
lihood of development success. Finally, I reveal several other exogenous and endo genous
antecedents of both governance mechanisms.
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Second, I would like to thank management scholars who devoted their time to review 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROJECT-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND MONETARY INCENTIVES 
Alliances are ‘collaborative agreements between two or more independent firms to achieve 
various strategic purposes’ (Inkpen, 2001, pg. 401). In the context of Research and 
Development activities, firms engage in strategic alliances to develop new technologies, 
products, services, standards and novel knowledge by sharing their resources (Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990; Chesbrough, 2006; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Katila, 2002). Increasingly, 
firms rely on strategic alliances to access external sources of R&D, while their internal 
R&D labs lose importance as innovation engines (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; 
Carson, 2007; Dahan and Hauser, 2002; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988; Quinn, 2000). In the past 
alliances were primarily used as a strategic tool to decrease the degree of market rivalry; 
now, they are sine qua non for innovation, not only for introducing new products to 
existing markets, but also for creating novel markets. Similarly, in the past, economists and 
management scholars were concerned about the relationship between alliances and 
industry competitiveness (Arndt, 1979; Clarke, 1983; Werner and Philips, 1965); now, 
however, scholars are interested in how alliances can be used to support innovation (Baum, 
Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; 
Powell, Kogut, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Tzabbar, 2009).  
Given the growing importance of alliances for innovation, firms need to effectively 
govern these cross-organizational business activities to realize the benefits while 
minimizing the risks of collaborative R&D. Otherwise, they will not be successful in 
developing innovations to increase their competitive advantages. Even worse, they might 
become victims of partner opportunism, e.g., they may lose their proprietary technologies 
and knowledge to their partners (Hamel, 1991). Hence, alliance governance plays an 
important role in explaining the performance of alliances. 
Alliance governance refers to the set of mechanisms used by the partners to align their 
incentives. More specifically, the governance mode of an alliance represents the parties’ 
decisions about how they allocate ownership, income and decision rights between each 
other and how they monitor/support and penalize/reward each other’s activities. Alliance 
governance mechanisms can be classified into two groups: 1) formal governance 
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mechanisms and 2) informal governance mechanisms. Formal governance mechanisms are 
associated with the allocation of ownership, income and decision rights between partners. 
Research has extensively studied the presence and nature of various formal mechanisms, 
including equity investments and different forms of contractual safeguards such as 
exclusivity and termination rights (Gulati and Singh 1998; Lerner and Malmandier, 2010; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998; Pisano, 1989; Puranam and Vanneste, 2009; Reuer and Arino, 
2007; Somoya, Kim, and Vonortas, 2010). Management scholars have also studied 
relational governance mechanisms, e.g., trust, and justice (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
1995; Luo, 2007).   
The choice of governance mode for external R&D is a complex managerial problem, 
and it is becoming more complex as firms experiment with novel formal governance 
mechanisms. One of these novel formal governance mechanisms is the appointment of 
alliance managers or dedicated project managers to controller and liaison roles. These 
dedicated managers, specialized in alliance governance and management, are primarily 
responsible for monitoring partner opportunism and creating healthy communication 
between the partners. While, in the past, the governance of alliances was under the 
responsibility of middle-level managers, nowadays this responsibility is often delegated to 
professional managers. This is largely a consequence of the establishment of the dedicated 
alliance management functions within the established firms. Eli Lilly was one of the first 
firms that adopted a professional alliance management approach by opening up its Office 
of Alliance Management at the beginning of the last decade (Sims, Harrison, and Gueth, 
2001). Currently, almost every large pharmaceutical firm has an alliance management 
office. Similar examples can also be found in other industries. Firms such as Philips, Cisco 
Systems and Wal-Mart govern their alliances through their alliance managers (Slowinski & 
Sagal, 2003).  
In addition, firms increasingly rely on formal joint committees for the governance of 
their alliances. The reason is that complex alliances are more likely to require the 
appointment of the senior managers to committee membership roles to monitor progress 
and resolve disputes should they emerge. Hence, firms are increasingly establishing joint 
steering and joint functional committees, e.g., joint research, development, 
1.1 Project-level Governance and Monetary Incentives                                                               3 
 
commercialization, regulation, manufacturing, patent and finance committees, to govern 
their alliances.  
We term the day-to-day governance performed by dedicated alliance managers and 
committee members as project-level governance. Like other governance mechanisms, 
project-level governance plays a crucial role in mitigating opportunism, and, in turn, 
aligning the partner’s interests. This is because the appointment of alliance representatives 
provides a firm with a mechanism to monitor the activities of its partner and to influence 
its behavior.  
Another governance mechanism that has become pervasive in the context of strategic 
R&D alliances is performance-based monetary incentives, i.e., potential milestone 
payments. Nowadays, firms frequently tie higher portions of their alliance payments to 
their partner’s realized development performance. This is particularly true for the 
biopharmaceutical industry (Mallik, Zbar, and Zemmel, 2004; Van Brunt, 2008). These 
performance-based monetary incentives are effective in reducing partner opportunism 
risks, because they mitigate both moral hazard and adverse selection problems addressed in 
agency theory (Arrow, 1985). This is because pay-for-performance not only incentivizes 
partners to invest in the future of alliances and not shirk their responsibilities, but also 
serves as a mechanism to eliminate low-quality, low competency partners, at the onset of a 
deal. 
While project-level governance and performance-based monetary incentives are crucial 
to the governance of alliances, the strategic alliances literature has paid little attention to 
both mechanisms. This is most likely due to the difficulties of finding data on alliance 
managers, committees and potential milestone payments (Oxley, 1997). In addition, it 
might be due to the fact that these mechanisms were less important in the past. Hence, 
while considerable research has been devoted to different forms of alliance governance 
mechanisms such as ex ante equity investments, contractual clauses, and relational 
governance, relatively less attention has been paid to alliance representatives and 
performance-based monetary incentives. Specifically, very little is known about the 
antecedents of these alliance governance mechanisms, the relationship between them and 
their impacts on alliance-level and firm-level performance in the context of strategic R&D 
alliances. Hence, this dissertation aims to reveal the antecedents of project-level 
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governance and monetary incentives, improve our understanding of the  exact relationship  
between  these mechanisms and explain how these mechanisms influence alliance-level 
and firm-level performance.  
 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
To better clarify the gaps in the literature that this dissertation addresses, a closer look at 
two distinct streams of research is necessary. On the one hand, there is a group of studies 
that investigates the alliance governance choices of firms. This research mainly focuses on 
the different forms of formal and informal governance mechanisms in the context of 
strategic alliances and aims at explaining when firms use the different governance forms 
and how these choices affect alliance and firm performance. As seen in the review below, 
both project-level governance and monetary incentives received less attention than other 
governance mechanisms addressed in the strategic alliances literature.  
On the other hand, there is another group of studies that tests the predictions of agency 
theory in various contexts such as corporate governance, acquisitions, franchising, sales-
force compensation plans, channel coordination etc. As mechanisms for mitigating agency 
problems, project-level governance and performance-based monetary incentives 
correspond to monitoring and bonding, respectively, in the terminology of agency theory. 
A review of recent research on the relationship between monitoring and bonding and their 
impact on performance can also help us understand potential agency theory contributions 
that might emerge from examining these two governance mechanism in a novel business 
context. Therefore, we also provide a short review of the research that tested agency theory 
in different settings in order to clarify the gaps that we addressed in this dissertation.    
Looking back: How Has the Alliance Governance Research Evolved? 
Project-level governance and performance-based monetary incentives are only two of 
several alliance governance mechanisms used to align the incentives of partners. Indeed, 
the set of possible governance mechanisms is large enough to make life of those 
responsible for designing alliance governance structures very difficult. Even more difficult 
is that each governance mechanism performs different functions at the same time, thus 
perplexing a decision-maker to a higher extent. For instance, equity investments were 
primarily regarded as safeguarding mechanisms to mitigate partner opportunism risks 
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(Oxley; 1997; Pisano, 1989; Pisano 1990) until Gulati and Singh (1998) revealed their role 
in solving coordination problems between partners. Subsequent research also showed that 
equity plays a key role in the knowledge transfer between partners (Sampson, 2007). 
Therefore, we believe that a chronological classification based on theories used to explain 
the different functions of each governance mechanism can be very helpful to the reader. 
Further, such a review will highlight the extent of gaps in the literature.  
Theories of Alliance Governance 
Economics and sociology are two main fields from which the alliance governance 
literature has extensively benefited. While agency theory, transaction cost economics 
theory, property rights theory, game theory and more recently, evolutionary economics 
theory explain the economic reasoning behind the choice of governance mechanisms, 
social embeddedness and social network theories provide the sociological roots for 
governance mechanism choices.  
Early alliance governance work focused primarily on joint ventures (JVs) probably 
because of their prevalence and the international context of the business world during the 
1990s – a period in which multinationals, in developed economies, preferred joint ventures 
as a means to enter emerging markets. In this period, agency theory was widely recognized 
as a sound theoretical perspective to study the governance structure of JVs. The literature 
mainly focused on the following questions: How do parent firms control their joint 
ventures? How is coordination between the parents and their joint venture achieved? To 
what extent and under what conditions do control and coordination improve the 
performance of the joint venture? The literature identified several governance mechanisms 
for control and coordination. Kumar and Seth (1998) provide a comprehensive list of 
control and coordination mechanisms extracted from the literature.  In their list, incentive 
plans, the structure of the JV board of directors as a means to influence voting outcomes, 
and the role of the board in monitoring (Killing, 1983) were the control mechanisms 
pertaining to agency theory. Their relationship to agency theory stems from the fact that 
parent firms used these output and behavior control mechanisms to align the diverging 
interests of the parent firms and their joint venture.  
The late 1980s was the beginning of a period in which strategic R&D alliances between 
small startups and large incumbents received a lot of attention among management 
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scholars. The differences in skills between the small and large firms motivated these firms 
to form partnerships. Through these alliances, small firms gained access to the downstream 
assets of the large firms which allowed them to further develop and commercialize their 
innovations, and, in turn, generate revenues. On the other hand, large firms needed to 
control and adapt to the technological discontinuities caused by small firms (Mitchell, 
1989; Rothaermel, 2001; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997; Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
While, at first glance, these alliances appear to be profitable arrangements for both sides, 
because of the potential benefits, the challenges are still significant. As Teece explains in 
his seminal work (1986), the innovating partner has to share some part of its decision-
making rights and the rights over the innovation’s profits with the incumbent firm to 
benefit from its downstream assets. In other words, the dependence on the large firm’s 
downstream assets negatively influences the small firm’s appropriabilty of its innovation. 
Then, the important questions become to what extent are control rights shared? To what 
extent is the product ownership shared? What is the optimal organizational and governance 
mode of the inter-organizational exchange between partners, i.e. a contractual alliance, and 
equity alliance or a joint venture? 
Alliance management scholars rely on transaction cost economics, property rights and 
game theories to understand what factors determine the allocation of control rights and 
ownership rights in these partnerships. Equity investments have been proposed as a 
governance mechanism that not only mitigates partner opportunism emerging from hold-up 
problems, but also reduces appropriation hazards resulting from difficulties in allocating 
residual control rights, i.e. rights that are not specified in alliance contracts because of the 
bounded rationality of partners in foreseeing contingencies ex ante. To explain when 
partners use equity investments to align their incentives, alliance governance scholars 
primarily rely on transaction cost economics theory which recommends higher integration 
under circumstances in which hold-up problems and appropriation hazards are high 
(Oxley; 1997; Pisano, 1989; Pisano 1990; Williamson, 1991).   
While transaction cost economics theory focuses on the choice of governance modes 
for inter-organizational exchanges, property rights theory focuses more on the allocation of 
contractual control rights between partners. Property rights theorists argue that the party 
whose input has a greater impact on performance should have higher ownership and more 
1.2 Literature Review                                                                                                                        7 
 
control rights, as long as that party has sufficient bargaining power (Aghion and Tirole 
1994; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Lerner and Merges (1998) conducted one of the first 
empirical tests of this theory in the biopharmaceutical industry by examining alliance 
contracts. They found that biotechnology firms with strong financial positions retain more 
control rights than those with limited financial resources. They also showed that when the 
efforts of the biotechnology firm have a lower impact on performance, it gains fewer 
control rights. 
The examination of alliance contracts in the alliance governance research is not 
restricted to Lerner and Merges’ study. Researchers have investigated various 
characteristics of contracts to understand their roles in alliance governance. Reuer and 
Arino (2007) demonstrated that contracts not only mitigate partner opportunism, but also 
foster the coordination between partners. In addition, Robinson and Stuart (2007) and 
Lerner and Malmendier (2010) examined the importance of termination rights in aligning 
incentives. More recently, Somaya et al. (2011) investigated licensing terms and found that 
license exclusivity is a contractual safeguarding mechanism.    
  Game theory has also been used as a complement to transaction cost economics and 
property rights theories. Parkhe (1993) examined how different types of alliance structures 
influence the behavior of partners, and, in turn, the outcomes of alliances. He found that 
the payoff pattern of a strategic alliance, determined by whether the alliance is structured 
as a competitive game (e.g. the prisoner’s dilemma) or as a cooperative game (e.g. the stag 
hunt game), influences the performance. Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998) distinguished 
between common and private benefits of an alliance to show how the opportunity set of 
each firm outside of the alliance influences its behavior within the alliances. They define 
private benefits as those that ‘a firm can earn unilaterally by picking up skills from its 
partner and applying them to its own operations in areas unrelated to the alliance activities’ 
and common benefits as those that ‘accrue to each partner in an alliance from the collective 
application of the learning that both firms go through as a consequence of being part of the 
alliance; these are obtained from operations in areas of the firm that are related to the 
alliance’ (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 1998, pg.195). They argue that there will be a 
learning race in an alliance when a partner’s ratio of private to common benefits is high, 
because the alliance payoff structure will resemble a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
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The alliance governance literature also benefited from evolutionary economics theory; 
particularly from the ideas used in the strategic management literature under the label of 
‘dynamic capabilities’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In general terms, the dynamic 
capabilities view focuses on the routines that help firms adapt to changing environments. 
The studies that used the dynamic capabilities view in alliance governance, therefore, 
concentrated on inter-firm routines and alliance management capabilities. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) highlighted inter-firm routines as critical firm resources and argued that routines for 
effective inter-organizational governance, among other things, create competitive 
advantage for firms.  Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) extended this view to show that the 
dedicated alliance management functions, in which these routines are developed and 
deployed, explain the performance heterogeneity of firm alliances. Although the effects of 
alliance governance on performance are not as salient as in other theoretical perspectives, 
the dynamic capabilities view also suggests that governance influences performance. Yet, 
this view is primarily concerned with routines that ensure the correct choices of 
governance mechanisms instead of how governance structure affects performance per se. 
While the economic theories of alliance governance highlight several formal 
governance mechanisms that can be used in alliances to align the interests of partners, 
these theories pay little attention to the relational aspects of alliances. Indeed, sociologists 
and relational contract theorists already discussed the socially embedded nature of 
exchange relationships between firms long before the alliance governance literature 
emerged (Granovetter, 1983; MacNeil, 1978). The main idea that social norms and values 
shape the behavior of parties in their inter-organizational relationships contrasts markedly 
to the arguments of economic theories which contend that formal governance mechanisms 
determine the behavior. However, relational governance mechanisms, such as trust, 
reputation, cooperation, fairness, and justice, exist in exchange relationships because the 
firm’s behavior is constrained and shaped by social norms and values.  
Trust is one of the most extensively investigated informal governance mechanisms in 
the alliance governance literature. Researchers, in the context of inter-organizational 
relationships, generally stick to the definition of goodwill trust, ‘the expectation that some 
others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate 
special concern for other’s interests above their own’ (Barber, 1983, pg.9). By definition, 
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goodwill trust reduces the transaction costs between partners, thereby eliminating the need 
for formal governance mechanisms. As a result, when the level of trust between partners is 
high, it is less likely that formal governance mechanisms will be used (Gulati, 1995). 
While the positive influence of trust between partners on exchange performance was 
discussed and demonstrated in several studies, researchers also noted that trust co-exists 
with other formal governance mechanisms and it complements, rather than substitutes 
them in explaining performance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and 
Nooteboom, 2005; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). 
Indeed, the co-existence of formal and informal governance mechanisms and the 
relationships between them have been central to the recent alliance governance research 
and it seems that it will attract more attention in the future. Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
conducted one of the first empirical studies on the relationship between formal and 
informal governance mechanisms. They formulated two alternative hypotheses to test 
whether formal contracts and trust complement or substitute each other in buyer-supplier 
relationships. In contrast to Gulati’s findings (1995), their results revealed that trust 
positively influences contractual detail. In other words, the partners are likely to write more 
detailed contracts when the level of trust between them is high.  Furthermore, they showed 
that trust and contracts complement each other in enhancing the performance of inter-
organizational relationships. In the same fashion, Luo (2002), Argyres, Bercovitz, and 
Mayer (2007), and Ryall and Sampson (2009) demonstrated that formal and informal 
governance mechanisms complement each other in inter-organizational exchanges. Unlike 
these studies, Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) argued that formal and informal mechanism 
co-exist, but are not interchangeable. They found that informal mechanisms are more 
effective for the governance of knowledge-based assets, whereas formal mechanisms are 
more effective for the governance of property-based assets. Finally, Agarwal, Croson, and 
Mahoney (2010) investigated the relationship between a formal governance mechanism, 
namely, monetary incentives, and informal communication between partners in an 
experimental setting. Similarly, they found that formal and informal governance 
mechanisms complement each other in enhancing performance. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
research findings on the relationship between formal and informal governance 
mechanisms. 
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The review of research on governance choices in strategic alliances demonstrates that 
the relationships between governance mechanisms, particularly those between formal and 
informal governance mechanisms, are central to alliance governance studies. Interestingly, 
however, there is relatively less interest in examining the relationships and interactions 
between formal governance mechanisms. Except from a few studies, such as Reuer and 
Arino (2007) and Robinson and Stuart (2007), the research has overlooked relationships 
between the different formal governance mechanisms. 
Another observation from this review is that empirical studies on both project-level 
governance and performance-based monetary incentives are relatively fewer. Moreover, 
performance-based monetary incentives have, to best of our knowledge, not been 
examined. Particularly, little is known about what determines the magnitude of these 
incentives and how they affect performance. 
 More importantly, the strategic alliances literature little investigates the exact 
relationship between project-level governance and monetary incentives and how these two 
mechanisms interact to determine performance. Do they complement or substitute each 
other in explaining alliance performance? As a result, further research is necessary to 
unravel the antecedents and consequences of project-level governance and performance-
based monetary incentives in the context of strategic R&D alliances. 
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Table 1. 1  The relation between formal and informal governance mechanisms 
Articles Topic Theories Methodology Findings 
Poppo & 
Zenger (SMJ, 
2002) 
The interplay 
between formal 
contracts and 
relational 
governance in 
interorganizational 
exchanges 
Transaction 
cost economics 
and the 
literature on 
relational 
governance 
Survey of Information 
Systems executives. 
Buyer-supplier 
relationships. 
Relational governance 
is measured based on 
the degree of open 
communication, trust, 
dependence and 
cooperation.Contractual 
complexity is related to 
the extent to which 
contract is customized 
for the relationship 
Formal contracts and 
relational governance 
complement each other 
in explaining 
performance of inter-
organizational exchanges 
Luo (SMJ, 
2002) 
The interplay 
between contracts 
and cooperation in 
IJVs. 
Transaction 
cost 
economics, 
contract theory 
and the 
literature on 
relational 
governance 
Survey of IJVs in 
China.A detailed 
cooperation scale was 
developed. e.g. 
cooperation in deciding 
strategic objectives and 
goals, reaching a 
consensus in making 
strategic decisions, 
cooperation in 
functional domains etc. 
A contract’s term 
specificity and 
contingency 
adaptability is 
measured 
Previous cooperation has 
a positive effect on 
contingency adaptability 
clauses. 
Contracts positively 
moderates the 
relationship between 
cooperation and 
performance. 
Argyres, 
Bercovitz, and 
Mayer (Org. 
Science, 2007) 
The effect of prior 
relations on 
contractual detail. 
The interplay 
between task 
description and 
contingency 
description clauses 
Learning to 
contract 
(evolutionary 
view), formal 
and relational 
governance 
386 contracts of an IT 
services supplier. 
Relationship history 
and the presence of 
contingency planning 
and task description 
clauses 
Contingency planning 
and task description 
terms behave as 
complements in 
contractual design. 
Repeated exchange leads 
to more detailed 
contracts. 
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Articles Topic Theories Methodology Findings 
Ryall and 
Sampson 
(Management 
Science, 2009) 
The effect of prior 
relations on the 
detail of contracts 
Learning to 
contract, 
formal and 
relational 
governance 
52 joint technology 
development deals of 
firms in 
telecommunications 
equipment and 
microelectronics 
industries. 
 
Contracts between firms 
with prior deal 
experience tend to be 
more detailed and more 
likely to invoke penalty 
clauses than contracts 
between firms with no 
such prior deal 
experience. 
Formal and relational 
mechanisms are 
complements 
Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 
(SMJ, 2009) 
The choice of 
relational 
governance over 
formal governance 
TCE. 
Incomplete 
contracting, 
coordination 
requirements. 
Formal and 
relational 
governance 
mechanisms 
71 completed 
questionnaires from 
German 
telecommunications 
industry. 
Relational governance 
is measured as the 
presence of 
committees, 
cooperation managers 
etc. 
Formal governance is 
measured as the use of 
standard operating 
mechanisms. 
Relational governance 
and knowledge based 
assets match. 
Agarwal, 
Croson, and 
Mahoney 
(SMJ, 2010) 
The interplay 
between incentives 
and 
communication. 
How important are 
incentive alignment 
and communication 
to achieving 
success in 
cooperative 
alliances 
 
Property rights 
theory the 
literature on 
common and 
private benefits 
accruing to 
partner firms.  
Experiments The higher positive 
effects of incentive 
alignment on 
performance in the 
presence of 
communication. 
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Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives and Agency Theory 
There is no doubt that project-level governance and performance-based monetary 
incentives are of central concern to agency theory. This is because of their roles in 
mitigating the hidden action, i.e., moral hazard, and the hidden information, i.e., adverse 
selection, problems in the agency relationships in which the principal depends on the agent 
to undertake some action on the principal’s behalf, e.g. a startup biotechnology firm (the 
agent) will develop a drug on behalf of an established pharmaceutical firm (the principal). 
When it is costly and difficult ex ante for the principal to verify that the agent has the 
required characteristics to successfully complete the work, the principal faces the hidden 
information problem. Although this explanation refers to an ex ante contractual problem, 
the hidden information problem persists ex post in innovative task settings where it is 
difficult to verify the quality of solutions developed by the agent ex post,. On the other 
hand, the principal faces hidden action problem if the principal cannot fully observe the 
agent’s actions. As a result of the lack of direct observation, the agent does not make its 
best efforts to complete the work in the course of the partnership and causes the moral 
hazard problem. 
These two problems determine the size of agency costs faced by the principal. Agency 
theory aims at designing the most efficient contract for the principal by minimizing these 
agency costs, and, indeed, according to the theory, the fundamental mechanisms that can 
be used by principals to address these issues are monitoring and performance-based 
monetary incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The empirical tests of agency theory, 
predominantly with the purpose of understanding when firms use these two mechanisms in 
the agency relationships has been conducted in various contexts including but not limited 
to CEO compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), acquisitions (Reuer, Shenkar, and 
Ragozzino, 2004), franchising agreements (Lafontaine, 1992),  salesforce compensation 
plans and the coordination of marketing channels (see Bergen, Dutta, and Walker, 1992 for 
an extensive review of the agency theory research in the marketing literature). In addition, 
the more recent work primarily in the context of CEO compensation has begun to address 
the interrelationships between these two mechanisms in order to understand these 
mechanisms whether substitute or complement each other (Boyd, 1994; Hoskisson, 
Castleton, and Withers, 2009; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 
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2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Moreover, the 
agency scholars also develop a behavioral approach, behavioral agency theory (Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), by integrating the ideas of agency theory with Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory (1979).  Different from classical agency theory, behavioral 
agency theory does not assume that the controllers of the principals are acting rationally 
when they monitor agents. Therefore, this theory explains the conditions where the 
evaluations of the controllers can be biased and how these biases affect performance of the 
agency relationships (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Interestingly enough, to date, strategic alliance scholars have limitedly used agency 
theory in the context of vertical R&D alliances to explain the antecedents and 
consequences of monitoring and monetary incentives.. This is primarily because of the 
present domination of TCE theory in the literature. Yet, although TCE helps us understand 
the choices of alliance governance modes, it explains little about the determinants of 
project-level governance and potential milestone payments. It is agency theory’s aim to 
design the optimal contract for the principal, and this decision mainly consists of the 
choices of the intensity of monitoring and the size of performance-based monetary 
incentives. Thus, agency theory offers substantial opportunities for improving our 
understanding of the antecedents of these governance mechanisms. Moreover, the 
relationship between the intensity of project-level governance and the magnitude of 
monetary incentives is little discussed in the literature. Again, the substitution and the 
complementarities positions of classical agency theory as well as behavioral agency theory 
can be used to reveal the possible relationships between the two mechanisms. Last, but not 
least, agency theory can be utilized to understand performance impacts of project-level 
governance and performance-based monetary incentives on alliance-level and firm-level 
performance. As a result of addressing these gaps in the literature from the lens of agency 
theory, the theory can also be tested in a novel context; thus, the findings of this 
dissertation can contribute to agency theory.   
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1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
On the basis of the literature review described above, we can conclude that the alliance 
governance literature represents a mature research field. It is, therefore, a challenging task 
for a researcher to identify research questions that will ultimately lead to novel theoretical 
contributions, as well as practical knowledge. Yet, there are still several emerging issues 
because of changing trends in alliance governance and the increasing availability of data 
not accessible a decade ago. 
One of the potential areas is micro-level governance mechanisms used for day-to-day 
governance of strategic R&D alliances. Project-level governance exercised by the firms’ 
alliance representatives (e.g. committee  members, alliance managers, and  project 
managers) who are responsible for monitoring the progresses of alliances, making key 
project decisions and providing coordination between partners, represent an important 
aspect of alliance governance that needs further research. Previous studies focused both on 
formal and relational dimensions of project-level governance. For instance, Child, Faulkner 
and Tallman  (2005, pg. 315) and Gerwin and Ferris (2004) note that a firm engaged in an 
alliance can exercise formal control over its partners through its representatives. On the 
other hand, project-level governance plays a relational governance role as well because the 
formal control role will evolve into an informal governance role as partners interact and 
develop trust between each other (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). For instance, Hoetker and 
Mellewigt (2009) showed that these informal control mechanisms are more crucial for the 
governance of alliances that involve knowledge-based assets rather than property-based 
assets. 
Yet the literature on formal project-level governance suffers from a lack of empirical 
research. Particularly, there is a lack of empirical studies that aim to improve our 
understanding of the conditions where partners use project-level governance and the exact 
relationship between project-level governance and other formal governance mechanisms 
including equity investments and contracts. Therefore, the first set of questions in this 
dissertation is: 
 
1.1 What are the exogenous determinants of project-level governance? 
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1.2 What is the relationship between project-level governance and equity? 
Do project-level governance and equity complement or substitute each 
other in explaining alliance innovation performance? 
 
1.3 What is the relationship between project-level governance and 
contractual complexity? Do project-level governance and contractual 
complexity complement or substitute each other in explaining alliance 
innovation performance? 
 
The evolution of the alliance governance literature shows that more recent studies try to 
explain the relationship between governance mechanisms and their joint effects on alliance 
performance, rather than treating each of them in isolation. Yet, we have a limited 
knowledge about the potential relationships between formal governance mechanisms 
because of the literature’s primary focus on the interplay between formal and informal 
governance mechanisms. Hence, there is a need for research that examines the relationship 
between project-level governance and monetary incentive. Particularly, we still know very 
little about whether these two mechanisms complement or substitute each other in the 
context of strategic R&D alliances.  
The relationship between monitoring and performance-based monetary incentives has 
been extensively examined from the lens of agency theory in the corporate governance 
setting. Unlike the agency theory applications that aim to reveal the exogenous factors 
determining the presence of monitoring mechanisms and monetary incentives in agency 
relationships (see Eisenhardt 1989 for an extensive review), several studies in the corporate 
governance stream focuses on the relationship between the two governance mechanisms. 
Yet, the empirical tests in this corporate governance setting created two groups with 
opposing views: (1) substitution view (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1994) 
and (2) complementarity view (Hoskisson, Castleton, and Withers, 2009; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 
1997).  Therefore, there remains controversy over how these two mechanisms affect each 
other. The strategic R&D alliances between startups and incumbents offer an appropriate 
context to which this debate can be extended. The presence of the agency problem, 
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resulting from the separation of ownership and control through a licensing agreement that 
grants commercialization and ownership rights of a new product, developed by a startup, to 
its incumbent partner, engenders the use of both governance mechanisms in order to align 
the incentives of the partners. Yet, little is known about whether incumbents offer higher 
monetary incentives to startups, in the form of milestone payments, if they control the 
activities of startups to a greater extent by means of greater project-level governance. 
Therefore, the next research question is: 
 
2.1 What is the relationship between project-level governance and 
monetary incentives in the context of R&D alliances between startups 
and incumbents? Do managers complement the use of one governance 
mechanism with the other or substitute one governance mechanism for 
the other? 
 
The literature on the governance mechanisms of strategic alliances requires more 
studies to shed light on the performance implications of governance mechanisms. The 
empirical research provides good insight on the circumstances in which formal and 
informal governance mechanisms are used and what type of relationship exist between 
these governance mechanisms, yet explains little about the effects of governance 
mechanisms on performance. Specifically, there is limited understanding about the 
performance impacts of project-level governance and performance-based monetary 
incentives in the context of startup-incumbent alliances. Do higher monetary incentives 
and greater project-level governance increase the odds of successful development and lead 
to higher abnormal stock returns following the announcement of alliances? Therefore, the 
final research question of this dissertation is: 
 
3.1 To what extent do monetary incentives and project-level governance 
influence alliance innovation performance and the stock market 
performance of the startup firm? 
 
18                                                                                                               1.4 Empirical Setting 
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL SETTING 
We picked the U.S. biotechnology industry as the empirical setting of this dissertation. 
Three main factors determined our choice. First, the prevalent use of strategic R&D 
alliances as organizational modes for innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry 
overcomes potential problems that may arise from small sample sizes. Startup 
biotechnology firms rely on pharmaceutical and other biotechnology firms’ clinical 
development, manufacturing and marketing resources to further develop their compounds. 
Moreover, the strong patent protection system not only mitigates free-riding concerns for 
biotechnology firms, but also forges a market in which biotechnology firms can grant their 
licenses to pharmaceutical firms in exchange for license fees, as the first step in forming an 
R&D alliance. Hence, the level of alliance activity in this industry is high enough to create 
large samples.     
Second, the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
force biotechnology firms to disclose their R&D agreements with other firms. This is 
because the SEC requires a public firm to disclose any material transactions, that represent 
5 percent or more of a firm’s revenues. Because many biotechnology firms experience 
difficulties in generating substantial revenues, their strategic R&D alliances fit the 
definition of material transactions. Hence, in this industry, the alliance agreements are 
available to a greater extent and consequently it is easier to get access to the alliance  data. 
 The information in contracts is also available through private databases which compile 
and organize this information to make it more accessible to outsiders. Therefore, we 
collaborated with Deloitte Recap, LLC to secure access to data on the alliances of 
biotechnology firms. We also used the SEC Edgar database, where the alliance contacts are 
stored in their raw form. This allowed us to gain access to additional information. Our 
efforts led to the collection of scores for about 40 variables pertaining to a dataset 
comprised of approximately 400 strategic R&D alliances.    
The third factor that shaped our decision regarding the empirical setting is the high 
variation across the alliance deals in the biopharmaceutical industry. The management 
principles used in these alliances are at an advanced level and may serve trend-setter roles 
for other industries.  For example, Eli Lilly’s Office of Alliance Management was the first 
dedicated alliance function. Similarly, the mega-deal concept in the context of strategic 
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R&D alliances, i.e., $1 billion plus deals, first emerged in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
As a result of this sophisticated governance choices in this industry, it is more likely to 
observe alliances with different deal characteristics. Thus, it is relatively easier in the 
biopharmaceutical industry setting  to create a sample in which alliances vary in their 
governance modes.   
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The following three chapters (Chapters 2-4) of the dissertation seek answers to the 
questions described above. In Chapter 2, we introduce one of the main constructs of this 
dissertation - project-level governance - by developing and testing a theory about the 
governance roles of alliance representatives. We define project-level governance as a 
formal governance mechanism exercised by partner firms through the appointment of their 
representatives to project manager, alliance manager, and committee membership 
positions. By drawing upon agency theory, transaction cost economics theory and the 
literature on firms’ contract design capabilities, we identify three project-level governance 
roles for alliance representatives: contract monitoring, contract design, and adaptation to 
contractual disturbances. We then hypothesize about project-level governance’s several 
antecedents and outcomes. First, we argue that there is a positive bi-directional relationship 
between  project-level governance and contractual complexity and a negative bi-directional 
relationship between project-level governance and the occurrence of partial equity 
investments. Then, we argue that, in explaining performance, project-level governance and 
contracts complement each other, whereas project-level governance and equity substitutes 
each other (See Figure 1.2). Second, we develop hypotheses about the exogenous 
determinants of project-level governance. We focus on the effects of alliance development 
stage and the number of prior deals on project-level governance. We tested these 
hypotheses on a sample of 316 strategic R&D alliances of U.S.-based biotechnology firms. 
We find that project-level governance together with detailed contracts is a viable 
alternative to partial equity investments, and greater contractual complexity, encouraged in 
part by greater project-level governance, positively influences alliance innovation 
performance. 
Chapter 2 examines the role of project-level governance in both horizontal and vertical 
alliances. In our sample, the horizontal alliances are those between two biotechnology 
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firms and the vertical alliances are those between a biotechnology firm and a 
pharmaceutical firm. Starting in Chapter 3, we focus only on vertical alliances for two 
reasons. First, vertical alliances, in our sample, are between a startup and an incumbent, 
which leads to significant asymmetries in the risk taking behavior of the parties. As a 
result, monetary incentives tied to the successful outcomes of startup firms are extensively 
used in these alliances. Therefore, it provides us with an appropriate setting to test the 
impact of pay-for-performance schemes on the performance of both the alliances and the 
startup firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, there is a greater division of labor in vertical alliances as compared to 
horizontal alliances. This is because vertical alliances involve unilateral licensing 
agreements in which early research and development tasks are assigned to startups, and 
late-stage development and commercialization tasks are assigned to incumbents. In 
contrast, horizontal alliances involve bilateral licensing agreements in which partners 
prefer to work jointly through different stages of product development. Consequently, in 
vertical alliances, the agency problem is a more central concern that influences the choice 
of governance modes.       
Alliance 
Performance 
Contractual 
Complexity  
Project-level 
Governance 
Partial Equity 
Investments 
Figure 1. 1 The conceptual framework used in Chapter 2. 
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In Chapters 3 and 4, we aim to reveal the relationship between project-level governance 
and monetary incentives and their interactive impacts on alliance and startup performance 
(See Figure 1.3). To achieve our goal, we model an alliance between a startup and an 
incumbent as an agency relationship, in which the startup is the agent and the incumbent is 
the principal. In Chapter 3, we define performance-based monetary incentives as potential 
milestone payments offered to a startup based on a pay-for-performance scheme 
established in its contractual R&D agreement with the incumbent firm. We develop two 
competing hypotheses to shed light on the relationship between project-level governance 
and monetary incentives in the context of strategic R&D alliances. In our first hypothesis, 
by drawing upon the substitution view of classical agency theory, we propose that there 
will be less need for project-level governance when appropriate levels of monetary 
incentives are offered, and vice versa. In our second hypothesis, by drawing upon the 
complementarities view that addresses the unexpected outcomes of over-control and over-
incentivizing of agents by principals, we argue that project-level governance and monetary 
incentives will reinforce each other in the context of strategic R&D alliances. We test the 
two hypotheses by using a sample of 220 R&D alliances between global pharmaceutical 
firms and U.S.-based biotechnology startups.  
In Chapter 4, we focus on the performance impacts of  these two governance 
mechanisms. To do this, we again develop two competing hypotheses. First, by drawing 
upon the complementarities view of classical agency theory, we propose that project-level 
governance provides an effective implementation of performance-based monetary 
incentive schemes and, vice versa. Therefore, if these two control mechanisms are used 
simultaneously, it will be more likely that successfully marketable products can be 
developed in R&D alliances, thus leading to the hypothesis: project-level governance and 
monetary incentives complement each other in explaining alliance innovation performance. 
To challenge this hypothesis, we develop an alternative hypothesis by drawing upon 
behavioral agency theory (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In contrast to the 
complementarities view of classical agency theory, behavioral agency theory assumes that 
the incumbent’s controllers are biased in their evaluations of the startup firm. Thus, facing 
a diverse group of controllers can make the startup risk averse because of bearing higher 
performance risks (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). On the other hand, the higher 
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monetary incentives can also cause more risk aversion on the part of the incumbent’s 
controllers because they need to more carefully evaluate the outcomes of the startup in 
order to avoid the risk of making wrong go/no-go decisions. As a consequence of the risk 
aversion by both the alliance representatives of incumbents and the startups, the rate of 
innovation decreases. Thus, greater project-level governance, encouraged in part by higher 
monetary incentives, negatively influences alliance innovation performance, and, in turn, 
project-level governance will offset the monetary incentives’ direct positive effect on 
alliance innovation performance. We test the two alternative hypotheses on the same 
sample of the preceding chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 2 The conceptual framework used in Chapter 3 and 4. 
In Chapter 4, we also examine the impacts of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives on a startup’s abnormal stock returns following an alliance announcement. By 
drawing upon the private-to-common benefits framework of Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria 
(1998), we argue that monetary incentives have a positive and project-level governance has 
a negative impact on a startup’s abnormal stock returns. Our results provide mixed support 
for these hypotheses.  
Chapter 5 is the last chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter, we summarize the key 
findings, clarify the theoretical contributions and explain the implications for practice. 
Finally, we mention several limitations of our research and discuss possible avenues for 
future research.  
Alliance Outcomes 
 Alliance 
Performance 
Startup 
Abnormal  
Stock Returns 
Project-level 
Governance 
Monetary 
Incentives 
(Pay-for-
performance) 
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CHAPTER 2: ANTECEDENTS AND OUTCOMES OF PROJECT-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN STRATEGIC R&D ALLIANCES 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we develop and test a theory on the formal governance roles of alliance 
representatives in the context of strategic R&D alliances. We define project-level 
governance as a formal governance mechanism employed by partner firms through the 
appointment of their representatives to project manager, alliance manager, and committee 
membership positions for their strategic alliances. By drawing upon agency theory, 
transaction cost economics theory, and the literature on firms’ contract design capabilities, 
we specify three governance roles for alliance representatives: contract design, contract 
monitoring, and contractual adaptation. We then develop several hypotheses on the 
antecedents and performance consequences of project-level governance. Our tests, on a 
sample of 316 strategic R&D alliances of U.S.-based biotechnology firms, suggest that (1) 
project-level governance and contractual complexity serve as complementary governance 
mechanisms, (2) project-level governance and equity serve as substitute governance 
mechanisms, (3) the development stage, at which alliance is signed, determines the degree 
of project-level governance, and (4) greater contractual complexity, encouraged in part by 
greater project-level governance, positively influences alliance innovation performance. 
 
24                                                                                                                      2.1 Introduction 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Project managers, alliance managers, and members of joint steering/functional committees 
represent their firms in strategic R&D alliances. Because they are the main actors 
responsible for day-to-day alliance governance processes including contract design, 
contract monitoring and daily decision-making, they play key roles in mitigating the risks 
of partner opportunism and increasing the capacity of alliances to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Yet, investigations of the effects of alliance representatives on the use of 
other alliance governance mechanisms and on alliance performance remain limited in the 
strategic alliances literature. More specifically, while the literature has demonstrated the 
effects of alliance representatives on monitoring, coordination, and adaptation in alliances 
(Child, Faulkner, and Tallman, 2005; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Gerwin, 2004; Gerwin and 
Ferris, 2004; Kale and Singh, 2009; Mayer and Teece, 2008), very little attention has been 
paid to (1) the interplay between alliance representatives and global alliance governance 
mechanisms such as complex contracts and equity investments, (2) the exogenous 
antecedents that affect a firm’s decisions on the use of alliance representatives in their 
strategic R&D alliances and (3) the performance impacts of alliance representatives.  
The extant research on strategic alliances includes extensive discussion on governance 
mechanisms utilized in alliances to mitigate partner opportunism, enhance coordination 
and facilitate adaptation. The mainstream studies on alliance governance, drawing 
primarily upon transaction cost economics theory, suggest the use of equity investments to 
control partner opportunism (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Pisano, 1989; Pisano, 1990; 
Santoro and McGill, 2005), to facilitate coordination and knowledge transfer between 
firms (Faems, Janssens and Van Looy et al., 2007; Gulati, 1998; Sampson 2007) and to 
increase the capacity of partnerships to adapt to changing circumstances (Pisano, 1989; 
Gulati et al., 2005). Recently, scholars began investigating alliance contracts revealing 
their control and coordination functions (Reuer et al., 2006; Reuer and Arino, 2007). In 
addition, as contract data become more available, researchers are conducting research on 
finer-grained governance mechanisms such as license exclusivity (Somaya et al., 2011) and 
severe termination rights (Lerner and Malmandier, 2010; Robinson and Stuart, 2007).  
As an alternative to the formal governance perspective, a relational governance 
perspective has been developed. In the relational governance perspective, the role of trust 
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in mitigating partner opportunism directly, as well by interacting with formal governance 
mechanisms, has been established (Faems et. al, 2008; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Nickerson, 
2008; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Puranam and Vanneste 2009; Yadong, 2002).  
Although alliance governance scholars address a wide range of governance 
mechanisms, they pay little attention to alliance representatives, primarily due to limited 
data availability. Because data on alliance representatives is now more easily accessible, 
there are ample opportunities for advancing our knowledge of alliance governance. For 
instance, we know from the literature that complex contracts are necessary for reducing 
partner opportunism (Reuer and Arino, 2007; Yadong, 2002). Yet, can a complex contract 
itself reduce opportunism if a firm does not appoint its representatives to oversee the extent 
of fulfillment of contractual obligations by its partner?   
On the other hand, alliance governance scholars, as a consequence of extensively 
drawing on agency and transaction cost economics theories to explain alliance governance 
decisions, do not associate a contract design role with alliance representatives. This is 
because these theories posit that representatives are primarily responsible for overseeing 
alliance activities rather than providing input during the writing of alliance contracts. 
However, the theoretical work of Argyres and Mayer (2007) highlights the importance of a 
contract design role for the firms’ managers and technical personnel in interorganizational 
arrangements. In line with this view, one may expect that the representatives of strategic 
R&D alliances, typically senior managers, middle managers and technical employees of 
R&D departments in their own firms, can function as repositories of contract design 
capabilities for their firms in strategic R&D alliances. Therefore, it is necessary to improve 
our understanding of the extent to which these representatives can increase the contractual 
complexity of an alliance.  
The alliance governance literature also extensively emphasizes the role of equity 
investments in mitigating contractual hazards. In the context of strategic R&D alliances, 
equity has been viewed as a fundamental governance mechanism to reduce appropriability 
hazards, resulting from a lack of contractual specifications and monitoring (Oxley, 1997; 
Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Williamson, 1991). Yet, the presence of alliance 
representatives can increase the adaptive and monitoring capacities of an alliance. Hence, it 
is also necessary to examine whether partial ownership through minority equity 
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investments is necessary when a firm uses its alliance representatives to monitor the 
partner’s behavior and make decisions on unforeseeable contingencies ex post. 
Moreover, we know little about how project-level governance by alliance 
representatives interacts with contractual complexity and equity in explaining alliance 
performance, particularly the innovation performance of strategic R&D alliances. Given 
the key role that alliance governance design plays in determining alliance success, it is 
crucial to understand the interactive effects of these mechanisms on performance. Hence, 
we also aim to demonstrate whether these mechanisms substitute or complement each 
other in explaining alliance performance.   
Previous studies in the strategic alliances literature have also extensively investigated 
the relation between task and partner characteristics and governance choices. For example, 
studies show that the R&D stage at which the alliance is signed (Santoro and McGill, 
2005) and the history of cooperation between (Gulati, 1995) partners influence the choice 
of governance modes. Yet, we do not have enough understanding of the effects of these 
exogenous factors on the day-to-day governance exercised by representatives. Are late-
stage strategic R&D alliances associated with more intense governance by alliance 
representatives? To what extent do prior relationships affect the presence of alliance 
representatives?  
We proceed by introducing the project-level governance construct that captures the 
daily governance structure of an alliance according to the hierarchical status of alliance 
representatives. Then, by integrating agency and transaction cost theories and the literature 
on contract design capabilities, we identify three governance roles of alliance 
representatives: (1) contract design, (2) contract monitoring, and (3) contractual adaptation, 
and explain how greater project-level governance leads to the fulfillment of these roles to a 
larger extent. Following this, we propose that there is a positive reciprocal relation between 
project-level governance and contractual complexity and a negative reciprocal relation 
between project-level governance and equity. Thus, project-level governance and 
contractual complexity operate as complements and project-level governance and equity 
operate as substitutes in explaining alliance performance. Finally, we examine the effects 
of two exogenous factors on project-level governance. We argue that late-stage alliances 
require higher degrees of contract monitoring and adaptation, resulting in greater project-
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level governance; and alliances between partners with a cooperation history require less 
project-level governance, because of relatively lower needs for contract monitoring and 
adaptation. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 316 strategic R&D alliances of U.S.-
based biotechnology firms. We use a 3-Stage Least-Squares estimation method to account 
for simultaneity biases resulting from interplay between project-level governance, equity, 
and contractual complexity. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
We describe project-level governance as a formal day-to-day alliance governance 
mechanism used by partners through the appointment of their representatives to project 
manager, alliance manager, and joint committee membership roles. Different from other 
formal alliance governance mechanisms that operate at alliance and firm levels, such as 
contract and equity, project-level governance is a mechanism primarily concerned with the 
day-to-day monitoring and management of projects in alliances. Hence, we include the 
term ‘project’ in our construct label.    
Understanding when alliance partners choose more intense project-level governance in 
a partnership and the extent to which this choice influences performance requires the 
examination of the contract design, contract monitoring and contractual adaptation roles of 
project-level governance. First, project-level governance plays a key role in contract 
design. Argyres and Mayer (2007) emphasize that managers and technical staff of firms, 
together with lawyers, play crucial roles in crafting interorganizational contracts, because 
they are the primary repositories of contract design capabilities. They suggest that 
managers and technical staff play a more important role than lawyers in specifying terms 
germane to the allocation and description of roles and responsibilities and the specification 
of communication methods that will be used in alliances. Furthermore, they mention that 
managers and technical staff provide crucial input to their firms in specifying terms 
pertaining to the allocation of decision and control rights and the description of 
contingencies. Because alliance representatives are senior or middle-level managers, 
dedicated alliance managers, or R&D personnel in their firms, they constitute the key 
repositories of contracting capabilities for their own firms, capabilities that can be 
deployed when the terms of the agreements are drafted. Thus, firms can use the knowledge 
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of their alliance representatives to draft detailed terms pertaining to task descriptions and 
contingencies in their alliances. This is particularly important for the firm’s strategic R&D 
alliances in which task definitions can be ambiguous and the environment can be very 
dynamic making it costly and difficult to describe contingencies ex ante.  
Practical evidence also supports the presence of a role in contract design for alliance 
representatives. Small firms without any dedicated alliance management units use their 
founders/directors at the contract design stage. These people also represent their firms at 
the alliance implementation stage. In the case of large firms, with higher levels of alliance 
management professionalization, practical evidence reveals that both senior managers 
appointed to joint steering or functional committees and alliance managers employed in 
dedicated alliance functions are responsible for contract drafting (Bamford, Gomes-
Cassares, and Robinson, 2003). The reason is that deal-makers who are responsible for 
negotiating and structuring contracts with alliance partners lack an understanding of 
operational issues because they primarily have a legal and economic mind-set which 
prevents them from effectively articulating operational issues within contracts. As a result, 
problems may emerge in the transition from deal making to alliance management. Thus, 
the involvement of a senior manager who is a member of a joint committee or the 
involvement of an alliance manager in the deal making process can help in designing a 
contract that effectively address the operational alliance issues. Therefore, alliance 
representatives who are mainly responsible for alliance execution can also be involved in 
the contract writing process before alliances are launched.  
  Project-level governance serves as a mechanism for contract monitoring. Agency 
theory emphasizes observability and verifiability attributes of transactions which result in 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, respectively (Arrow, 1985; Holmstrom, 
1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the context of strategic R&D 
alliances, these attributes necessitate the monitoring of partner activities and verification of 
the partner’s inputs and performance, both of which are positively associated with project-
level governance. Overseeing the partner’s activities to assess the fulfillment of contractual 
obligations entails the appointment of representatives to project-level governance roles. 
Prior research has addressed the monitoring role of alliance representatives (Child, 
Faulkner, and Tallman, 2005; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Mayer and Teece, 2008)). Yet, the 
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verification role has received relatively less attention. Alliance representatives are 
necessary when alliance outcomes are evaluated and rewards distributed based on required 
performance levels. A firm can use its managers and committee members to decide on 
whether the outputs developed by its partner fulfill the performance requirements specified 
in the agreement, thereby permitting a decision regarding the rewarding of its partner. 
Without properly working project-level governance, a firm is likely to have difficulties in 
assessing the quality of the partner firm’s outputs which can result in an improperly 
functioning incentive scheme. Additionally, a firm can use project-level governance to 
assess whether its partner is deploying the necessary inputs for the alliance. Hence, project-
level governance serves as a mechanism to mitigate problems resulting from not only 
observability, but also verifiability in strategic R&D alliances. 
The extract below is from the contract of an alliance formed between a pharmaceutical 
firm and a biotechnology firm in 2008. It is possible to observe the contract monitoring 
functions of project-level governance, i.e. monitoring and verification of results, within this 
section of the contract. As stated in clause (e), the joint steering committee has the right to 
oversee the parties’ progress in the conduct of the R&D activities. Furthermore, as 
mentioned in clause (f), the committee has the right to make  go/no-go decisions on the 
licensed compounds picked by the joint research and development committee. 
  
Within twenty (20) Business Days after the Effective Date, PharmaCo 
and BiotechCo shall establish a joint steering committee (the “JSC”) to 
review, coordinate and provide overall strategic direction to their 
activities pursuant to the Research Plan and any Development Plan… 
The JSC shall be comprised of approximately three (3) senior 
executives of PharmaCo and three (3) senior executives of BiotechCo 
with appropriate levels of decision making authority… The JSC shall be 
responsible for … (e)   overseeing the joint research and development 
committee (JRDC) and the Parties’ progress in the conduct of the 
Research Program and in Research and Development activities 
hereunder…(f)     approving the nomination of Licensed Compounds 
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which have been recommended by the JRDC for advancement into 
Development. 
 
Finally, project-level governance serves as a contractual adaptation mechanism in 
strategic R&D alliances. This is because project-level governance can help partners in 
solving ex post contingencies that are not described ex ante in the contracts. In incomplete 
contracting theory, these contingencies are called indescribable contingencies (For an 
extensive review see, Tirole, 1999). Incomplete contracting theory emphasizes the bounded 
rationality of exchange partners, which leads to omitting contingencies when the costs of 
anticipating, devising optimal responses to, and drafting provisions for improbable events 
outweigh the expected gains. The extent to which the contract is incomplete determines the 
need for adaptation mechanisms presented at different levels in various types of 
governance modes in the market-hierarchy continuum. Theories of transaction cost 
economics explain how an appropriate governance mode can mitigate contractual hazards 
of transactions (Oxley, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sampson, 2004; Williamson, 
1991). Hierarchical governance modes with high levels of integration between partners are 
more appropriate if alliances involve contractual hazards on account of the considerable 
level of uncertainty which is hard to predict ex ante (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997; 
Williamson 1991). Project-level governance offers a means of handling contingencies ex 
post because of the formal decision-making and dispute resolution roles assigned to 
alliance representatives. Having voting rights enables alliance representatives to protect the 
interests of their parent firms when unexpected events increase opportunism risks. In 
addition,  as project-level governance increases, the level of bounded rationality decreases 
because alliance representatives serve as feedback instruments to help in quickly 
processing information and mobilizing resources accordingly (Kale and Singh, 2009). 
Thus, the presence of alliance representatives leads to increased adaptive capacity that can 
fine-tune the alliance to contractual disturbances that may emerge in the course of the 
relationship. 
After describing governance roles, we can also develop a ranking of the ability of 
alliance representatives in performing these roles. Project and alliance managers (PMs and 
AMs) are the most important contributors to contract design because of their familiarity 
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with operational issues. Their input can be used in the specification of terms pertaining to 
the allocation of roles and responsibilities and task descriptions. They can effectively 
assess the appropriate division of tasks and provide considerable insight into R&D and 
commercialization plans. Joint steering committee (JSC) and joint functional committee 
(JFC) members are the primary representatives who oversee alliance activities and verify 
alliance results. Particularly, JFC members conduct the primary monitoring and 
verification roles, because they are the first-line of authority responsible for these activities 
in their functional domains. Mostly, JSC members perform contract monitoring based on 
the advice of joint functional committees. Thus, JFC members have a relatively more 
important role in contract monitoring than joint steering committee members. In terms of 
adaptation to contractual disturbances, joint steering and joint functional committee 
members are equally important. Their decision-making and conflict-resolution roles enable 
partnerships to adapt to unanticipated circumstances. They typically have voting rights in 
meetings. On the other hand, PMs and AMs typically do not have voting rights. 
Furthermore, they have limited responsibilities in the verification of results. Hence, they 
are the third highest in the role of both contract monitoring and adaptation to disturbance. 
In aggregate, the members of JFCs have the highest, members of JSCs have the second 
highest, and PMs/AMs have the third highest impact on project-level governance. 
 
Table 2. 1 Alliance representatives’ rankings based on their governance roles 
Reps vs. Governance 
Roles 
Contract 
Design 
Contract 
Monitoring 
Adaptation Aggregate 
PMs & AMs Highest Third Highest Second highest Third highest 
JSC members Second highest Second Highest Highest Second Highest 
JFC members Second highest Highest Highest Highest 
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2.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Project-level governance and contractual complexity 
In general terms, contractual complexity refers to the detail of contractual clauses 
regarding the specification of partners’ roles and responsibilities, description of tasks, and 
contingency plans (Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Reuer and Arino 2007; Ryall and 
Sampson, 2009). Complex contracts require a relatively higher degree of contract 
monitoring than simple contracts. First, the higher level of formalization increases the need 
for a mechanism that will oversee the partner’s behavior. For instance, if a contractual 
provision added by one partner obliges the other to appoint a definite number of full-time 
scientists to the R&D alliance, the partner that added this clause to the contract needs to 
appoint a project manager or an alliance manager to oversee the human resource 
commitments of the other partner. Similarly, if partners develop a relatively more detailed 
development and commercialization plan at the outset, they will both require joint 
development and commercialization committee members as controllers in order to 
effectively assess whether the project proceeds as written in the plans. Hence, the more 
detailed the contract, the higher the required degree of project-level governance to ensure 
that parties fulfill the requirements.  
Second, the higher the number of contingency clauses, i.e. the clauses that specify 
which actions will be taken when describable contingencies occur, the higher the need for 
an authority to assess the contingency situation and make a decision. Hence, committee 
members also play a key role in enforcing the contingency clauses of R&D alliance 
contracts. For example, a relatively more detailed milestone payment scheme that links 
financial rewards to a higher number of milestone events will require relatively higher 
degrees of governance due to the higher needs for the evaluation of event outcomes. A 
partner must use its joint steering committee or research and development committee 
members to evaluate the claims of their partners on the performance of the developed 
solution in order to make a payment decision.  
Contractual complexity not only influences the degree of project-level governance, but 
is also influenced by it, primarily due to the contract design function of project-level 
governance. As discussed, in a strategic R&D alliance, the representatives that will be 
involved in project-level governance can provide input on task descriptions and 
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contingencies when the partners’ deal-makers draft the contract. They will be willing to 
provide this input, because it will be easier for them to govern a transaction whose rules are 
not fully imposed on them by the partners’ lawyers. Their involvement in the contract 
writing process will result in additional clauses that can address important operational 
issues. The formalization of these issues at the outset will reduce ambiguities and 
consequently increase their effectiveness in contract monitoring. 
   If the degree of project-level governance is high in an alliance, partners will have 
different types of representatives which means that a more diverse and broad sets of issues 
can be formalized in the contracts. For instance, an alliance manager may contribute to the 
inclusion of a clause related to a general alliance management issue such as the 
communication media that would be used between partners in the meetings. On the other 
hand, a member of the joint research committee can provide his insight on which activities 
should be included in the research plan of the project. Hence, an alliance that has a high 
degree of project-level governance is likely to have a more detailed contract. 
  
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, as contractual complexity increases, the 
degree of project-level governance increases in the context of strategic 
R&D alliances. 
    
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, as the degree of project-level 
governance increases, contractual complexity increases in the context of 
strategic R&D alliances. 
    
Performance effects of project-level governance and contractual complexity 
We propose that project-level governance and contractual complexity complement each 
other in enhancing the performance of a strategic R&D alliance. This is because project-
level governance provides for the effective implementation of complex contracts, and vice 
versa. Detailed contractual clauses are hardly effective if a firm does not have the ability to 
monitor the activities of its partner. In addition, project-level governance ex ante provides 
the necessary knowledge to draft a more effective contract that better specifies the roles 
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and responsibilities, tasks, and contingency plans. Therefore, project-level governance 
increases the effectiveness of contractual complexity in enhancing performance.  
Likewise, contractual complexity leverages the effects of project-level governance on 
performance. Complex contracts more effectively describe the responsibilities and limits of 
alliance representatives’ authority (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). In other words, complex 
contracts facilitate the establishment of a clear legal framework that resolves ambiguities 
regarding the allocation of decision-making authority and division of labor. Without 
clauses that clearly describe the responsibilities of alliance representatives, the tasks under 
their control, and contingency plans that will be used when unforeseen circumstances 
emerge, alliance representatives will contribute less to the innovation performance of an 
alliance. Therefore,  
  
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, project-level governance and 
contractual complexity complement each other in explaining alliance 
innovation performance in the context of strategic R&D alliances. 
 
Project-level governance and equity  
Project-level governance and equity are likely to operate as substitute governance 
mechanisms, because both mechanisms serve as means for adapting alliances to changing 
circumstances and controlling partner opportunism. Strategic R&D alliances operate in 
dynamic and turbulent environments. Maneuvers of competitors, changes in customer 
demands, and alterations to regulations influence product requirements, leading to changes 
in the benefits and payoffs that alliance partners expect from their partnership. In such 
environments, the ability to adapt plays a key role in the continuation of the partnership. 
The adaptation problem emerges from the difficulty of predicting contingencies ex ante; a 
problem that worsens if partners do not develop mechanisms to handle it. This is because 
the indescribable contingencies make partners vulnerable to each other’s opportunistic 
behavior. The strategic alliances literature suggests the use of equity investments to 
increase the adaptive capacity of the partnership (Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; 
Pisano, 1989)).  Equity aligns the incentives of partners by providing residual rights of 
control to the partner that makes the equity investment (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The 
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residual rights of control enable the partner to claim rights over the issues not described in 
the contract. As a result, the negative effects of unexpected contingencies can be mitigated 
without any contract renegotiation.  
Project-level governance also serves as a key adaptation mechanism. This is because 
partner firms delegate decision-making and conflict resolution tasks to their alliance 
representatives so that alliance representatives can develop solutions ex post for the issues 
not described in the contract. Particularly, senior managers appointed as committee 
members of joint steering and joint functional committees can adapt the alliance to 
changing circumstances by making decisions on unexpected and conflicting issues through 
use of their voting rights. Therefore, greater project-level governance can substitute for the 
adaptive capacity provided by the equity investments.     
Equity’s role in mitigating partner opportunism risks has been pointed out in the 
strategic alliances literature (Pisano, 1989; Pisano, 1990; Santoro and McGill, 2005). 
Equity reduces partner opportunism risks through incentive alignment because a partner 
with equity investment will cause economic disadvantages to itself if it acts 
opportunistically to its partner. Furthermore, prior research has reported that the equity 
holding partner is often granted a seat on the target’s board which increases the degree of 
joint governance at the board of the target partner (Allen & Phillips, 2000; Mjoen & 
Tallman, 1997; Pisano, 1989; Robinson & Stuart, 2007; Yan & Gray, 1994). Through 
representation on its partner’s board, the partner with the equity investment can influence 
the behavior of its partner and, in turn, the overall progress of the partnership. 
Project-level governance’s contract monitoring role represents the control function of 
alliance representatives to mitigate partner opportunism risks. As the degree-of project 
level governance increases, a firm is, to a higher extent, able to deter its alliance partner 
from opportunistic behavior and control whether its partner breaches the conditions of the 
agreement. Therefore, if a firm is able to monitor its partner through its alliance 
representatives, there will be less need for equity investments. Similarly, if equity is used, 
there will less need for alliance representatives.   
Hypothesis 4: All else being equal, as the degree of project-level 
governance increases, the alliance will be less likely to be an equity 
alliance in the context of strategic R&D alliances. 
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Hypothesis 5: All else being equal, the presence of equity will be negatively 
related to the degree of project-level governance in the context of strategic 
R&D alliances. 
 
Performance effects of project-level governance and equity 
We define the performance of an alliance as the extent to which development efforts lead 
to marketable products. Therefore, we do not include the costs of governance in our 
definition of performance. Thus, although both equity and governance mechanisms are 
likely to enhance alliance innovation performance, when they are used in isolation, they 
will substitute each other in explaining alliance performance. As discussed above, partners 
will opt for either a high project-level governance with no equity investment governance 
structure or a low project-level governance with equity investment governance structure, 
because of the similarities between the functions of two governance mechanisms in 
improving control and adaptation. This will lead to the governance choice with minimum 
governance costs. Nevertheless, either decision will not allow partners to gain the benefits 
of one of the two governance mechanisms. Hence, while the use of only one of these 
governance mechanisms minimizes the costs of governance, it negatively affects the 
innovation performance of a strategic R&D alliance. Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 6: All else being equal, project-level governance and equity 
substitute each other in explaining alliance innovation performance in the 
context of strategic R&D alliances. 
 
Stage at signing and prior relationships as exogenous antecedents 
Exogenous factors that influence governance decisions are the prevailing conditions in 
which deal-makers of partner firms must operate when they design the governance 
structures of their alliances. These are the factors that are external to the system, i.e., not 
determined by one of the variables in the system. The development stage at which alliance 
is signed is one of these factors. Prior research has found that the stage at signing 
influences the governance choices in strategic R&D alliances (Santoro and McGill, 2005). 
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Early-stage alliances face less severe observability and verifiability problems. Partners 
typically explore alternative solutions at this stage to resolve technical uncertainties. Thus, 
the required degree of monitoring, due to higher experimentation and creative problem-
solving needs, is relatively lower for early-stage projects than late-stage projects. 
Furthermore, it is generally too early to assess the ultimate market performance of outputs. 
Therefore, the need for contract monitoring is lower. Additionally, because the solution is 
not developed enough to be commercialized in the market, the need for adaptation to 
changing market circumstances is lower.  
On the other hand, late-stage alliances involve high levels of technical and market 
uncertainties. Furthermore, the level of behavioral uncertainty also increases, as a solution 
gets close to the market. Hence, the likelihood of opportunistic behavior increases, which 
in turn, increases the required degree of monitoring. Furthermore, the need for a more 
detailed evaluation of project outcomes becomes higher. The input of downstream 
specialists, such as marketers and manufacturing engineers, is necessary to assess the 
marketing and manufacturing costs of a solution. As a result of the increased contract 
monitroing needs, in terms of verifying the quality of developed solutions, joint 
commercialization and manufacturing committees will be formed in addition to joint 
research and development committees. Moreover, adaptation needs will be higher at later 
stages due to increased behavioral uncertainties. Therefore, we expect that the degree of 
project-level governance will be relatively higher for late-stage projects than early-stage 
projects. 
 
Hypothesis 7: All else being equal, late-stage alliances are likely to have 
greater project-level governance than early-stage alliances in the context 
of strategic R&D alliances. 
 
Previous research on strategic alliances suggests that partners with prior relationships 
experience opportunism risks to a lesser degree. For instance, Parkhe (1993) finds that the 
history of cooperation reduces the level of perception of opportunistic behavior. Moreover, 
the literature suggests that partners with prior relationships will develop trust that decreases 
the need for safeguarding mechanisms such as equity investments (Gulati, 1995). Thus, 
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there is a negative association between prior relationships and the need for formal 
governance due to the relatively lower risks of opportunism. In line with these findings, we 
expect that the degree of project-level governance will be lower for alliances between 
partners that have a cooperation history because of the reduced need for monitoring. In 
addition, we argue that the adaptation role of project-level governance will be less salient, 
because prior relationships lead to the development of informal adaptation mechanisms 
such as trust, justice, and fairness that can substitute for formal governance through 
alliance representatives. However, first-time partners are more likely to rely on project-
level governance as a control and adaptation mechanism. Therefore, 
   
Hypothesis 8: All else being equal, as the number of prior relationships 
increases, the degree of project-level governance decreases in the context 
of strategic R&D alliances. 
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2.4 METHOD 
The empirical setting of this study was the US biotechnology industry. The U.S. 
biotechnology industry offered an attractive setting to conduct our study. First, the 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) force 
biotechnology firms to disclose their R&D agreements with other firms. This is because 
the SEC requires a public firm to disclose all material transactions, representing 5 percent 
or more of a firm’s revenues. Because many biotechnology firms experience difficulties in 
generating substantial revenues, their strategic R&D alliances fit the definition of material 
transactions. Hence, deal information is widely available as compared to other high-tech 
industries, making the biotechnology industry an ideal setting for our study. Second, the 
professionalization of alliance management in the biotechnology industry has created 
diversity in the degree of project-level governance. Hence, alliances with both low and 
high degrees of project-level governance are observable in the industry. 
We primarily used the Deloitte’s Recap and SEC Edgar databases for data collection. 
We used the Recap database to create our sample. Recap’s specialization in the 
biotechnology industry and it is superiority in covering alliances has been recognized in the 
literature (Schilling, 2009). Specifically, we received deal data including, presence of 
equity, stage at signing, the number of prior deals, nationality of partners, therapeutic 
scope, alliance type, i.e. bio-bio or bio-pharma, and alliance formation year from Recap. 
We checked the accuracy of information by analyzing annual reports and press releases of 
the biotechnology firms whose alliances were included in our sample. We used the SEC 
Edgar database to conduct an in-depth analysis of contracts. We gathered data on project-
level governance by downloading alliance contracts. We analyzed the ‘Alliance 
Governance’ sections of these contracts and codified all necessary information for our 
study.  
Sample 
We used several criteria for sampling. First, we included only dyadic alliances. Alliances 
with multiple partners were excluded from our sample. Second, our sample consisted of 
only U.S.-based biotechnology firms. Yet, the pharmaceutical firms in the sample were 
from the U.S., Europe and Japan. Third, we picked the period 1996-2008. Fourth, only 
contractual alliances and minority investment alliances were in the sample because project-
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level governance, as we described in this paper, does not take place in equity joint 
ventures. The creation of a new entity in joint ventures typically leads to a department-
based structure in which committee membership, alliance management, and project 
management roles are barely observed. In addition, if any of these roles exist, it is not 
possible to gather data on them through the analysis of contracts. Finally, we pick alliances 
with relatively higher levels of technical difficulties and market potential. We analyzed 
medical journals, specialized in clinical trials, to avoid including trivial development 
alliances. As a result, we picked alliances targeting areas with relatively low drug approval 
rates, including oncology, central nervous system, cardiovascular, endocrinological and 
metabolic, hematologic, autoimmune/ inflammatory and psychiatry. Based on these 
criteria, we randomly picked 316 dyadic R&D alliances.   
Model specification 
To account for endogeneity, we used the simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) approach 
(Wooldridge, 2002). SEM requires the identification of equations for each endogenous 
variable. Given that project-level governance, contractual complexity, equity and alliance 
innovation performance are endogenous variables in the model, we identified four 
equations: (1) the project-level governance equation, (2) the contractual complexity 
equation, (3) the equity equation, and (4) the alliance innovation performance equation. 
The right-hand side of each equation consists of endogenous independent variables, 
exogenous independent variables used only in a single equation, exogenous independent 
variables used in more than one equation, and an error term.  
As we discussed in the hypotheses development section, the project-level governance 
equation involves contractual complexity, equity, stage at signing and prior deals. In 
addition, we control for the effects of partner type (i.e. a vertical R&D alliance between a 
biotechnology firm and a pharmaceutical firm or a horizontal R&D alliance between two 
biotechnology firms) on the required degree of project-level governance. Vertical R&D 
alliances involve unilateral licensing agreements. In contrast, horizontal R&D alliances 
involve bi-lateral (i.e. cross-licensing) agreements. We expect that bi-lateral licensing 
reduces the need for project-level governance, because the presence of a bi-lateral license 
safeguards against partner opportunism. Furthermore, in horizontal alliances, because 
partners bring similar resources and skills to the alliance, they pursue a pooling strategy 
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that consists of sharing similar resources. On the other hand, vertical alliances are typically 
characterized by skill and resource contributions that differ between partners. Although 
these differences create complementarities and increase the chances of innovation, they 
may also lead to inter-firm conflicts and partner opportunism. Therefore, it is more likely 
that vertical alliances will have greater project-level governance than horizontal alliances.  
The contractual complexity equation involves project-level governance as an 
endogenous variable. In addition, we include equity as the second endogenous variable. 
Robinson and Stuart (2007) found that equity ownership and contractual complexity act as 
complements in the setting of early stage biotech R&D alliances. They argue that the 
partner holding the equity investment has the desire to include clauses that describe in 
detail the circumstances under which equity-based control can be exercised. Hence, the 
presence of equity increases contractual complexity. On the other hand, Reuer and Arino 
(2007) controlled for the effect of equity on contractual complexity in their model 
explaining the factors affecting the complexity of contracts and found some mixed results. 
They demonstrated that equity has a positive effect on contractual complexity, when 
contractual complexity is measured at an aggregate level, however, equity substitutes for 
some enforcement and coordination clauses. In line with these studies, we add equity to the 
contractual complexity equation. 
In addition, alliance formation year, therapeutic scope, prior deals, and partner type are 
included in the contractual complexity equation to control for their effects on contractual 
complexity. The formation year reflects the extent to which industry-level contracting 
capabilities evolve over time. From the beginning of the second half of the 1990s, strategic 
R&D alliances became an important organizational mode to conduct R&D in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. Until now, the trend has continued. We 
expect that various industry participants, including firm founders, senior managers, alliance 
managers and lawyers, learned to write more detailed contracts because their accumulated 
experience helped them in identifying contingencies more effectively. Therefore, we 
control for the effects of learning on contractual complexity by proposing that alliances 
signed more recently will have higher complexity than alliances signed in the late 1990s.  
We also control for the therapeutic scope of the alliance. Broad scope alliances involve 
multiple therapeutic areas, leading to the need for more detailed task descriptions and 
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contingency plans. Therefore, contractual complexity is positively related to the scope of 
the alliance in terms of the number of therapeutic areas. Previous research demonstrated 
that prior relationships allow contracts to be specified in greater detail due to learning 
effects (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Vanneste and Puranam 2010). Hence, we control for 
prior deals in the contractual complexity equation. Finally, partner type is included to 
control for its effect on contractual complexity. As mentioned, vertical alliances may 
require higher levels of control than horizontal alliances, because of higher opportunism 
risks. Therefore, if a biotechnology firm partners with a pharmaceutical firm, it will draft a 
more detailed contract to avoid any risks resulting from the opportunism of the 
pharmaceutical firm. 
The equity equation involves project-level governance, as discussed in the hypothesis 
development section, and contractual complexity, as discussed above. Prior research has 
examined the effect of technical uncertainty on the choice of alliance governance modes, 
i.e., equity vs. non-equity alliances (Gulati and Singh 1998; Santoro and McGill 2005). 
Hence, we include alliance formation stage as a proxy for technical uncertainty.. 
Following, the literature on international alliances (Beamish and Lupton, 2009; Brouthers, 
2002; Gulati, 1995), we add the presence of a cross-border partnership to our model to 
account for the effect of nationality differences on the governance choice. We also add the 
number of prior deals to the equation in line with the prior literature that demonstrated a 
negative association between the number of prior deals between partners and the use of 
hierarchical governance structures (Gulati, 1995).  We also include partner type to control 
for the influence of partner type in terms of the required degree of incentive alignment. 
Following our prior arguments, we contend that vertical alliances are riskier than 
horizontal alliances in terms of partner opportunism, and therefore, horizontal alliances are 
less likely to have equity investments as compared to vertical alliances. 
Finally, we specify an equation for alliance innovation performance which refers to the 
extent to which the alliance attained successful development outcomes. Following our 
hypotheses, this equation involves project-level governance, equity, and contractual 
complexity. In addition, we control for the effects of stage at signing, the number of prior 
relationships, and the nationality of partners on alliance innovation performance.  
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As a result, the following four equations were specified to test our hypotheses 
associated with the antecedents and outcomes of project-level governance in the context of 
strategic R&D alliances.     
 
project-level governance  = α10 + γ12  contractual complexity + γ13  equity +β11 stage at 
signing  +  β12 prior deals + β13 partner type + ε1                                                                                      (1) 
contractual complexity  = α20 + γ21  project-level governance + γ23  equity + β21 alliance  
formation year + β22 therapeutic scope +  β23 prior deals + β24 partner type + ε2        (2)                   
equity = α30 + γ31  project-level governance + γ32  contractual complexity+ β31 stage at 
signing+ β32 cross-border+ β33 prior deals + β34 partner type+ ε3                               (3) 
alliance innovation performance  = α40 + γ41  project-level governance + γ42  
contractual complexity+ γ43  equity + β41 stage at signing+ β42 cross-border+ β43 prior 
deals + ε4                                 (4) 
Measures 
Main dependent variable   
Alliance Innovation Performance 
Alliance innovation performance represents the extent of success of the pre-
commercialization activities of the partners.  It was operationalized as an ordinal variable 
with scores 0, 1, and 2, corresponding to low, moderate, and high success scores, 
respectively. We assigned the highest score, 2, to alliances during which partners were 
successful in developing a drug that received an approval from either the Federal Drug 
Agency (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency (EMA). We assigned a score of 1 to 
alliances during which partners were still not successful by January 2011 in developing a 
drug that received approval from either the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) or the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), but the partners had not terminated the alliance for any reason; 
or the incumbent partner licensed the compound developed during the partnership, yet 
decided not to ally with the startup for further development. Finally, the score 0 was 
assigned to alliances terminated without any successful drug approvals or licensing by 
incumbents. 
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Endogenous variables 
Project-level governance 
This variable captures whether senior and middle-level managers of the partner firms were 
appointed to committee membership, alliance management and project management roles. 
As mentioned, we obtained scores for this variable by reading the ‘alliance governance’ 
sections of agreements. These sections describe in detail which joint committees should be 
formed and whether liaison personnel, such as project and alliance managers, should be 
appointed.  
Based on our reasoning in the theory section, we assigned weights to formal alliance 
representative roles. We also included joint finance and patent committees in our measure, 
because these committees occasionally appear in alliances. However, they are peripheral 
committees that support other committees in decision-making. They have the lowest 
governance ranking among all the roles. Hence, we call them peripheral committees.  In 
line with measurements used in prior studies, a weight was assigned to each of these 
dimensions based on their governance complexities (Kumar and Seth, 1998). A rank of 1 
was assigned to ‘peripheral joint functional committees’, 2 to ‘project and alliance 
managers’, 3 to ‘joint steering committees’, and 4 to ‘joint functional committees’.  Then 
the sum of the scores of each dimension was divided by 24, the maximum score1 
attainable. 
Contractual complexity 
This variable captures the extent of contractual detail pertaining to the specification of 
roles and responsibilities, monitoring and non-compliance penalties, processes for dispute 
resolution and termination clauses. There are alternative ways of measuring contractual 
complexity. Until recently, the scale developed by MacNeil (1978) was commonly used in 
the contracting literature to measure contractual complexity. This scale counts the 
appearances of specific clauses in the contract. The biotechnology alliance contracts 
written in the US, however, typically include most, if not all of the sections specified in the 
scale. Therefore, we encountered difficulties in measuring the differences among contracts 
by using this scale. Previous studies that used this measure investigated contracts which are 
                                                     
1 Twenty-four is the maximum score obtained when governance consists of a joint 
peripheral committee, project managers, alliance managers, a steering committee, and joint 
research, development, commercialization, and manufacturing committees.  
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either written for the relationships that can be described as arm’s length contractual 
relationships, rather than strategic alliances (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007), or as 
alliances between partners not operating in the biotechnology or pharmaceutical industries 
(Mellewigt et al., 2007; Reuer & Arino, 2007), or as alliances between partners outside the 
US, where regulations demand relatively less standardization regarding the inclusion of 
specific clauses (Reuer & Arino, 2007). Hence, by using this scale, those studies found 
enough variance for contractual complexity among contracts. This was not, however, the 
case for the contracts in our sample. Therefore, in line with some other studies in the 
literature, we measured contractual complexity as the number of pages in the 
contract,(Joskow, 1988). Although we employ a rather coarse measure, it was a viable 
option for measuring the contractual complexity of alliances in our sample. 
Equity  
Equity is a binary value that takes the value of 1 for equity alliances (i.e. minority equity 
alliances in our cases) and 0 for non-equity, contractual alliances.  
Exogenous variables 
Stage at signing. We included 9 dummy variables that represent the stages of 
biotechnology drug development: formulation, discovery, lead molecule, pre-clinical, 
phase I, phase II, phase III, BLA/NDA filed, and approved. We picked phase III as the 
base category. 
Therapeutic Scope. The Recap database provides information on the therapeutic areas that 
will be covered by the alliance. Some alliances relate to a single therapeutic area. On the 
other hand, some alliances cover multiple therapeutic areas. We categorized the former 
alliances as narrow scope projects and the latter ones as broad scope projects. We used a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the alliance scope is broad and 0 if the alliance scope is 
narrow.  
Partner type. Because our sample consists of alliances between either two biotech firms or 
a biotech and a pharmaceutical firm, we used a dummy variable which equals 0 if the 
partnership is between a biotech and a pharmaceutical firm (i.e. vertical), and 1 if the 
partnership is between two biotech firms (i.e. horizontal).  
Prior deals. We measured the number of prior relationships between partners by counting 
the number of alliance agreements between partners.   
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Cross-border. Using the Recap database, we identified the nationality of partners. We used 
a dummy variable which equals 0 if the partnership is between partners in the same locality 
and 1 otherwise. 
Alliance formation year. We included 13 dummy variables for each year in our model. We 
used the ending year 2008 as the base category. 
Methods 
To control for endogeneity, we solve the equations by a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regression. To ease the interpretation of results, when regressing the alliance innovation 
performance over the independent variables in the alliance innovation performance 
equation, we estimate a linear probability model instead of probit and logit models. 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests the use of linear probability models in complex models with 
discrete response variables to ease interpretations because they provide good estimates of 
the partial effects of independent variables on the response probability, at average values 
for the independent variables. Hence, the size and significance of the effect, derived by 
solving a linear probability model, will be close to those derived by solving a probit or 
logit model, at average values for the independent variables. Because solving simultaneous 
equations by 3SLS is not a trivial approach in itself, we decide to pursue the linear 
probability model heuristic. 
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2.5 RESULTS 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, respectively. 
The results of 3SLS estimation are summarized in Table 2.4. Hypotheses 1 and 2 examine 
the complementarities between project-level governance and contractual complexity. As 
predicted, the coefficient for contractual complexity is positive and statistically significant 
in the project-level governance equation (p < .10) and the coefficient for project-level 
governance is positive and statistically significant in the contractual complexity equation (p 
< .01). These results support our reasoning that there is a positive reciprocal relation 
between project-level governance and contractual complexity. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 
and 2 are supported. 
  
Table 2. 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Alliance innovation performance .58 .72 .00 2.00 
Project-level governance .34 .18 .1250 .9167 
Contractual complexity 72.78 33.91 11 197 
Equity .37 .48 0 1 
Formulation .07 .26 0 1 
Discovery .33 .47 0 1 
Lead molecule .09 .29 0 1 
Pre-clinical .15 .36 0 1 
Phase I .08 .27 0 1 
Phase II .11 .32 0 1 
Phase III .12 .33 0 1 
BLA/NDA filed .02 .14 0 1 
Approved .02 .13 0 1 
Therapeutic scope .61 .49 0 1 
Crossborder  .50 .50 0 1 
Prior deals .27 .70 0 5 
Partner type .27 .45 0 1 
48                                                                                                                                2.5 Results 
 
Table 2. 3 Pearson correlations 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 propose that equity and project-level governance serve as substitute 
governance mechanisms. As predicted in this hypothesis, the coefficient for equity in the 
project-level governance equation is negative and statistically significant (p < .001), and 
the coefficient for project-level governance is negative and statistically significant in the 
equity equation (p < .001). Hence, these findings suggest a substitution relationship 
between project-level governance and equity, thereby providing support for Hypotheses 3 
and 4. 
The examination of the effect sizes provides important insights into the impact of each 
governance mechanism on each other. For instance, the formation of a joint development 
and commercialization committee will increase project-level governance by 0.33 units, 
thereby increasing the contractual complexity by around 34 pages, which is slightly larger 
than 1 standard deviation of contractual complexity. On the other hand, the effect of size of 
contractual complexity in the project-level governance equation is rather small. Regarding 
the relationship between project-level governance and equity, the formation of two joint 
functional committees will decrease the chances of equity investments by 0.85 percentage 
points. Likewise, the presence of equity will reduce project-level governance by 0.29 units, 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Alliance innovation performance 1        
2.Project-level governance .063 1       
3. Contractual complexity .011 .363** 1      
4. Equity -.073 -.038 .084 1     
5. Therapeutic scope -.061 .006 .093 .021 1    
6. Crossborder deal .128* .104 .115* -.136* -.008 1   
7. Prior deals .073 .101 .089 -.022 .004 -.029 1  
8. Partner type -.105 -.069 -.120* .028 .018 -.317** -.090 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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which is close to the score when two joint functional committees are not formed or an 
alliance manager, a steering committee and a peripheral committee are not utilized. 
Hypotheses 3 and 6 relate to the performance impacts of alliance governance 
mechanisms. Hypothesis 3 states that project-level governance and contractual complexity 
complement each other and Hypothesis 6 states that project-level governance and equity 
substitute each other in explaining alliance innovation performance. As can be seen in 
Table 2.5, only the coefficient for contractual complexity is significant and positive in the 
alliance innovation performance equation (p < .05). Both coefficients for project-level 
governance and equity are insignificant. Therefore, only greater contractual complexity, 
encouraged in part by greater project-level governance, positively influences alliance 
innovation performance. One-unit increase in contractual complexity increases the 
probability of success by 0.015 in a 0 to 2 scale. Converting this scale to a 0-100 scale 
results in an effect size of 0.75 percentage points. Hence, the formation of two joint 
committees, for instance, increases the contractual complexity by 34 units which in turn 
increases the probability of success by 34*0.75 = 25.5 percentage points. 
Hypothesis 7 proposes that alliances formed at late development stages have relatively 
greater project-level governance than those alliances formed at an early stage. As shown in 
the project-level governance equation, the coefficients for Discovery, Formulation, Lead 
Molecule and Preclinical stages are negative and statistically significant (p < .01) thereby 
supporting Hypothesis 7.  Finally, Hypothesis 8 posits a negative relationship between 
prior deals and project-level governance. The regression results show that the coefficient 
for prior deals in the project-level governance equation is positive and not statistically 
significant. Hence, prior relations do not appear to substitute for the governance functions 
of alliance representatives. Thus, Hypothesis 8 is not supported. 
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Table 2. 4 Estimation results for the relationships among the governance mechanisms 
 
 
 
Project-level 
Governance 
Equation 
Contractual 
Complexity Equation 
Equity  
Equation 
Endogenous variables    
Project-level 
governance 
- 103.07** 
(40.543) 
-2.577*** 
(0.543) 
Contractual 
Complexity 
0.002+ 
(0.001) 
- 0.035 
(0.004) 
Equity -0.293*** 
(0.068) 
11.366 
(17.891) 
- 
Equation(s)-specific 
exogenous variables 
   
Formulation -0.161** 
(0.053) 
- -0.503** 
 (0.153) 
Discovery -0.087** 
(0.032) 
- -0.298** 
(0.107) 
Lead molecule -0.137** 
 (0.045) 
- -0.451** 
(0.143) 
Preclinical  -0.113** 
 (0.039) 
- -0.360** 
 (0.114) 
Phase I -0.060 
 (0.042) 
- -0.131 
(0.144) 
Phase II -0.020 
 (0.034) 
- -0.166 
(0.132) 
BLA/NDA filed -0.127+ 
 (0.067) 
- -0.457+ 
 (0.239) 
Approved 0.117+ 
(0.070) 
- -0.485+ 
 (0.259) 
1996 - -4.366 
(12.005) 
- 
1997 - -23.696+ 
(14.529) 
- 
1998 - -8.616 
 (13.311) 
- 
1999 - -11.034 
(11.729) 
- 
2000 - -15.246+ 
(9.030) 
- 
2001 - -19.145* 
(12.198) 
- 
2002 - -8.415 
(13.311) 
- 
2003 - -9.173 
(7.459) 
- 
2004 - -9.799 
(7.536) 
- 
2005 - -6.544 
(4.881) 
- 
2006 - -4.199 
(5.544) 
- 
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In addition, several exogenous variables showed significant relationships with 
governance mechanisms and alliance innovation performance. The contracts of alliances 
that were written before 2001 are more likely to be shorter than the alliance contracts 
written in 2008. Broad scope alliances that involve multiple therapeutic areas are more 
likely to have longer contracts than narrow scope alliances involving only a single 
therapeutic area. Firms are less likely to use partial equity investments as safeguarding 
mechanisms in their early stage alliances compared to late stage alliances signed at Phase 
III testing. Finally, our results show that the stage at signing is a determinant of alliance 
innovation performance. Late stage alliances, i.e. Phase III, are more likely to be successful 
in new product development than early stage alliances.  
 
2007 - -2.976 
(4.778) 
- 
Therapeutic scope - 4.133+ 
(2.500) 
- 
Cross-border - - -0.050 
 (0.050) 
Common exogenous 
variables 
   
Prior deals 0.012 
(0.015) 
0.757 
(2.665) 
0.037 
 (0.045) 
Partner type 0.007 
(0.024) 
-5.154 
(3.983) 
-0.015 
 (0.074) 
Constant 0.372** 
(0.124) 
41.340* 
(16.362) 
1.289*** 
(0.272) 
N 
χ 
316 
64.49 
316 
53.35 
316 
36.52 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
+ indicates p < 0.1, two tailed, 
* indicates p < 0.05, two tailed, 
** indicates p < 0.01, two tailed, 
*** indicates p < 0.001, two tailed. 
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Table 2. 5 Governance mechanisms and performance 
Variables Alliance Innovation Performance 
Project-level governance -1.01    
 (1.17) 
Contractual complexity 0.015*  
 (0.01) 
Equity -0.41  
 (0.46) 
Formulation -0.07    
 (0.29) 
Discovery -0.35+    
 (0.18) 
Lead molecule -0.17    
 (0.26) 
Preclinical -0.21    
 (0.22) 
Phase I -0.12    
 (0.21) 
Phase II -0.32+    
 (0.18) 
BLA/NDA filed 0.44  
 (0.36) 
Approved 0.72+     
 (0.39) 
Prior deals 0.04   
 (0.07) 
Crossborder 0.06    
 (0.10) 
Constant .13     
 (0.66) 
N 
Χ 
Prob > χ2 
316 
41.38 
0.0001 
+ indicates p < 0.1, two tailed, 
* indicates p < 0.05, two tailed, 
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2.6 DISCUSSION 
In this study, we introduced the project-level governance construct and explained its 
effects on alliance governance and alliance innovation performance. We described the 
degree to which project managers, alliance managers and joint committee members are 
responsible for contract monitoring, contract design and adapting their alliances to 
changing circumstances. As a result, we provided the reader with a theory of how alliance 
representatives serve as governance agents for their firms. Based on our theory, we tested a 
model for the antecedents and outcomes of project-level governance. We found that 
project-level governance and contractual complexity serve as complementary governance 
mechanisms while project-level governance and equity serve as substitute governance 
mechanisms. Moreover, we showed that greater contractual complexity, encouraged in part 
by greater project-level governance, positively influences the chances of successful product 
development in strategic R&D alliances. Finally, we found that late-stage alliances are 
more likely to have high degrees of project-level governance compared to early-stage 
alliances.  
By focusing on alliance representatives, we extended prior research on alliance 
governance mechanisms which has focused extensively on equity, contracts and informal 
governance mechanisms until now. We illustrated the interplay between these mechanisms 
and project-level governance and thus, highlighted the importance of alliance 
representatives in governance. We also advanced alliance research by uncovering 
exogenous factors that determine the need for alliance representatives. Moreover, we 
introduced a novel construct and develop a scale to measure it. This empirical contribution 
opens up new research avenues for scholars studying governance of alliances.  
Our findings have important implications for the governance of strategic R&D 
alliances. We contribute to the literature on alliance governance by showing that alliance 
representatives play a key role in designing contracts. Theories of transaction cost 
economics have emphasized the monitoring role of alliance representatives (Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt 1986; Barthélemy and Quélin 2006; Williamson, 1991). Consistent with 
this view, we showed that complex contracts require greater monitoring and in turn greater 
project-level governance. Yet, in addition to contract monitoring, alliance representatives 
are likely to increase the contractual complexity of alliances because of their contract 
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design roles. In line with the organizational learning view that alliance representative’s 
expertise, knowledge and status in their firms make them important sources of knowledge 
in contract design (Argyres and Mayer, 2007), our findings show that these representatives 
play key roles in the contract design processes in inter-organizational relationships. We 
explain why alliance representatives should be involved in the design of alliance contracts 
by arguing that their involvement facilitates the description of their roles, responsibilities, 
the boundaries of their authority, and the specification of tasks and unexpected 
contingencies, thereby resulting in the avoidance of operational problems. 
Interestingly, our findings reveal that while greater contractual complexity, encouraged 
in part by greater project-level governance, positively influences alliance innovation 
performance; greater project-level governance, encouraged in part by greater contractual 
complexity, has no significant effect on alliance innovation performance. This result is 
important because it suggests that the contract design role of alliance representatives is 
relatively more important than the contract monitoring role of alliance representatives in 
explaining performance. In contrast to the predictions of the transaction cost view, that 
explain performance outcomes by safeguarding against partner opportunism, the 
predictions of the learning-based theories applied in the context of inter-organizational 
contracting literature (Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; 
Mayer and Argyres, 2004), explain better why some alliances are more successful in 
developing new products and sustaining healthy relationships.   
Contrary to the focus in previous research on equity vs. contractual governance 
choices, we focus on micro-level governance mechanisms used for monitoring, 
coordination, and adaptation. Oxley (1997) emphasized the necessity and, at the same time, 
difficulty of collecting and analyzing micro-level data. We exploited micro-level data 
availability to advance the current literature by developing a finer-grained understanding of 
alliance governance mechanisms. In turn, we were able to reveal the interplay between 
macro-level governance mechanisms, such as partial equity investments, and micro-level 
governance mechanisms, such as project-level governance. Our findings show that partial 
equity investments and project-level governance substitute each other in the context of 
strategic alliances. This and our findings on the complementarities between project-level 
governance and contractual complexity provide important insights into the two distinct 
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global governance mechanisms adopted by firms in their strategic R&D alliances: (1) 
complex contracts with high degrees of project level-governance and (2) partial equity 
investments with low degrees of project-level governance and less contractual complexity. 
Apparently, to managers, these two distinct governance mechanisms offer two alternative 
ways of governing strategic R&D alliances. However, our findings demonstrate that equity 
and project-level governance have no significant effect on alliance innovation 
performance. Therefore, the managers who choose the first governance option are likely to 
experience higher performance than the managers who choose the second governance 
option.   
Our finding that links the alliance formation stage to the degree of project-level 
governance contributes to the emerging literature on the organization of inter-firm product 
development teams (Carson, 2007; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Staudenmayer, Tripsas, and 
Tucci, 2005) and the literature on organizing teams for the pursuit of exploitation and 
exploration (Jansen et al., 2009; Tiwana 2008). Consistent with these literatures, we 
showed that formal monitoring by alliance representatives is less necessary under 
circumstances which require more creative problem-solving and exploration. On the other 
hand, late-stage deals, characterized by exploitation, are more likely to necessitate the use 
of hierarchical control mechanisms at the project-level to mitigate risks of partner 
opportunism and effectively verify the efforts and outcomes of the partners.  
The results regarding no significant effects of prior relationships on project-level 
governance and alliance innovation performance were in contrast with the predictions of a 
relational view in strategic alliances. Although previous studies point out that prior 
relationships can contribute to the development of inter-firm and inter-personal trust and in 
turn reduce the need for formal safeguarding mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
1995; Larson, 1992), we found that prior relationships do not eliminate the need for 
project-level governance. Moreover, in contrast with studies that showed the link between 
partner-specific experience and alliance performance (Gualti, Lavie, and Singh, 2009; 
Zollo. Reuer, and Singh, 2002), we could not find any significant effects of prior 
relationships on performance. The latter may be explained by the differences in 
performance measures used in studies by researchers.  On the other hand, the former can be 
attributed to the fact that prior relationships may have a more significant effect on macro-
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level governance mechanisms, such as equity and contracts, rather than micro-level 
governance mechanisms, such as ex post monitoring by alliance representatives. 
  
Future research and extensions 
Our study also offers avenues for future research. Future research may investigate the 
effects of project-level governance at different levels. For instance, the investigation of the 
relationship between alliance portfolio size and project-level governance would enable us 
to understand the effectiveness of project-level governance for large firms that govern a 
significant number of external R&D partnerships simultaneously. Firms with large 
portfolios can leverage their alliance representatives’ expertise to a higher extent, in the 
sense that both partners can benefit from that expertise. As an example, formal project-
level governance can help a large firm to access the knowledge of a small firm to a higher 
extent and apply it in its other partnerships. On the other hand, small firms can benefit 
from the ties of the large firm’s representatives with other firms in the alliance portfolio. In 
this way these representatives might externally champion their projects, which result in 
higher reputation and legitimacy for the small partner. Social network theory and the 
literature on inter-firm learning can be used to explain the roles of project-level governance 
in external championing and inter-firm knowledge transfer. 
In addition, alliance researchers may also investigate the influence of project-level 
governance on alliance operating teams and alliance staff from the lenses of organizational 
behavior theory. Project-level governance is a formal governance mechanism used to 
oversee the progress of alliances. The formalization of the governance of day-to-day 
alliance activities may cause some dysfunctions for alliance operating teams responsible 
for performing the day-to-day tasks of alliances. The motivation literature can inspire an 
examination of how project-level governance influences the motivation of the members of 
the operating teams of alliances.  
In this paper, we aim to explain under which circumstances partner firms use their 
alliance representatives for contract design, contract monitoring and contract adaptation 
roles to govern their relationships. We tested our theory in the setting of R&D alliances of 
U.S.-based biotechnology firms and our findings demonstrated that project-level 
governance go together with contractual complexity, indirectly influencing alliance 
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innovation performance via an effect on contractual complexity; this governance is an 
alternative to equity, and is influenced by the stage at which the alliance is signed. We 
hope that our findings help scholars and practitioners to understand the importance of 
project-level governance in the realm of strategic alliances. 
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CHAPTER 3: MONETARY INCENTIVES AND PROJECT-LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE IN STARTUP-INCUMBENT STRATEGIC R&D 
ALLIANCES: SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Incumbents use several mechanisms to align incentives with their startup alliance partners. 
This paper investigates the relationship between two of these mechanisms that are 
understudied in the literature: performance-based monetary incentives and project-level 
governance. While the substitution position of classical agency theory predicts that these 
mechanisms are substitutes, we argue by drawing upon the complementarities position of 
classical agency theory and the innovation management literature that in the context of 
innovation alliances they are complements. We test these alternative hypotheses by using a 
sample of 220 R&D alliances of global pharmaceutical firms with U.S.-based 
biotechnology startups. We find support for our complementarities hypothesis, by showing 
that monetary incentives and project-level governance go hand in hand in the context of 
strategic R&D alliances.    
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Incumbents in high-tech industries rely on R&D alliances with startups to develop new 
products (Garrette, Castaner, and Dussauge, 2009; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doer, 1996, 
Rothaermel and Hess, 2009; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). In these alliances, aligning 
incentives to avoid conflicts of interests is one of the fundamental managerial challenges. 
The strategic alliances literature has investigated both formal and informal governance 
mechanisms for incentive alignment with a primary emphasis on equity investments, 
contracts and trust (Gulati, 1995; Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; Gulati and 
Nickerson, 2008; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1990; Sampson, 2004; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Puranam and Vanneste, 2009;  Reuer and Arino, 2007; Santoro 
and McGill, 2005). However, the literature has paid little attention to performance-based 
monetary incentives offered by incumbents to startups, i.e. potential milestone payments 
that will be made to startups upon the successful completion of research and development 
milestones. Particularly, the relationship between monetary incentives and project-level 
governance exercised on startups by incumbents is not well known, although management 
scholars have investigated the relation between monetary incentives and monitoring in 
several other principal-agent settings. In this paper, by drawing upon two competing 
theoretical lenses, we investigate the relationship between these two mechanisms in the 
context of startup-incumbent strategic R&D alliances to develop an understanding as to 
whether these mechanisms serve as substitutes or complements. 
Monetary incentives refer to the potential pre-commercialization milestone payments 
offered to a startup. Monetary incentives are contingent payments made by incumbents if a 
startup successfully achieves predetermined milestones. Such pay-for-performance 
schemes incentivize the startup to invest its best efforts into alliance projects and provides 
an incumbent with a means of controlling the startup’s behavior. An incumbent also 
controls a startup’s daily project activities by appointing its senior and middle-level 
managers to committee membership, alliance management and project management roles. 
As more representatives are used, the intensity of control will be higher, and in turn, a 
startup will be less likely to act opportunistically. We use the term project-level 
governance to define this type of monitoring-based governance.    
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To understand the relation between the two mechanisms we modeled a strategic R&D 
alliance between a startup and an incumbent as a principal-agent relationship in which the 
incumbent is the principals and the startup is the agent. According to the substitution 
position of classical agency theory, when appropriate levels of monitoring are exercised on 
the agent by the principal, it is less likely that the agent will diverge from the interests of 
the principal. In turn, there will be less need for monetary incentives to achieve incentive 
alignment. Hence, agency theory would predict that as the incumbent increase the intensity 
of project-level governance, it will be able to offer fewer monetary incentives, meaning 
that the two governance mechanisms are substitutes. 
Nevertheless, the substitution position of agency theory overlooks several dysfunctions 
of formal control mechanisms. First, the startup may misrepresent its results to receive a 
higher  portion of monetary incentives. Second, the intense control of the incumbent may 
create additional performance risks to the startup. Therefore, while the former will lead to 
greater project-level governance by incumbents, the latter will lead to the startup’s request 
of higher monetary incentives, thereby the two mechanisms reinforce each other. Hence,  
by drawing upon the complementarities position of classical agency theory and the 
innovation management literature, we challenge the substitution position by arguing that 
monetary incentives and project-level governance go hand-in-hand in the context of 
incumbent-startup R&D alliances. 
We empirically tested these competing hypotheses on a sample of 220 R&D alliances 
of global pharmaceutical firms with U.S.-based biotechnology firms. There is a growing 
interest on the phenomenon in the biotechnology industry (Mallik, Zbar and Zemmel, 
2004; Van Brunt, 2008). The number of both $100 million-plus and $1 billion-plus 
alliances increased substantially from 1998 to 2007. The biotechnology industry did not 
experience a single $1 billion-plus deal until 2001. Yet, between 2001 and just before the 
credit crisis in September 2008, the number of $1 billion-plus deals was 25. Moreover, in 
these deals, on average, potential pre-commercialization milestone payments represent the 
most significant portion of the deal sizes (Van Brunt, 2008). Given these figures, it is 
important to understand the antecedents of monetary incentives. Moreover, the U.S. 
biotechnology industry offers an attractive setting to conduct our study. First, the prevalent 
use of strategic R&D alliances to develop new therapeutic solutions and the availability of 
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information about the alliance contracts eased our data collection efforts. Second, the 
professionalization of alliance management in the pharmaceutical industry has created 
variety in the degree of monitoring. Hence, alliances with both low and high degrees of 
project-level governance are observable. 
In addition to its contributions to practice, this study makes several theoretical 
contributions. First, our study contributes to the strategic alliances literature. As data 
availability increases, the strategic alliances literature is beginning to explore distinct 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, scholars are developing finer-grained approaches 
that will improve our understanding of a broader set of governance mechanisms used in 
alliances, such as the exclusivity of licensing (Somaya, et al., 2011) and termination rights 
(Lerner and Malmandier, 2010). Our study extends this literature by revealing the 
relationship between levels of monetary incentives and monitoring. In addition, the 
literature generally adopts a focal-firm perspective. Yet, it has drawbacks because it 
provides ‘a one-sided analysis of a dyadic phenomenon’ (Zajac and Olsen, 1993).  By 
using a simultaneous equation modeling approach, we conduct a two-sided analysis of 
alliances that demonstrates how an incumbent’s project-level governance decision affects a 
startup’s request for monetary incentives, and vice versa. 
 Second, our study also contributes to the technology licensing literature by 
demonstrating the extent to which project-level governance influences the size of monetary 
incentives. Prior studies in the literature predominantly focused on understanding when 
firms license their technologies instead of developing them in-house (Aggarwal and Hsu, 
2009; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006; Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002). So far, pre-
commercialization payments received relatively little attention. Sakakibara (2010) 
examined the antecedents of upfront payments and royalties in the context of Japanese 
patent licensing agreements; however, pre-commercialization performance-based 
payments were not in the scope of her study.  
Third, our study contributes to the emerging literature on inter-firm teams, particularly 
on the choice of inter-firm team structures and staffing. Because of difficulties in accessing 
micro-level data, the studies in this literature are predominantly theoretical (Gerwin, 2004; 
Gerwin and Ferris, 2004). By developing a novel way of collecting micro-level alliance 
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staffing data through contracts, our paper sheds light on how micro-level organizational 
structures determine the level of monetary incentives. 
Finally, by showing the conditions under which startups will require higher levels of 
monetary incentives, we contribute to research on entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurship 
research views alliances as key to the growth of entrepreneurial firms in the face of their 
lack of the financial resources and commercialization capabilities (Baum, Calabrese and 
Silverman 2000; Niosi, 2003; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doer 1996; Stuart, 2000). 
However, the literature has paid little attention to research and development milestones as 
sources of revenue. Further, this literature has little investigated the managerial practices of 
incumbents that can stifle innovation in R&D alliances. Therefore, the examination of the 
link between monetary incentives and project-level governance fills a gap in this literature.  
This paper begins by defining the study’s two main constructs: monetary incentives 
and project-level governance. Then, we develop the two competing hypotheses. Following 
this, we specify the equations for monetary incentives and monitoring. We specified two 
equations because of potential endogeneity. In other words, we take into account the 
possible bi-directional relationship between monetary incentives and monitoring by 
specifying and simultaneously solving the two equations by three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) regression. Finally, we present the results of the 3SLS regression and close with a 
discussion of the results and implications for theory and practice.  
  
3.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Incumbents and startups form strategic R&D alliances to benefit from each other’s 
complementary resources (Teece, 1986). Startups typically lack financial resources and 
commercialization capabilities necessary to develop and commercialize their discoveries. 
On the other hand, incumbents experience difficulties in innovating because of their 
culture, organizational structures and path dependencies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Thus, incumbents can obtain access to the specialized knowledge of startups by forming 
R&D alliances with them (Rothaermel, 2001a). 
Startup-incumbent R&D alliances typically involve a licensing and development 
agreement. First, partners sign a licensing agreement in which the startup grants 
commercialization rights of their invention/technology to the incumbent. Typically at this 
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stage, incumbents pay license fees and agree on the level of royalties on net sales of 
products that will be developed based on licensed technologies. Then, partners sign a 
development agreement that specifies, among other things, the responsibilities of partners, 
alliance governance structure, and milestones that will be paid upon successful 
accomplishment of discovery targets and product tests. 
A development agreement specifies monetary incentives, i.e. the potential pre-
commercialization milestone payments offered to startups. Milestone payments are 
different from upfront payments in the sense that they are not committed payments. They 
are typical pay-for-performance schemes that ensure startups share the development risks 
with their incumbent partners. Without milestone payments, a startup may not invest in the 
success of the alliance after the agreement is signed. Therefore, from an incumbent’s 
perspective, monetary incentives function as an incentive alignment mechanism by 
influencing the extent to which a startup will invest in the success of an alliance over the 
long-term and ensure that a startup will not make decisions that are against its interests. 
Prior research also showed that when appropriate levels of monetary incentives are offered, 
startups are more likely to invest their time on project tasks, reveal timely and accurate 
information and share their know-how with their partners (Mayer and Teece, 2008). 
Development agreements also specify the responsibilities of partners and the 
governance structures of alliances. In these alliances, startups are responsible for basic 
research and development activities, while incumbents are responsible for commercializing 
the product. Therefore, there is a clear division of responsibilities between partners. 
However, descriptions of alliance governance structures in the agreements provide us with 
evidence that incumbents tend to exercise control on the activities of startups and intervene 
in the startups’ decisions by appointing their representatives to committee membership, 
alliance management and project management roles. For instance, below is an extract from 
the contract of the 2008 alliance between Synta and Roche. This extract clearly depicts that 
Roche’s representatives have the rights to monitor Synta’s activities, to be involved in 
development related decision-making and to evaluate Synta’s efforts. 
Within twenty (20) Business Days after the Effective Date, ROCHE and 
SYNTA shall establish a joint steering committee (the “JSC”) to review, 
coordinate and provide overall strategic direction to their activities 
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pursuant to the Research Plan and any Development Plan… The JSC 
shall be comprised of approximately three (3) senior executives of 
ROCHE and three (3) senior executives of SYNTA with appropriate 
levels of decision making authority… The JSC shall be responsible for 
… (b)    periodically reviewing the Research Plan and any Development 
Plan and suggesting or approving such amendments to the Research Plan 
or Development Plan as the JSC deems appropriate, including budget 
amendments;… (e)  overseeing the JRDC and the Parties’ progress in the 
conduct of the Research Program and in Research and Development 
activities hereunder…(f)     approving the nomination of Licensed 
Compounds which have been recommended by the JRDC for 
advancement into Development;… (k)  attempting to resolve disputes 
arising under this Agreement that are referred to the JSC by the JRDC or 
either of the Parties.  
Supporting this view, prior research has discussed the monitoring and decision-making 
roles representatives play in controlling partner behavior. For instance,  Child, Faulkner, 
and Tallman (2005, p. 315) mention that a firm engaged in an alliance can exercise control 
over its partner by appointing key personnel to alliance governance and management roles. 
In line with this view, prior studies have documented that firms use project managers, 
alliance managers and committee representatives to oversee the progress of alliance 
projects, and in particular, the activities of their partners (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and 
Robinson, 2003; Gerwin, 2004; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Kale and Singh, 2009; Mayer 
and Teece, 2008). 
In order to make our arguments clearer, it will be useful to distinguish the monitoring 
roles of representatives from their decision-making roles. Monitoring involves detecting 
opportunistic actions of startups and evaluating the outcomes generated by them. 
Therefore, monitoring is important to reduce shirking and information asymmetries. 
However, it has a passive meaning in the sense that it does not contain the rights of 
representatives to engage in decision-making and conflict resolution – means by which an 
incumbent would be able to actively intervene in the development decisions of startups. 
Given the dynamism and technical uncertainties in high-tech industries, the decision-
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making and conflict resolution responsibilities of an incumbent’s representatives are 
crucial to ex post incentive alignment. This is because whenever a contingency arises, 
incumbents can influence decisions made in the committee meetings by using the voting 
rights of their representatives. Hence, having the full responsibility for development tasks 
does not mean that startups will make development decisions autonomously. The degree to 
which incumbents exert, through their representatives, project-level governance on startups 
is a key determinant of the level of autonomy the startups possess in their partnerships with 
incumbents. 
  
3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Startup-incumbent R&D alliances involve agency problems because the division of labor 
leads to the separation of ownership and decision-making rights. More specifically, 
incumbents own the license for the product and are thus mainly responsible for 
commercialization activities; however, they have limited control over the development 
activities of startups. Furthermore, the transfer of the ownership makes agents more risk 
averse compared to principals, thus increasing the goal incongruence. As a result, moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems may emerge, resulting in agency problems.  
The extant research provides some evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems in strategic alliances (Deeds and Hill, 1999). For instance, the licensing literature 
claims that firms have the tendency to develop more attractive products in-house and 
license the ones that are less attractive to other firms (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 
2007). Thus, startups might license out products which have less profit potential to 
incumbents. Further, startups may shirk their responsibilities (Dickson, Weaver, and Hoy, 
2006). Shirking happens when a startup takes advantage of the incumbent’s limited 
managerial control and does not devote enough effort to the alliance activities taking 
advantage of the incumbent’s limited managerial control (Argyres and Mayer, 2007; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). A shirking partner may not provide enough resources in terms of 
necessary quantity and quality. For instance, a startup firm may not appoint any of its star 
scientists to the alliance project on the basis that the star scientists can be more beneficial 
to the firm if used in internal projects (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Moreover, the startup 
may also use the research support, provided by the incumbent, for its internal projects 
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rather than for the alliance, a type of opportunistic behavior called cross-subsidization 
(Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). Alternatively, the startup may not be willing to share its 
know-how due to risks of losing its competitive advantage (Hamel, 1991). Insufficient 
knowledge sharing may result in severe negative performance outcomes for the alliance 
and in turn for the incumbent (Sampson, 2007). Without integrating their knowledge, the 
partners may develop a lower quality solution which can particularly be problematic for 
incumbents who possess the commercialization rights of the solution. 
Agency theory addresses these issues by offering the use of monitoring and monetary 
incentives by principals. However, the exact relation between monitoring and monetary 
incentives remain a controversy.  According to the substitution position of classical agency 
theory, monetary incentives and monitoring act as substitutes. This is because when the 
appropriate degree of monitoring is exercised, there is less need for monetary incentives, 
and vice versa (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Rediker and Seth; 
1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). For instance, if an  incumbent is able to exercise strict 
governance on its startup partner by appointing its representatives to project-level 
monitoring and decision-making roles, then the startup is not able to shirk, hide 
information, and make decisions that harm the interest of incumbents. In turn, the 
incumbent will face less performance risks, and in turn, will need to offer relatively less 
financial compensation.    
In a similar way, when appropriate levels of monetary incentives are offered to 
startups, there will be less need for monitoring. This is because of the theory’s assumption 
that startups are primarily motivated by financial incentives. Startups will strive to 
accomplish the project tasks in a way that satisfies the interests of incumbents, because 
doing so will guarantee the payments from the incumbents. Therefore, following the 
substitution position of  classical agency theory, monetary incentives and project-level 
governance operate as substitute governance mechanisms in the context of incumbent-
startup R&D alliances. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative bi-directional relationship between the 
level of monetary incentives and the degree of project-level governance in 
the context of strategic R&D alliances between startups and incumbents.       
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Yet, the performance risks shifted to startups because of greater project-level 
governance  may result in an outcome different from what the substitution position 
predicts. This is because the substitution position focuses on minimizing the risks of 
principals and overlooks the performance risks of agents. Indeed, it might be the case that 
strict project-level governance might result in the transfer of more than necessary risks 
from incumbents to startups. Below, we describe the sources of these risks.  
First, intense project-level governance is likely to reduce the intrinsic motivation of the 
startup firm. The innovation management literature has demonstrated the negative effects 
of control on innovation and creativity (Amabile, 1983; Carson, 2007). In line with this 
literature, one can expect that project-level governance negatively influences intrinsic 
motivation of the startup. However, the loss of intrinsic motivation must be compensated 
by the incumbent. One way of doing this is offering higher monetary incentives to increase 
the overall motivation of the startup. Therefore, greater project-level governance might 
result in higher monetary incentives in innovative task settings such as R&D alliances.  
Second, alliance representatives of the incumbent tend to make decisions in areas that 
fall into the startup’s specialization under strict project-level governance. As a result, the 
startup will lose its autonomy which will cause two problems. First, joint decision-making 
might result in less favorable decisions for startups. Shan, Walker, and Kogut (1994) 
discuss how interference by an incumbent in a startup’s research agenda may reduce its 
innovative output. Second, because joint decision-making is slower than autonomous 
decision-making, startups can lose a considerable amount of time, which can influence the 
project’s ultimate success as well as the firm’s survival in dynamic environments 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
The third source of performance risk pertains to knowledge leakage hazards. Strategic 
alliances are mechanisms by which knowledge transfers take place between partners 
(Hamel, 1991; Kale and Singh, 2000; Lazzarini, Claro, and Mesquita, 2008; Mowery, 
Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Tarun, Ranjay, and Nitin, 1998). Greater project-level 
governance allows for greater transfer of tacit knowledge between partners due to stronger 
integration. Hence, as the degree of project-level governance increases, a startup faces 
relatively higher risks in transferring its proprietary knowledge to its incumbent partner. If 
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an incumbent succeeds in transferring the knowledge of a startup through its 
representatives, the competitive advantage of the startup will erode.   
Finally, as project-level governance becomes more intense, startups face higher costs of 
administrative complexity, which will result in higher performance risks due to a diversion 
of efforts from innovative tasks to administrative tasks. Prior research emphasized the 
administrative difficulties startups face in implementing alliances (Arino, Ragozzino, and 
Reuer, 2008; Mayer and Teece, 2008). These difficulties can be exacerbated under 
complex governance structures that demand higher degrees of professionalism and 
expertise in the management of alliances from startups. Complex governance structures 
require specialization in downstream business functions, especially when 
commercialization and manufacturing committees have to be formed. In addition, if the 
project requires the appointment of liaison personnel, such as alliance managers, then the 
project will require the development of alliance management capabilities. These factors 
will, then, cause additional effort and overhead costs to startups. Given that startups have 
limited resources, the use of these resources for administrative tasks of partnership will put 
pressure on the resources allocated for innovation. It is likely that they will transfer some 
of these resources for the administrative tasks, which will lead to an increase in 
performance risks. 
Prior empirical research has emphasized the performance risks that startups face in 
their partnerships. Rothaermel (2001a) mentioned the importance of alliances for 
incumbents as a means to exploit the innovative capabilities of a startup. Particularly, 
startups face higher performance risks when they form highly integrated partnerships with 
incumbents. Also, prior research on acquisitions found evidence for negative effects of 
higher levels of acquirer integration on the performance of innovative partners (Puranam, 
Singh, and Zollo, 2006).  
In summary, the higher the degree of project-level governance, the greater the chance 
that intrinsic motivation is eroded and innovative performance, at the startup, suffers 
because of the loss of autonomy, the risk of knowledge leakages, and an increase in 
administrative complexity. In turn, these risks function to increase the required level of 
monetary incentives for startups.  
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Finally, in line with the complementarities position of agency theory (Tosi, Katz, and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1997), higher monetary incentives will increase the need for control to 
avoid startups’ misrepresentations of their results to receive milestone payments from 
incumbents. Hence, incumbents will require more controllers to assess the real value of 
solutions developed by startups which in turn increase project-level governance. Hence, 
not only greater project-level governance results in higher monetary incentives, but also 
higher monetary incentives will lead to greater project-level governance by alliance 
representatives of incumbents. Therefore, we hypothesize that monetary incentives and 
project-level governance are complements. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive bi-directional relationship between the 
level of monetary incentives and the degree of project-level governance in 
the context of strategic R&D alliances between startups and incumbents. 
      
3.4 METHOD 
The empirical setting of the study was the US biotechnology industry. The disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) force biotechnology firms to 
disclose their R&D agreements with pharmaceutical firms. This is because the SEC 
requires a public firm to disclose its material transactions, representing 5 percent or more 
of a firm’s revenues. Because many biotechnology firms experience difficulties in 
generating substantial revenues, their strategic R&D alliances, particularly those with large 
pharmaceutical firms, fit the definition of material transactions. Hence, deal information is 
widely available as compared to other high-tech industries, making the biotechnology 
industry an ideal setting for our study. 
We primarily used the Deloitte’s Recap and SEC Edgar databases for data collection. 
We used the Recap database to create our sample. Recap’s specialization in the 
biotechnology industry and it is superiority in covering alliances has been recognized in 
the literature (Schilling, 2009). We received deal data including, potential milestone 
payments, upfront payments, equity investments, therapeutic areas, stage at signing, 
alliance formation year and technology bases. We checked the accuracy of information by 
analyzing annual reports and press releases of the biotechnology firms whose alliances 
3.4 Method                                                                                                                                            71 
 
included into our sample. We used the SEC Edgar database to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of contracts. We gathered data on project-level governance and license exclusivity by 
downloading alliance contracts. We analyzed the ‘Alliance Governance’ and ‘Grants of 
Licenses’ sections of these contracts and codified all necessary information for our study. 
Finally, we codified firm-related information including each biotech’s age, biotech’s 
listing in the stock exchange, and pharmaceutical firm’s R&D intensity from the 
Compustat database and other publicly available data sources. 
Sample 
We used several criteria for sampling. First, we included only dyadic alliances between a 
biotechnology and a pharmaceutical firm, because our study investigates startup-
incumbent alliances. Thus, dyadic alliances between only biotechnology or only 
pharmaceutical firms were excluded from our sample. Second, our sample consisted only 
of U.S.-based biotechnology firms. Yet, the pharmaceutical firms in the sample were from 
the U.S., Europe and Japan. Third, we picked the period 1996-2008. We started from 1996 
because strategic R&D alliances began gaining popularity in this industry starting in the 
late 1990s. Fourth, only contractual alliances and minority investment alliances were in the 
sample because project-level governance, as we described in this paper, does not take place 
in equity joint ventures. The creation of a new entity in joint ventures typically leads to a 
department-based structure in which committee membership, alliance management, and 
project management roles are barely observed. Further, if any of these roles exist it is not 
possible to gather data on the role simply by analyzing contracts. Finally, we pick alliances 
with relatively higher levels of technical difficulties but at the same time higher levels of 
market potential. We analyzed medical journals, specialized in clinical trials, to avoid 
including trivial development alliances. As a result, we picked alliances targeting areas 
with relatively low drug approval rates, including oncology, central nervous system, 
cardiovascular, endocrinological and metabolic, hematologic, autoimmune/ inflammatory 
and psychiatry. Based on these criteria, we randomly picked 220 dyadic R&D alliances.     
Model identification  
To test the feedback relationship between monetary incentives and project-level 
governance, we used the simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) approach (Wooldridge, 
2002). SEM requires the identification of equations for each endogenous variable. As 
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monetary incentives and project-level governance are endogenous variables in the model, 
we need to identify two equations: (1) the monetary incentives equation, and (2) the 
project-level governance equation. The right-hand side of each equation consists of an 
endogenous independent variable (i.e. project-level governance in the monetary incentives 
equation and monetary incentives in the project-level   governance equation), exogenous 
independent variables that are used only in a single equation (i.e. potential identifying 
variables), exogenous independent variables used in both equations, and an error term.  
We use the year effects, the therapeutic areas covered by the alliance, the listing of the 
biotech in the stock market, the biotech’s age at alliance formation, and the incumbent’s 
R&D intensity as the identifying variables for the monetary incentives equation. The year 
effects account for the change in market conditions in the industry. Specifically, after the 
late 1990s the market shifted from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market (Van Brunt, 2008). 
This is because the increased rivalry caused by generic drug producers (Hamel and 
Valikangas, 2003) and increased regulations by the FDA that resulted in higher attrition 
rates (Kola and Landis, 2004), both of which led pharmaceutical firms to rely more on 
biotechnology firms to innovate. As a consequence, the bargaining power of biotechnology 
firms increased considerably. In turn, for biotechnology firms, the chances to close deals 
with relatively higher levels of monetary incentives increased considerably. Another 
reason for including year effects in the equation is that we can control for changes in 
economic conditions. For instance, the 2005-2007 period experienced a peak in megadeals 
due to the positive economic conditions. During this period, large firms were likely to 
more easily find the resources necessary to invest in alliances.  
Therapeutic areas covered in an alliance can potentially influence the level of monetary 
incentives. The reason is, as the number of therapeutic areas increases, the level of project 
complexity increases, which makes development more challenging. As a result, 
biotechnology firms are likely to be compensated by pharmaceutical firms for the extra 
effort required to develop a compound for alternative therapeutic uses.  
The level of monetary incentives may also depend on whether a biotechnology firm is a 
publicly traded or a private firm. Publicly traded firms send signals to the market through 
their announcements (Janney and Folta, 2003; Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). For a 
publicly traded firm, an alliance announcement with substantial monetary incentives is a 
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key signal to investors in the market because potential payments may generate revenues in 
the future. Therefore, publicly traded biotechnology firms will negotiate more on monetary 
incentives than private firms and strive to close the deal with substantial monetary 
incentives. The age of a biotechnology firm might also affect its bargaining power. 
Younger firms face the liability of newness and rely more on incumbent firms (Freeman, 
Carroll, and Hannan, 1983). As a result, they have less bargaining power in negotiations. 
However, as entrepreneurial firms age, they obtain access to alternative financial 
resources, build partnerships with other incumbents, and increase their legitimacy in the 
market. Thus, it is relatively easier for older biotechnology firms to close the deal with 
higher levels of monetary incentives. Finally, a pharmaceutical firm’s R&D intensity may 
have a positive impact on the level of monetary incentives. This is because firms with 
higher R&D expenditures to sales ratios are likely to be more willing to invest in both 
internal and external R&D.   
We use the level of committed payments and the stage at signing as the identifying 
variables for the project-level governance equation. As noted, project-level governance 
provides an incumbent firm with the opportunity to monitor its partner and intervene in 
key development decisions. Therefore, when the required degree of monitoring and 
intervention is high, the degree of project-level governance will also be high. The level of 
committed payments (i.e., the total of license fees, equity investments, research funding 
and reimbursement of prior R&D expenses) can influence both the required degree of 
monitoring and intervention. As the level of committed payments increases, the 
pharmaceutical firm faces a hold-up problem to a higher extent because of the 
irreversibility of its investments (Williamson, 1991). As a result, it will monitor the 
activities of the biotech to a higher extent to avoid any opportunism and intervene into the 
biotech’s decisions to a higher extent to adjust its risks. Therefore, we expect that the 
higher the level of committed payments, the higher the degree of project-level governance. 
Rothaermel (2001b) and Santoro and McGill (2005) showed that early stages alliances 
had higher uncertainty than late stage alliances. Thus, early-stage R&D alliances involve 
tasks that demand higher levels of creativity and problem-solving ability of biotechnology 
firms. This requires that the pharmaceutical firm must give more leeway. We expect, 
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therefore, that early-stage alliances require lower degrees of project-level governance 
compared to those formed at later stages.  
We include exclusivity of license, equity and cross-border in both equations to control 
for their effects. When the license is non-exclusive, a biotechnology firm can grant the 
commercialization rights of the compound to other firms. That causes a hold-up problem 
for the pharmaceutical firm (Somaya et al., 2011; Williamson, 1991). As a result, the 
pharmaceutical firm will monitor the activities of the biotech to a higher extent to avoid 
any opportunism and intervene in the biotech’s decisions to a higher extent to adjust its 
risks. Therefore, we expect that non-exclusivity leads to higher degrees of project-level 
governance. Further, as biotechnology firms will face fewer performance risks under a 
nonexclusive license agreement, the level of monetary incentives will be lower. Hence, 
non-exclusivity is likely to have a negative impact on the level of monetary incentives. A 
minority investment alliance is more effective in aligning the incentives of partners than a 
non-equity contractual alliance (Gulati and Singh, 1998, Pisano 1989). Therefore, we 
expect that the presence of equity investment will reduce the degrees of project-level 
governance and the level of monetary incentives. In  addition,  cross-border alliances may 
cause higher monitoring requirements for a pharmaceutical firm because of the 
unfamiliarity with the partner’s way of doing business. Therefore, cross-border alliances 
are likely to have higher degrees of project-level governance. Moreover, the 
pharmaceutical firm needs to incentivize a cross-border partner more than a local partner, 
because approaching a cross-border partner signals that in its own region there are a 
limited number of available partners. In negotiations, the biotechnology firm may take 
advantage of this situation and demand higher levels of monetary incentives. Finally, 
biotechnology firms typically deploy a mixed set of technologies to develop products. 
These technologies represent scientific techniques and tools utilized to develop products. 
To control for their effects on monetary incentives and monitoring, we also included them 
in both equations. Therefore, we define the following two equations: 
monetary_incentives = α10 + γ12  project-level_governance + β11 year_effects  +  
β12 therapeutic_areas + β13 public + β14 biotech age +  
β15 pharma_R&D_ intensity + β16 exclusivity + β17 equity +  
β18 cross-border + β19 technologies + ε1                      (1) 
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project-level_governance = α10 + γ21  monetary_incentives +  
β21 committed_payments  + β22 stage_at_signing + β23 exclusivity + β24 equity +  
β25 cross-border + β26 technologies + ε2                                   (2)  
 
Endogenous variables 
Monetary incentives 
Monetary incentives refers to the total dollar value of the deal, that is the sum of research 
and development milestone payments offered to a biotech by its pharmaceutical partner. 
These are potential payments that will be made when the biotech firm achieves the specific 
milestones defined in the agreement. Given its evident right skewed distribution, we use 
the natural logarithm in our estimations. We also control for the effects of inflation. We 
created inflation-adjusted values by taking 1996 as the base year. 
Project-level governance 
This variable captures whether senior and middle-level managers of a pharmaceutical firm 
were appointed to committee membership, alliance management and project management 
roles. As we mentioned, we obtained scores for this variable by reading the ‘alliance 
governance’ sections of agreements. These sections describe in detail which joint 
committees were formed and whether liaison personnel such as project and alliance 
managers were appointed.  
Under the monitoring of joint steering committees, specialized joint functional 
committees exist. We considered joint functional committees in two separate groups. The 
first group, core joint functional committees, includes those associated with either a core 
upstream or downstream alliance activity. Joint research, development, commercialization, 
and manufacturing committees constitute the fundamental upstream and downstream 
functional committees formed in alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
firms. The second group, peripheral joint functional committees, involves committees 
responsible for activities pertaining to either finance or intellectual property rights. We call 
them peripheral because of their limited monitoring and decision-making rights. Typically, 
they provide input to decisions made by the core committees. For instance, joint patent 
committees assist research committees in specifying how a novel technology developed in 
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the partnership can be protected and how the patent ownership will be handled. Similarly, 
joint finance committees assist joint research teams to control the costs of research 
activities or to assist commercialization committees in preparing a budget for co-promotion 
activities. 
As a result of distinguishing core joint committees from peripheral ones, we ended up 
with four dimensions of project team structure: (1) core joint functional committees, (2) 
peripheral joint functional committees, (3) liaison personnel, and (4) steering committees.  
Parallel to the measurements used in prior studies, a weight was assigned to each of these 
dimensions based on their governance complexities (Kumar and Seth, 1998). A rank of 1 
was assigned to ‘peripheral joint functional committees’, 2 to ‘project and alliance 
managers’, 3 to ‘steering committees’, and 4 to ‘core joint functional committees’.  Then, 
the sum of the scores of each dimension divided by 242, the maximum score that can be 
attained, was taken to obtain the score for the degree of project-level governance. We 
assigned the highest weight to joint functional committees because through these 
committees an incumbent exerts the most intense monitoring to its partner in a particular 
functional domain. Furthermore, these committees are the first line of defense in resolving 
conflicts that arise in the alliance. The steering committees resolve conflicts that cannot be 
solved at joint functional committees; they also have less chance to observe project 
activities as compared to joint committees. Hence, joint steering committees received a 
lower weight than joint functional committees. Liaison personnel have rights to participate 
committee meetings, however they may not have decision-making rights, or they represent 
a single vote in decisions. They are mainly responsible for providing healthy 
communication between partners. Therefore, they received the weight of two.   
Exogenous variables 
For year effects, we included 13 dummies for each year. We used the year 2008 as the base 
category.  Therapeutic areas is a measure of the technical scope of an alliance. It captures 
the total number of therapeutic areas covered within the alliance agreement. For instance, 
if an alliance’s therapeutic area covers only two indications in total (e.g. cancer and central 
                                                     
2 This is the maximum score obtained when governance consists of a joint peripheral 
committee, project managers, alliance managers, a steering committee, and joint research, 
development, commercialization, and manufacturing committees.  
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nervous system) this variable receives a value of 2. The variable Public is a dummy, coded 
as 1 if the biotechnology firm is publicly traded. The variable Biotech’s age is the 
difference between the alliance formation year and the biotech’s foundation year. The 
variable Pharma’s R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures to turnover.  
Following Santoro and McGill (2005), we included three dummy variables that 
represent the stages of drug development: Early research (i.e. formulation, discovery, lead 
molecule, pre-clinical), Early clinical (i.e. phase I, phase II),and  Late clinical (i.e. phase 
III, BLA/NDA filed, and approved). We picked Late clinical as the base category. 
Committed payments measure pharmaceutical firm’s upfront irreversible payments; this 
involves license fees, equity investments, research funding, reimbursement of prior 
research expenses. Like monetary incentives, we use the natural logarithm of the variable 
and its inflation adjusted values by picking 1996 as the base year.   
We captured license exclusivity by an ordinal scale, 0 if the license is non-exclusive, 1 
if it is co-exclusive, 2 if it is exclusive. We included the Equity dummy, 1 if there is an 
equity investment by the incumbent and 0 otherwise. The variable Cross-border measures 
the nationality differences between partners. We coded it as 1 if the partnership is cross-
border, and 0 otherwise. The variable Technologies measures the total number of different 
technologies used by the biotech to develop solutions.  
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3.5 RESULTS 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations, respectively. 
We use 3SLS regression to estimate the simultaneous equation model (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the 3SLS regression. We report unstandardized 
coefficients, and standard errors for each variable, respectively. 
Contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for project-level governance 
is not negative in the monetary incentives equation and the coefficient for monetary 
incentives is not negative in the project-level governance equation. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is 
not supported. 
 Table 3. 1 Descriptive statistics of variables in the project-level governance-monetary 
incentives model 
Variable Mean/Freqs St. Dev. Variable Mean/Freqs St. Dev. 
Ln (Monetary incentives) 4.36 1.44 1998 0.07 - 
Project-level governance 0.35 0.18 1999 0.12 - 
Therapeutic areas 1.43 0.83 2000 0.10 - 
Public 0.70 0.46 2001 0.06 - 
Biotech’s age 10.83 6.61 2002 0.07 - 
Pharma’s R&D intensity 0.14 0.57 2003 0.06 - 
Ln (Committed payments) 2.79 1.19 2004 0.06 - 
Exclusivity 1.79 0.49 2005 0.08 - 
Equity 0.36 0.48 2006 0.11 - 
Cross-border 0.60 0.49 2007 0.12 - 
Technologies 1.41 0.69 2008 0.07 - 
Early Research 0.65 -    
Early clinical 0.20 -    
Late Research 0.16 -    
1996 0.04 -    
1997 0.02 -    
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On the other hand, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, there is a positive significant bi-
directional relationship between monetary incentives and project-level governance. The 
coefficient for project-level governance is positive and statistically significant in the 
monetary incentives equation (p < 0.001) and the coefficient for monetary incentives is 
positive and statistically significant in the project-level governance equation (p < 0.05). 
These results reveal the complementarities between monetary incentives and project-level 
governance. Regarding the interpretation of effect sizes, an average increase in project-
level governance corresponding to 0.35 units, i.e., close to the value when two functional 
committees are formed, lead to 2.14 times higher monetary incentives offered to startups. 
On the other hand, one percent increase in monetary incentives increases the degree of 
project-level governance by 0.03 units. 
In the monetary incentives equation, consistent with our predictions, the formation year 
of an alliance has an impact on the level of monetary incentives. The coefficients for 
dummies for the alliance formation years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
and 2004 are negative and statistically significant in the monetary incentives equation (p < 
0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.05,  p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p < 0.01 p < 0.10, p < 0.10). This 
result suggests that year effects is a significant determinant of monetary incentives. It is 
apparent that, after 2004, the favorable market conditions, combined with the demand of 
pharmaceutical firms to expand their R&D pipelines, resulted in relatively higher levels of 
monetary incentives. Another factor that has an impact on the size of monetary incentives 
is the number of therapeutic areas. The coefficient for therapeutic areas is positive and 
statically significant (p < 0.001) -- expanding the scope of the alliance, by adding another 
therapeutic area, increases the level of monetary incentives by 29%. 
Regarding other results, the coefficient for committed payments is positive and 
statistically significant in the project-level governance equation (p < 0.001). This 
corroborates the argument that as pharmaceutical firms’ upfront or irreversible investments 
increase, they employ more intense governance to avoid partner opportunism. Finally, the 
coefficient for exclusivity is positive and statistically significant in the project-level 
governance equation. This supports the idea that exclusivity mitigates opportunism risks 
(Somaya et al., 2011), and in turn reduces the need for project-level governance.  
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Table 3. 3 Estimation results for the project-level governance and monetary 
incentives model 
Variables PLG Equation 
Monetary Incentives 
Equation 
Endogenous variables   
Ln (Monetary incentives) 0.03* 
(0.01) 
- 
Project-level governance - 6.48*** 
(1.33) 
Equation-specific exogenous variables   
1996 - -1.74** 
(0.51) 
1997 - -1.60** 
(0.58) 
1998 - -1.30** 
(0.45) 
1999 - -1.15** 
(0.41) 
2000 - -1.59*** 
(0.37) 
2001 - -1.26*** 
(0.35) 
2002 - -0.73* 
(0.32) 
2003 - -0.65+ 
(0.34) 
2004 - -0.63+ 
(0.34) 
2005 - -0.15 
(0.30) 
2006 - -0.30 
(0.29) 
2007 - 0.04 
(0.28) 
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Therapeutic areas - 0.29*** 
(0.08) 
Public - -0.22 
(0.14) 
Biotech’s age - -0.01 
(0.01) 
Pharma’s R&D intensity - -0.52 
(1.13) 
Early research -0.01 
(0.02) 
- 
Early clinical 0.01 
(0.02) 
- 
Ln (Committed payments) 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
- 
Common exogenous variables   
License exclusivity -0.004+ 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
Equity -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
Crossborder -0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.19) 
Technologies 0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
Constant 0.15* 
(0.06) 
2.39** 
(0.88) 
Χ square 83.43 176.80 
Prob > χ square 0.000 0.000 
N 220 220 
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3.6 DISCUSSION  
While prior research on the governance of strategic alliances has extensively covered the 
antecedents and outcomes of various formal and informal governance mechanisms, little 
attention has been paid to monetary incentives as a governance mechanism used by 
partners to align their incentives. Hence, we were motivated by the dearth of research on 
monetary incentives and study its antecedents and outcomes in the context of startup-
incumbent strategic R&D alliances. We suggested that there is an interplay between the 
level of monetary incentives offered to startups and the degree of project-level governance 
exercised on startups by incumbents. To improve our understanding of the direction of the 
relationship between these governance mechanisms, we contrasted two competing 
perspectives, one derived from the substitution position of classical agency theory, and the 
other derived from the integration of the complementarities position of classical agency 
theory and the literature on innovation management. Our findings reveal that monetary 
incentives and project-level governance function as complements rather than substitutes, 
thus conforming the latter view.   
By contrasting the substitution and complementarities views, we also had the 
opportunity to understand the extent to which incumbents choose between alternative 
project-level governance mechanisms and the extent to which startups are primarily 
motivated by financial rewards. The findings showed that generous compensation and 
intense governance go hand in hand. The use of project-level governance as a mechanism 
to monitor startups and intervene in their development decisions explains why these two 
mechanisms act as complements. For incumbents, the upside of exercising strict project-
level governance is a reduction in risks, but the downside is a decline of intrinsic 
motivations and the innovative performance of startups. Incumbents need to use additional 
monetary incentives to compensate for the decline of both factors. 
By distinguishing licensing from the development process, we found significant effects 
of committed payments and license exclusivity on project-level governance. Both 
committed payments and non-exclusive licenses cause hold-up problems in partnerships 
which require the incumbents’ monitoring of and involvement in decision-making 
processes during development to mitigate partner opportunism concerns.   
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This study provides several theoretically and empirically imported contributions to the 
literature. The extant literature on strategic alliances has extensively focused on  equity vs. 
non-equity governance choices. However, the presence of equity investments is related to 
the structure of monetary incentives and does not reflect the magnitude of monetary 
incentives. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the magnitude 
of monetary incentives in the context of strategic R&D alliances. Alliance governance 
scholars have recently started to delve into different safeguarding mechanism such as 
termination rights and exclusivity. For instance, Somaya et al. (2011) showed that 
exclusivity of licensing agreements provides safeguarding to licensee’s investments. 
Further, Lerner and Malmandier (2010) showed the incentive alignment function of 
termination rights in controlling partner opportunism. By introducing monetary incentives 
and project-level governance constructs, and showing the complementarity between them, 
we extended the literature on formal alliance governance mechanisms one step further. 
Finally, we develop measures for monetary incentives and project-level governance. We 
distinguish milestone payments from upfront committed payments in a manner that allows 
us to build a better understanding of the differential effects of committed payments and 
performance-based payments on project-level governance. We also take into account the 
different roles appointed to alliance representatives and develop a finer-grained approach 
to examine the day-to-day monitoring and decision-making processes in alliances. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the micro-level governance of alliances. 
Recent studies have suggested that micro-level governance is crucial to monitoring, 
coordination and adaptation in alliances (Gerwin, 2004; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; Kale and 
Singh, 2009; Tiwana, 2008). However, prior research on micro-level governance 
mechanisms has treated project-level governance in isolation, and paid little attention to its 
interplay with global governance mechanisms such as monetary incentives. We filled this 
gap by showing on a sample of 220 strategic R&D alliances that micro-level governance 
and macro-level governance are interrelated. 
By showing the complementarities between project-level governance and monetary 
incentives in the context of strategic R&D alliances, we contributed to debate over whether 
these mechanisms complement or substitute each other. Our findings extended the 
previous agency theory research which showed the complementarities between the two 
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mechanisms particularly in the context of corporate governance (Hoskisson, Castleton, and 
Withers, 2009; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 
1997). In addition, our findings have implications for transaction cost economics theory 
(TCE). TCE theory predicts the positive effects of monetary incentives on project-level 
governance because the theory suggest that complex contractual agreements that involve 
pay-for-performance schemes lead to higher ex post transaction costs because of higher 
verification needs (Barthélemy and Quélin 2006, Williamson, 1991). However, the theory 
pays little attention to project-level governance’s influence on monetary incentives thus 
limitedly captures the overall transaction costs. In the terminology of TCE, project-level 
governance is the main constituent of ex post transaction costs for the controlling party. 
However, in strategic alliances partners know also ex ante the extent of control their 
counterparts exercise on them. Indeed, it is formalized in the contractual agreement. 
Therefore, the party that is under control can try to minimize the negative effects of ex post 
control in negotiation by increasing the required performance-based payment. 
Consequently, ex post transaction costs can become even higher for the controlling party. 
Hence, project-level governance not only increases ex post transaction costs directly but 
also indirectly through its effect on monetary incentives.  
Our study has contributions to the entrepreneurship literature as well. The literature has 
found that the formal management practices of firms can stifle innovation in alliance 
(Carson et al., 2003; Carson, 2007; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Dyer and Singh 1998), 
M&A (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006), and corporate venture capital (Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2005; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009) settings. The findings of this study reveal a 
mechanism that can help startups adjust their risks when they face strict governance: 
requesting higher monetary incentives. In this vein, we explained why it is plausible for 
startups to request higher levels of monetary incentives when they encounter intense 
project-level governance from their incumbent partners. Future research should address 
alternative ways by which startups can minimize the performance risks and complexity 
costs in their R&D partnerships. A viable option is to diversify alliance portfolios by 
forming alliances with not-for-profit entities. For instance, startups can form partnerships 
with research institutes, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations; entities 
that would exert relatively less governance on the startup. Even though these partnerships 
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do not reward huge milestone payments and do not help much in commercialization, more 
autonomy and a lower risk of knowledge leakage can help startups survive their infancy. 
They can also search alternative partners for the commercialization of their technologies. 
For instance, in the biotechnology industry, the biotechnology startups can collaborate 
with other biotechnology firms that have already established downstream capabilities in 
the market. Alternatively, startups may choose to integrate downstream to reduce their 
dependency on incumbents. 
One may ask the question whether it is possible to break the positive feedback loop 
between the two formal governance mechanisms. Such a strategy may be exemplified by a 
setting in which the startup believes that the incumbent’s actions are fair and in compliance 
with its justice perceptions, both during the negotiation and implementation stages of the 
alliance. In such a situation, the startup may agree on a relatively low level of monetary 
incentives. Future research might serve to benefit from the literature on justice in strategic 
alliances and behavioral agency theory to determine the boundary conditions for the 
complementary relationships revealed in this study. 
Another important question is: How should these governance mechanisms be used to 
increase alliance performance? Do they crowd out or leverage each other in influencing 
different dimensions of alliance performance including innovativeness, stability and 
commercial success? Future research should seek answers to these questions. Furthermore, 
to what extent do misalignment of incentives create conflicts? For instance, a startup firm 
strictly controlled by an incumbent can create conflicts in the partnership if an appropriate 
level of monetary incentives are not provided. Future research should investigate the 
relationship between the emergence of conflicts and the match between the monetary 
incentives and project-level governance.  
Managerial implications   
There are two important managerial implications in our study, one for  incumbents and the 
other for startups. Our suggestion to the senior managers and deal-making teams of large 
incumbents is that they must take into account the compensation that will be asked by the 
startups who put a price tag on the governance exercised on them. Typical calculations of 
alliance governance costs solely focus on the time spent by project/alliance managers and 
key executives appointed to the partnerships. Our study reveals an additional cost item 
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awaiting incumbents in these alliances. Therefore, without taking the impact of their 
governance structure into consideration, they can miscalculate the costs and benefits of 
control in these alliances.  
On the other hand, our suggestion to founders and relationship managers of startups is 
that they must ask for compensation if they believe the incumbent will intervene into their 
research agendas, because these interventions can significantly increase the development 
costs, development time and amount of rework. Therefore, without any compensation, they 
put the future of their alliances as well as their enterprises in risk. 
We began this research with the goal of revealing what determines the size of 
performance-based monetary incentives offered to startups in their R&D alliances with 
incumbents. We hope that our findings can help the managers of startups and incumbents 
who devote their time to the management and governance of these partnerships. Our 
findings should make it clear that the size of monetary incentives significantly depend 
upon the degree of project-level governance exercised over the startups that engage in 
these partnerships by the controllers of incumbents.  
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE IMPACTS OF PROJECT-LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE AND MONETARY INCENTIVES  
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine how the ex post monitoring of a startup’s activities by the incumbent and ex 
ante performance-based contingent pay influences the innovation performance of startup-
incumbent R&D alliances and the startup’s abnormal stock market returns following the 
announcement of these alliances. By contrasting the complementarities view in the classic 
agency model with behavioral agency theory, we develop two alternative hypotheses. First, 
drawing upon the complementarities view in agency theory, we hypothesize that project-
level governance and monetary incentives complement each other in enhancing alliance 
innovation performance. Second, building on behavioral agency theory, we alternatively 
propose that project-level governance, encouraged in part by monetary incentives, has a 
negative impact on innovation performance, because it increases the startup’s and 
incumbent’s risk aversion, and thus negatively influences innovation. Hence, the two 
mechanisms neutralize, instead of complement, each other in explaining performance. 
Finally, we argue that the two governance mechanisms neutralize each other in explaining 
the startup’s value creation because of the project-level governance’s negative and the 
monetary incentives’ positive impact on the startup’s private benefits. We test our 
hypotheses on a sample of 220 strategic alliances between global pharmaceutical firms and 
U.S.-based biotechnology firms. We found that higher monetary incentives, encouraged in 
part by greater project-level governance, increase alliance innovation performance and a 
startup’s abnormal market return. Nonetheless, greater project-level governance, 
encouraged in part by higher monetary incentives, has a negative impact on the innovation 
performance of alliances and has no significant effect on a startup’s abnormal market 
return. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Strategic R&D alliances between startups and incumbents are pervasive (Cyr, 2001; 
Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan; 2007). In these alliances, incumbents employ two 
fundamental governance mechanisms to align their incentives with the incentives of their 
partners. First, project-level governance, i.e., the ex-post monitoring of the startup’s 
activities by the incumbent’s alliance representatives, such as committee members, alliance 
managers, and project managers, is used to control the behavior of startups. Second, 
incumbents rely on ex ante pay-for-performance schemes to incentivize startups to invest 
in the future success of R&D alliances.  
Although considerable research has been devoted to the performance implications of 
different alliance governance mechanisms such as the presence of equity investments (Das 
and Teng, 1996; Pangarkar, 2003; Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2007), the allocation of 
ownership (Beamish and Inkpen, 1995; Chung and Beamish, 2010; Yan and Gray, 1994) 
and control rights (Lerner, Shane, and Tsai, 2003) and the complexity of contractual 
agreements (Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), very little is known about the 
performance effects of the two underemphasized mechanisms: project-level governance 
and performance-based monetary incentives. Of particular interest is the impact of these 
mechanisms on alliance innovation performance and a startup’s abnormal market returns. 
Given the key roles that these formal governance mechanisms play in aligning interests 
between partners, our aim, in this paper, is to show the extent to which these two 
mechanisms can influence alliance-level performance and firm-level performance. 
The literature on strategic alliances highlights the poor governance choices as one of 
the reasons for the low success rates of alliances. Previous studies found that the 
misalignment of governance with transaction characteristics results in low alliance 
(Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009) and firm performance (Sampson, 2004). While these 
studies demonstrated that alliance and firm performance vary depending on governance 
choices, they treat each governance mechanism in isolation by overlooking the fact that 
alliances involve the simultaneous use of multiple governance mechanisms which 
influence each other as well as the performance outcomes through their interaction.  
Nevertheless, there is growing interest in examining the interactive effects of formal 
and informal governance mechanisms on alliance performance. For instance, Poppo and 
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Zenger (2002) and Luo (2002) found that trust and contracts complement each other in 
enhancing the performance of buyer-supplier relationships and international joint ventures, 
respectively. Likewise, Agarwal, Croson and Mahoney (2009) demonstrated in an 
experimental setting that the formal payoff structure of an alliance and informal 
communication between partners complement each other in explaining alliance 
performance. Although this stream of literature extensively studied the interplay between 
formal and informal governance mechanisms, it neglected to consider the potential 
interactive effects of different formal governance mechanisms on alliance performance. 
Hence, we know little about how the interactive effects of project-level governance and 
performance-based monetary incentives influence performance.  
The stream of the strategic alliances literature on the relation between alliances and 
firm performance has been limited to studies that investigate the effects of firm-level and 
alliance-level factors on firm-level performance measures. These studies used event study 
methodology in order to reveal when a firm enjoys greater than abnormal stock returns 
following its alliance announcement and thus creates more value in its alliance (Gulati, 
Lavie, and Singh, 2009; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002). For instance, Koh and Venkatraman 
(1991) and McConnell and Nantell (1995) showed that joint venture formation has a 
positive effect on abnormal stock returns. Likewise, Chung, Kofrod and Lee (1993) found 
that international joint ventures create value for firms. Das, Sen and Sengupta (1998) found 
that technology alliances create more value than marketing alliances. Anand and Khanna 
(2000) and Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) demonstrated the positive effects of alliance 
capabilities on abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements. Similarly, 
Kalaignanam, Shakar, and Varadarajan (2007) focused on firm and alliance-level factors 
that explain the differences in short-term changes in shareholder values of small and large 
established firms following the announcements of new product development alliances. 
However, all of these studies paid little attention to the relationship between governance 
choices and a firm’s abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements. For 
example, little is known about whether higher monetary incentives would result in higher 
abnormal stock returns for startup firms. Likewise, there is a limited understanding of the 
link between the intensity of project-level governance exercised by an incumbent and a 
startup’s abnormal stock returns following the announcement of the alliance. 
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The factors that influence the performance of inter-organizational new product 
development projects are central to the innovation management literature. This literature 
primarily focuses on the negative effects of control on innovation and creativity, by 
drawing upon the findings of previous studies conducted in a single firm product 
development setting (Amabile 1983, Andrews and Smith, 1996; Thompson, 1965; 
Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek, 1973). For instance, Carson (2007) used the control 
theories of innovation in the setting of outsourced development projects and revealed 
negative effects of control on the supplier’s innovation performance. This literature, 
however, generally does not take into account the relation between monitoring and 
monetary incentives, i.e., the reciprocal effects between the two. This can be problematic, 
particularly if complementarities exist, because monetary incentives offered to startups can 
compensate for the downsides of control. Furthermore, previous studies have been 
restricted to the relation between control and partnership performance while overlooking 
the effects of control on firm-level performance, particularly on the performance of the 
innovative partner. 
Agency theory provides useful insights into the performance impacts of monitoring and 
monetary incentives in principal-agent relationships characterized by the separation of 
ownership and control. In startup-incumbent R&D alliances, startups represent agents and 
incumbents represent principals. Because incumbents license the development and 
commercialization rights of the technologies developed by startups, their interests are 
aligned with alliance performance. Yet, the transfer of the rights to incumbents makes 
startups less concerned about the market success, causing goal incongruence. In other 
words, startups become more risk-averse than incumbents. Furthermore, the licensing 
agreement makes incumbents depend on startups’ early stage research and development 
decisions and efforts; activities that are beyond the incumbents’ control (Deeds, 1999; 
Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, and Santoro, 2008). 
Classical agency theory suggests that in settings where agents and principals have 
divergent interests, principals need to rely on monitoring and monetary incentives to 
protect their interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Specifically, principals 
employ monitoring and monetary incentives simultaneously to minimize their output 
measurement errors in settings that involve high environmental dynamism and ambiguity 
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(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007; Shapira, 2000). 
The proponents of the complementarities view, therefore, argue that these two governance 
mechanisms complement each other for enhancing performance in uncertain and 
ambiguous settings such as collaborative R&D. However, there still remains controversy 
over whether the combination of these two mechanisms generate higher performance 
(Hoskisson, Castleton, and Whithers, 2009; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007). In 
this paper, by drawing upon the behavioral agency theory model (Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998), we develop an alternative hypothesis to challenge the complementarities 
view in the context of strategic R&D alliances. We argue that although there is a positive 
reciprocal relation between project-level governance and monetary incentives (as we 
showed in the previous chapter), the two mechanisms reveal opposite effects on 
performance, i.e. project-level governance has negative effects and monetary incentives 
have positive effects, resulting in the partial satisfaction of the complementarities 
conditions. Furthermore, by concentrating on the relationship between the startups’ private 
benefits and the two governance mechanisms, we propose that the same will also be true 
for their impacts on startups’ performance. 
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4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Agency theory and startup-incumbent strategic R&D alliances 
Strategic alliances are long-term collaborations between two or more firms during which 
they share their resources, knowledge and capabilities to create value and competitive 
advantage (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Spekman et al, 1998). Joint R&D alliances between 
startups and incumbents represent one pervasively observed type of alliance, in which 
startups grant the commercialization licenses of their technologies to incumbents and 
cooperate with them on the development and commercialization of the products pertaining 
to the licensed technologies. As a consequence of these license grants, ownership is 
separated from control in these alliances. Therefore, although incumbents have market 
ownership of the product associated with the license, the successful launch of the product 
depends highly on the decisions made by startups during the research and development 
stages. In fact, early stage research and development decisions are typically made by 
startups, because they have the necessary knowledge and expertise to make effective 
decisions as inventors of scientific outputs. As a result, although market ownership belongs 
to the incumbents, they are less capable of controlling R&D decisions. 
This separation of ownership from control causes two generic problems for principals, 
as described by agency theory. The first problem, moral hazard, is defined as the tendency 
of agents to shirk their responsibilities, not invest the necessary efforts in the alliances, and 
act opportunistically (Deeds, 1999; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). For example, a startup may 
prefer not to assign its best personnel to the alliance. Alternatively, it may not share its 
proprietary knowledge with the partner and in turn cause difficulties to its partner 
especially at the late-stages of development. The second problem, adverse selection, refers 
to the principals’ inability to verify the information that agents provide (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1985; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007). This is a particularly 
important issue in the context of R&D alliances because of the high degree of technical 
novelty involved. This high degree of novelty can make assessments on the quality of the 
startups’ outputs difficult for incumbents.  
Agency theory offers two solutions to principals in order to mitigate agency problems 
stemming from moral hazard and adverse selection. First, principals can rely on 
monitoring to a higher extent in order to collect more information about agents. The 
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increase in monitoring will result in a decrease in information asymmetries and a better 
verification of agents’ efforts. Furthermore, agents will act less opportunistically because 
of the increased monitoring they face. Finally, strict levels of monitoring to prevent the 
opportunistic behavior of agents might also limit the agent’s decision making authority, 
causing a higher degree of interest alignment. In the context of strategic R&D alliances, 
the alliance representatives of incumbents appointed to project manager, alliance manager, 
and committee membership roles in order to carry out day-to-day task monitoring. Each of 
these representatives has the responsibility to monitor the alliance’s progress. Committee 
membership roles are designated to facilitate the incumbents’ review of startups’ 
deliverables. The committee members have formal decision-making authority allowing 
them to make key go-no-go decisions and resolve conflicts between partners. Overall, we 
define this type of operational, day-to-day monitoring and control by the representatives of 
incumbents as project-level governance – the greater the use of these formal alliance 
representative roles, the more intense the project-level governance.  
In addition to monitoring, principals may employ performance-based incentive 
mechanisms in order align their incentives with the agents’ incentives. In the context of 
strategic R&D alliances, incumbents rely extensively on milestone-based incentive 
schemes designed to reward startups when they reach certain milestones such as prototype 
designs, development tests, and product launches (Davida, Foster, and Li, 2009). 
Although agency theory suggests the use of monitoring and monetary incentives to 
mitigate agency problems, research on the exact relationship between monitoring and 
monetary incentives provides mixed results. Specifically, while some empirical studies in 
the corporate governance setting showed that they complement each other (Hoskisson, 
Castleton, and Withers, 2009; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and 
Brown, 2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997), others found that they substitute each 
other (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). In the context of strategic R&D 
alliances between startups and incumbents, we demonstrated, in the previous chapter, that 
these mechanisms complement each other. The reason that higher monetary incentives lead 
to greater project-level governance is due to the incumbents’ increased need to effectively 
evaluate the performance of startups; performance that is tied to their compensation. On 
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the other hand, startups require higher monetary incentives because greater project-level 
governance by incumbents increases their performance risks.  
Alliance performance implications of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives 
Agency theory focuses on the maximization of the principals’ interests. In a strategic R&D 
alliance, the main interest of an incumbent, i.e. the principal, is to own a marketable 
product at the end of the alliance. Project-level governance helps incumbents achieve this 
goal by minimizing any self-serving and opportunistic behavior of startups. Facing strict 
governance, a startup is less likely to behave against the interests of its partner. 
Strict governance, however, may result in negative consequences. For instance, project-
level governance may limit a startup’s ability to apply its expertise because of the 
intervention of the incumbent’s representatives in their R&D decisions. In addition, 
startups may lose their intrinsic motivation to contribute to the alliance. Previous studies 
contend that scientists and engineers in entrepreneurial firms must have fun in performing 
their tasks in order to develop creative and innovative solutions (Gottschalg and Zollo, 
2007; Ness, 2009). Hence, control might negatively influence the intrinsic motivation of a 
startup firm, which in turn decreases alliance innovation performance. Yet, these negative 
consequences of strict governance can be mitigated by monetary incentives. Increasing the 
magnitude of monetary incentives may increase a startup’s willingness to contribute its 
expertise to the alliance by balancing its interests with its partner’s interests. Furthermore, 
monetary rewards may compensate for the loss of intrinsic motivation due to the over-
control. Hence, monetary incentives help incumbents effectively implement project-level 
governance and in turn achieve benefits rather than losses from strict governance. 
It may also be the case that project-level governance helps incumbents effectively 
implement pay-for-performance type monetary incentives. When the proportion of 
compensation tied to performance increases, agents have tendency to misrepresent the 
results of their efforts (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Hunt 1986). Therefore, principals 
require greater monitoring to measure the performance of agents with less error 
(Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). For 
example, it is less likely that startups misrepresent their results to earn milestone payments 
when strict project-level governance is exercised on them. In that sense, project-level 
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governance curbs problems that may arise in the implementation of pay-for performance 
schemes by improving an incumbent’s ability to verify the outcomes of its startup partner. 
Therefore, the combination of project-level governance and monetary incentives should 
generate higher alliance innovation performance than either control mechanism in 
isolation. 
   
Hypothesis 1: Project-level governance and monetary incentives 
 complement each other in explaining alliance innovation 
 performance. 
 
The complementarities view of classical agency theory predicts that greater project-
level governance by incumbents, encouraged in part by higher monetary incentives, 
increases alliance innovation performance. This is because incumbents use project-level 
governance to ensure that they reward their partners with minimum error. Such a 
conclusion requires the assumption that alliance representatives can without any biases 
accurately assess the efforts and outputs of startups. Behavioral agency theory differs from 
the complementarities view of classical agency theory in this assumption. According to 
behavioral agency theorists, the controllers of principals typically do not utilize accurate 
and unbiased information about the agent’s efforts (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Furthermore, they argue that performance appraisals will be 
influenced by the backgrounds of evaluators, thus controllers with diverse backgrounds 
will have different opinions on the performance of a startup, which in turn makes reaching 
a consensus riskier (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Therefore, as project-level 
governance increases, startups bear higher risks. 
When startups bear higher risks, they will be less willing to take risks. Knowing that 
taking risks may lead to negative evaluations because of ambiguities in performance 
appraisals, startups will opt for less riskier decisions. As a result of this risk aversion, 
startups will explore less and invest less time in riskier efforts. However, this behavior 
hampers the development of successful products because innovation requires risk-taking 
and exploration (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995, March, 1991). By not investing the time 
and effort in attempts with a possibly high variance in outcomes, as a means to avoid 
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negative appraisals by the incumbents’ alliance representatives, a startup is making a trade-
off between long-term innovation performance and short-term partner satisfaction. To 
avoid the short-term losses of alliance termination due to negative evaluations of riskier 
efforts, startups may avoid taking risks. Hence, we expect that project-level governance by 
the incumbents’ alliance representatives can result in the reduction of risk taking by 
startups and in turn, reduce alliance innovation performance.        
Interestingly, project-level governance may lead to risk averse behavior on the part of 
the incumbents as well, particularly when the size of contingent payments are higher. In 
other words, monetary incentives negatively moderate the relationship between project-
level governance and the incumbent’s risk taking. When incumbents try to minimize their 
measurement errors by forming more complex project-level governance modes, they may 
become too strict that they either steer the project to a path where they can assess the 
performance easily or completely terminate it when they receive some initial negative 
feedback. This effect will be stronger for alliances with higher performance-based 
payments, because the higher the magnitude of payments, the higher the incumbents’ 
alliance representatives’ risk. Alliance representatives bear the risks of wrong go/approval 
decisions to a higher extent the greater the size of the startup’s compensation for 
performance is. This scenario instantiates a low-probability loss frame for the incumbent’s 
alliance representatives, thus increasing the tendency to limit the innovativeness of the 
project or completely terminate it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In addition, alliance 
representatives typically lack the necessary in-depth knowledge to evaluate the technology 
of their partner, because the startups brought highly specialized technologies to the R&D 
alliances. Hence, it is less costly for them to sway the direction of a project in a way that 
makes assessments easier or yields a termination, rather than take risks and commit 
themselves.  
However, innovation projects are, in general, high risk-high return projects that require 
risk-taking to facilitate experimentation. The innovation management literature tells us that 
new product development entails experimenting with new ways of doing as well as 
learning from failures (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). As long as project-level governance, 
because of higher monetary incentives offered to startups, functions to inhibit startups’ 
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experimentation and confront them with their failures, it will negatively influence 
innovation and reduce the likelihood that marketable products will be developed.  
Although we challenge the prediction of classical agency theory’s complementarities 
view on the direct effect of project-level governance on alliance innovation performance, 
we still hold its prediction on the positive impact of monetary incentives on performance. 
As monetary incentives grow, startups will take risks and invest time and effort in 
innovative attempts, which in turn increase the chances of developing successful products.  
However, two control mechanisms do not completely satisfy complementarity 
conditions. If project-level governance, encouraged in part by higher monetary incentives, 
decreases and higher monetary incentives, encouraged in part by greater project-level 
governance, increases, then the project-level governance and monetary incentives offset 
each other in explaining alliance innovation performance and the chances of developing 
marketable products,. Therefore, 
        
Hypothesis 2: Project-level governance and monetary incentives 
 offset each other in explaining alliance innovation performance. 
 
Thus far, we concentrated on the effects of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives on innovation performance in alliances. It is possible, however, that these 
mechanisms influence firm-level performance; particularly the performance of startup 
firms. We discuss next how the market’s perception of the value creation potential of a 
strategic alliance for a startup firm might be shaped by the degree of project-level 
governance exercised on the startup and the magnitude of monetary incentives offered to 
startup. 
 
Firm-level performance implications of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives 
Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998) distinguish an alliance’s private benefits from its 
common benefits. According to them, private benefits are those that accrue to individual 
firms, and common benefits are those that accrue collectively to all participants in the 
alliance. In a startup-incumbent alliance, both private and common benefits determine a 
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startup’s value creation and in turn, its abnormal returns following the alliance 
announcement. Nevertheless, some private benefits are accrued at the expense of the other 
partner. This is because, while common benefits create value for both partners, some 
private benefits create value for one partner at the expense of the other and other private 
benefits create value for one partner without destroying the value of the other partner 
(Kumar, 2010). Such value destroying private benefits necessitate the use of contractual 
safeguards by the firm whose value is at risk of destruction, because of the opportunistic 
actions of the other firm (Parkhe 1993).   
Strategic R&D alliances offer several opportunities for startup firms to create private 
benefits. These benefits, such as access to financial resources, an increase in prestige and 
legitimacy, connections to the suppliers and customers of incumbents, and access to the 
marketing and alliance management expertise of incumbents can be exploited by the 
startup outside of the terms of the alliance and in turn induce a positive market reaction. 
However, some of these benefits might be derived at the expense of the incumbent. One 
well known example is the cross-subsidizing problem, i.e. the use of money provided by 
the project sponsor not only for the sponsor’s project, but also for other projects (Lerner 
and Malmandier, 2010). Likewise, a startup firm may use its partner’s network to form or 
expand its own network. Furthermore, the startup may bypass the connections of the 
incumbent to get in touch with new customers and partners, resulting in the destruction of 
the incumbent’s value.   
Intense governance of the startup, exerted by alliance representatives of the incumbent, 
however, reduces the chance that the startup can gain these types of private benefits. First, 
project-level governance limits the startup’s ability to utilize the incumbent’s research 
funding outside the scope of the alliance, thus negatively impacting cross-subsidizing. 
Likewise, it is difficult for the startup to transfer its human resources from one project to 
another under intense project-level governance. In addition, the formalization of 
communication channels through the formation of committees serves to hamper the 
uncontrolled transfer of contacts, knowledge and capabilities to the startup firm. Hence, 
greater project-level governance, encouraged in part by monetary incentives, reduces the 
startup’s value creation at the expense of its partner and thus, negatively influences a 
startup’s abnormal stock market return following the alliance announcement.   
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In contrast, the market will react positively to alliance announcements with high 
monetary incentives. Although monetary incentives are conditional payments, they send  
signals to the market that the startup firm has a chance of receiving additional cash flows 
in the short term. Indeed, these cash flows, when received, can be used by the startup at its 
own discretion. Therefore, they represent an important source of private benefits that can 
be accrued by the startup firm, albeit not at the expense of its partner. Hence, higher 
monetary incentives, encouraged in part by greater project-level governance, will increase 
the startup’s abnormal stock market returns following the alliance announcement. 
Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Project-level governance and monetary incentives 
 neutralize each other in explaining a startup’s abnormal stock      
 returns  following an alliance announcement. 
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4.3 DATA AND METHODS 
The empirical setting of the study is the U.S. biotechnology industry, the same empirical 
setting of the study in the previous chapter. We utilize a longitudinal research methodology 
and event study methodology to reveal the antecedents of alliance innovation performance 
and a startup’s abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements, respectively.   
We obtained a significant portion of alliance information from Recombinant Capital 
(Recap), a California-based consultancy firm recently acquired by Deloitte. Recap 
provided us with deal data including, potential milestone payments, upfront payments, 
equity investments, therapeutic areas, stage at signing, alliance formation year, and 
technology bases. More importantly, Recap enabled us to identify R&D alliances whose 
contracts are publicly available. We then used the SEC Edgar database to collect publicly 
available contracts. From these contracts, we obtained information about project-level 
governance by analyzing the collaboration governance section, typically the second section 
of these contracts. We collected data for other independent variables from the Compustat 
database, and publicly available sources such as the firm’s annual reports and industry-
specific trade journals. 
The alliance innovation performance data came from multiple secondary data sources. 
For each alliance, we searched for announcements of test results and alliance 
termination/expansion decisions from different sources including publicly available data 
sets such as clinicaltrials.gov, FDA.com, and ema.europe.eu, the biotechnology firm’s 
annual reports, the pharmaceutical firm’s websites giving information about their product 
pipelines, industry magazines, and internet search engines. Likewise, the daily stock return 
data of the biotech companies came from archival data sources, mainly from publicly 
available datasets on the Web.   
Samples 
We use two different samples to test our hypotheses. The first one is the same sample of 
the previous section, i.e. the sample of 220 randomly selected strategic R&D alliances 
between U.S.-based biotechnology firms and global pharmaceutical firms. We test our 
hypotheses pertaining to alliance innovation performance on this sample. Because we used 
the same sample, the sample selection criteria is also the same: 
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x One partner is a biotechnology firm and the other partner is a pharmaceutical 
firm; 
x None of the partners was a government agency, a nonprofit organization, or a 
university; 
x The biotechnology firm must be U.S.-based; 
x There exists at least one R&D component of the alliance complemented with a 
licensing agreement in which the biotechnology firm grants technology rights  to 
a pharmaceutical firm; 
x The market potential and technical difficulties of different alliances must be close 
to each other and both of them must be high; 
x The type of alliance is either a contractual alliance or minority equity alliance that 
does not result in the creation of a new entity. 
 The second sample, however, is a sub-set of the first sample because of the limited 
availability of data for calculating abnormal market returns. This was due to three reasons. 
First, there were private companies in the first sample for which the information on their 
stock market values was not available. Second, several firms were acquired or were 
bankrupt at the time of data collection, and as a result, they were deleted from stock 
exchanges, which in turn made it difficult for us to find their previous stock prices. Finally, 
several biotechnology firms had completed their IPOs just before their alliance formations, 
therefore it was not possible to find the necessary history of stock return data for these 
firms. As a result, we ended up with 116 strategic R&D alliances for which the biotech’s 
stock returns, following alliance announcements, can be calculated and classified as 
abnormal or not. 
Model identification  
At first glance, we have two equations to solve, one for the alliance innovation 
performance and the other for the abnormal stock returns of the startup. Yet, as a result of 
the complementarities between project-level governance and monetary incentives, we need 
to identify two additional equations for the two endogenously determined variables in the 
system: project-level governance and monetary incentives.  Because of the presence of the 
endogeneity, we cannot treat these two variables as exogenous determinants of alliance 
innovation performance and the biotech’s abnormal stock returns. Hence, we use the 
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simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) approach to generate estimates for the coefficients 
of project level-governance and monetary incentives (Wooldridge, 2002).  
SEM requires the identification of equations for each endogenous variable. As 
monetary incentives and project-level governance are two of the four endogenous variables 
in the model, we first identified equations for them: (1) the monetary incentives equation, 
and (2) the project-level governance equation. The right-hand side of each equation 
consists of an endogenous independent variable (i.e. project-level governance in the 
monetary incentives equation and monetary incentives in the project-level governance 
equation), exogenous independent variables that are used only in a single equation (i.e. 
potential identifying variables), exogenous independent variables used in both equations, 
and an error term.  
We use the year effects, the therapeutic areas covered by the alliance, the listing of the 
biotech in the stock market, the biotech’s age at alliance formation, and the incumbent’s 
R&D intensity as the identifying variables for the monetary incentives equation. The year 
effects account for the change in market conditions in the industry. Specifically, after the 
late 1990s the market shifted from a buyer’s market to a seller’s market (Van Brunt, 2008). 
This is because the increased rivalry caused by generic drug producers (Hamel and 
Valikangas, 2003) and increased regulations by the FDA that resulted in higher attrition 
rates (Kola and Landis, 2004), both of which led pharmaceutical firms to rely more on 
biotechnology firms to innovate. As a consequence, the bargaining power of biotechnology 
firms increased considerably. In turn, for biotechnology firms, the chances to close deals 
with relatively higher levels of monetary incentives increased considerably. Another 
reason for including year effects in the equation is that we can control for changes in 
economic conditions. For instance, the 2005-2007 period experienced a peak in megadeals 
due to the positive economic conditions. During this period, large firms were likely to 
easily find the resources necessary to invest in alliances.  
Therapeutic areas covered in an alliance can potentially influence the level of monetary 
incentives. The reason is, as the number of therapeutic areas increases, the level of project 
complexity increases, which makes development more challenging. As a result, 
biotechnology firms are likely to be compensated by pharmaceutical firms for the extra 
effort required to develop a compound for alternative therapeutic uses.  
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The level of monetary incentives may also depend on whether a biotechnology firm is a 
publicly traded or private firm. Publicly traded firms send signals to the market through 
their announcements (Janney and Folta, 2003; Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). For a 
publicly traded firm, an alliance announcement with substantial monetary incentives is a 
key signal to market investors because potential payments may generate revenues in the 
future. Therefore, publicly traded biotechnology firms will negotiate more on monetary 
incentives than private firms and strive to close a deal with substantial monetary 
incentives. The age of a biotechnology firm might also affect its bargaining power. 
Younger firms face the liability of newness and rely more on incumbent firms (Freeman, 
Carroll, and Hannan, 1983). As a result, they have less bargaining power in negotiations. 
However, as entrepreneurial firms age, they obtain access to alternative financial 
resources, build partnerships with other incumbents, and increase their legitimacy in the 
market. Thus, it is relatively easier for older biotechnology firms to close a deal with 
higher levels of monetary incentives. Finally, a pharmaceutical firm’s R&D intensity may 
have a positive impact on the level of monetary incentives. This is because firms with 
higher R&D expenditures to sales ratios are likely to be more willing to invest in both 
internal and external R&D.   
We use the level of payments committed and the stage at signing as the identifying 
variables for the project-level governance equation. As noted, project-level governance 
provides an incumbent firm with the opportunity to monitor its partner and intervene in 
key development decisions. Therefore, when the required degree of monitoring and 
intervention is high, the degree of project-level governance will also be high. The level of 
committed payments (i.e., the total of license fees, equity investments, research funding 
and reimbursement of prior R&D expenses) can influence both the required degree of 
monitoring and intervention. As the level of committed payments increases, the 
pharmaceutical firm faces a hold-up problem to a higher extent, because of the 
irreversibility of its investments (Williamson, 1991). As a result, it will monitor the 
activities of the biotech firm to a higher extent in order to avoid any opportunism and 
intervene in the biotech firm’s decisions to a higher extent in order to adjust its risks. 
Therefore, we expect that the higher the level of committed payments, the higher the 
degree of project-level governance. 
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Rothaermel (2001b) and Santoro and McGill (2005) showed that early stage alliances 
had higher uncertainty than late stage alliances. Thus, early-stage R&D alliances involve 
tasks that demand higher levels of creativity and problem-solving ability from the 
biotechnology firms. This requires that the pharmaceutical firm must give more leeway. 
We expect, therefore, that early-stage alliances require lower degrees of project-level 
governance compared to those formed at later stages.  
We include exclusivity of license, equity and cross-border in both equations to control 
for their effects. When the license is non-exclusive, a biotechnology firm can grant the 
commercialization rights of the compound to other firms. This causes a hold-up problem 
for the pharmaceutical firm (Somaya et al., 2011; Williamson, 1991). As a result, the 
pharmaceutical firm will monitor the activities of the biotech to a higher extent in order to 
avoid any opportunism and intervene in the biotech’s decisions to a higher extent in order 
to adjust its risks. Therefore, we expect that non-exclusivity leads to higher degrees of 
project-level governance. Furthermore, as biotechnology firms will face fewer 
performance risks under a nonexclusive license agreement, the level of monetary 
incentives will be lower. Hence, non-exclusivity is likely to have a negative impact on the 
level of monetary incentives. A minority investment alliance is more effective in aligning 
the incentives of partners than a non-equity contractual alliance (Gulati and Singh, 1998, 
Pisano 1989). Therefore, we expect that the presence of equity investment will reduce the 
degree of project-level governance and the level of monetary incentives. In addition,  
cross-border alliances may cause higher monitoring requirements for a pharmaceutical 
firm because of the unfamiliarity with the partner’s way of doing business. Therefore, 
cross-border alliances are likely to have higher degrees of project-level governance. 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical firm needs to incentivize a cross-border partner more than a 
local partner, because approaching a cross-border partner signals that there is a limited 
number of available partners in its own region. In negotiations, the biotechnology firm may 
take advantage of this situation and demand higher levels of monetary incentives. Finally, 
biotechnology firms typically deploy a mixed set of technologies, with varying costs, to 
develop products. These technologies represent scientific techniques and tools utilized to 
develop products. To control for their effects on monetary incentives and monitoring, we 
also included them in both equations. 
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We also identified two equations for the two main dependent variables in the system of 
equations. The first is the alliance innovation performance equation and the second is the 
startup’s abnormal stock returns equation. Following the literature on alliance 
performance, we control for the effects of the task, partner, and experience-related factors 
that might influence alliance innovation performance and a startup’s value creation in a 
strategic alliance. Therefore, we controlled for the effects of the number of therapeutic 
areas, the stage at signing, the presence of equity investment, the presence of a non-local 
incumbent partner, the number of prior deals between partners and the number of 
technologies employed by the biotech firm.   
Measures 
Main dependent variables   
Alliance Innovation Performance 
Alliance innovation performance represents the extent of success of pre-commercialization 
activities by the partners.  It was operationalized as an ordinal variable with scores of 0, 1, 
and 2, corresponding to low, moderate, and high success scores, respectively. We assigned 
the highest score, 2, to alliances in which the partners were successful in developing a drug 
that received an approval from either the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) or the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA). We assigned a score of 1 to alliances for which partners were 
still not successful by January 2011 in developing a drug that received an approval from 
either the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency (EMA), but the 
partners had not terminated the alliance for any reason; or the incumbent partner licensed-
in the compound developed during the partnership, but decided not to ally with the startup 
for further development. Finally, the score 0 was assigned to alliances terminated without 
any successful drug approvals or licensing-ins by incumbents.       
Biotech’s abnormal stock returns 
We measured the firm-level value creation effects of strategic R&D alliance events by 
calculating the cumulative abnormal stock market return (CAR) for each alliance 
announcement. CAR is an ex ante market-based measure of expected return for a firm 
participating in an alliance.  It has been extensively used as a performance measure in 
alliance event studies (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Chung, Koford,and Lee, 1993; 
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Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers, 1986; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; McConnell and Nantell, 
1985; Park and Kim, 1997; Reuer and Koza, 2000).  
We calculated abnormal returns using residual analysis of the market model (Fama et 
al., 1969). Based on the alliance announcement, the event date was set as t = 0. We 
estimated the market model for the period t = [−250,−10]: rit = αi + βi rmt + εit, where rit is 
the common stock return of firm i on day t , rmt is the corresponding daily market return on 
the Nasdaq biotechnology index, αi and βi are firm-specific parameters, and εit is the error 
term. The resulting estimates were used for predicting the daily returns for firm i over the 
two-day event window [−1, 0]:  ritഥ = αഥi+ βiഥ rmt , where ritഥ  is the predicted return, and αഥi and 
βiഥ  are the model estimates. We calculated the daily firm-level abnormal returns: εiഥt = rit − 
ritഥ , and then computed the cumulative abnormal return of firm i during the event window 
using the formula: CARi = ∑t εiഥt, where t ranges from −1 to 0. 
 
Endogenous variables 
Monetary incentives 
Monetary incentives refer to the total dollar value of the deal; that is the sum of research 
and development milestone payments offered to a biotech firm by its pharmaceutical 
partner. These are potential payments that will be made when the biotech firm achieves the 
specific milestones defined in the agreement. Given its evidently right skewed distribution, 
we use the natural logarithm in our estimations. We also control for the effects of inflation. 
We created inflation-adjusted values by taking 1996 as the base year. 
Project-level governance 
This variable captures whether senior and middle-level managers of a pharmaceutical firm 
were appointed to committee membership, alliance management or project management 
roles. As mentioned, we obtained scores for this variable by reading the ‘alliance 
governance’ sections of the agreements. These sections describe in detail which joint 
committees were formed and whether liaison personnel, such as project and alliance 
managers, were appointed.  
Under the monitoring of joint steering committees, specialized joint functional 
committees exist. We considered joint functional committees in two separate groups. The 
first group, core joint functional committees, includes those associated with either a core 
upstream or downstream alliance activity. Joint research, development, commercialization, 
4.3 Data and Methods                                                                                                  109 
 
and manufacturing committees constitute the fundamental upstream and downstream 
functional committees formed in alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
firms. The second group, peripheral joint functional committees, involves committees 
responsible for activities pertaining to either finance or intellectual property rights. We call 
them peripheral because of their limited monitoring and decision-making rights. Typically, 
they provide input to decisions made by the core committees. For instance, joint patent 
committees assist research committees in specifying how a novel technology developed in 
the partnership can be protected and how the patent ownership can be handled. Similarly, 
joint finance committees assist joint research teams in controlling the costs of research 
activities or assisting commercialization committees in preparing a budget for co-
promotion activities. 
As a result of distinguishing core joint committees from peripheral ones, we ended up 
with four dimensions of project team structure: (1) core joint functional committees, (2) 
peripheral joint functional committees, (3) liaison personnel, and (4) steering committees.  
Parallel to the measurements used in prior studies, a weight was assigned to each of these 
dimensions based on their governance complexities (Kumar and Seth, 1998). A rank of 1 
was assigned to ‘peripheral joint functional committees’, 2 to ‘project and alliance 
managers’, 3 to ‘steering committees’, and 4 to ‘core joint functional committees’.  Then, 
the sum of the scores of each dimension divided by 243, the maximum score possible, was 
taken to obtain the score for the degree of project-level governance. We assigned the 
highest weight to joint functional committees, because through these committees an 
incumbent exerts the most intense monitoring of its partner in a particular functional 
domain. Furthermore, these committees are the first line of defense in resolving conflicts 
that arise in the alliance. The steering committees resolve conflicts that cannot be solved in 
the joint functional committees; they also have fewer chances to observe project activities 
as compared to joint committees. Hence, joint steering committees received a lower weight 
than joint functional committees. Liaison personnel have the right to participate in 
committee meetings, however they may not have decision-making/voting rights, or they 
                                                     
3 This is the maximum score obtained when governance consists of a joint peripheral 
committee, project managers, alliance managers, a steering committee, and joint research, 
development, commercialization, and manufacturing committees.  
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represent a single vote in decisions. They are mainly responsible for ensuring healthy 
communication between partners. Therefore, they received the weight of two.   
Exogenous variables 
For year effects, we included 13 dummies for each year. We used the year 2008 as the base 
category.  Therapeutic areas is a measure of the technical scope of an alliance. It captures 
the total number of therapeutic areas covered within the alliance agreement. For instance, 
if an alliance’s therapeutic area covers only two indications in total (e.g. cancer and central 
nervous system) this variable receives a value of 2. The variable Public is a dummy, coded 
as 1 if the biotechnology firm is publicly traded. The variable Biotech’s age is the 
difference between the alliance formation year and the biotech’s foundation year. The 
variable Pharma’s R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures to turnover.  
Following Santoro and McGill (2005), we included three dummy variables that 
represent the stages of drug development: Early research (i.e. formulation, discovery, lead 
molecule, pre-clinical), Early clinical (i.e. phase I, phase II), and Late clinical (i.e. phase 
III, BLA/NDA filed, and approved). We picked Late clinical as the base category. 
Committed payments measure a pharmaceutical firm’s upfront irreversible payments; this 
involves license fees, equity investments, research funding, and reimbursement of prior 
research expenses. Like monetary incentives, we use the natural logarithm of the variable 
and its inflation adjusted values using 1996 as the base year.   
We captured license exclusivity by an ordinal scale, 0 if the license is non-exclusive, 1 
if it is co-exclusive, 2 if it is exclusive. We included the Equity dummy, 1 if there is an 
equity investment by the incumbent and 0 otherwise. The variable Cross-border measures 
the nationality differences between partners. We coded this variable as 1 if the partnership 
is cross-border, and 0 otherwise. The variable Technologies measures the total number of 
different technologies used by the biotech to develop the solutions. Finally, we included 
prior deals, i.e., the number of prior alliances between the partners, to control for the 
effects of partner-specific experience on alliance innovation performance and startups’ 
abnormal stock returns. 
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Methods 
To generate the estimates for our system of linear equations with a discrete choice 
dependent variable, i.e. alliance innovation performance, we first derived the estimates for 
project-level governance and monetary incentives by three-stage least-squares (3SLS) 
estimation. Using 3SLS regression enables us to control for the endogeneity between 
project-level governance and monetary incentives. In the second step, we regress alliance 
innovation performance over the estimates of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives and the control variables. Because alliance innovation performance is an ordinal 
discrete choice dependent variable, taking values “low, moderate, or high performance”, 
we used ordered logit regression to generate the alliance innovation performance model 
estimates. However, because of the difficulties in interpreting the ordered logit estimates, 
we also conducted an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) of alliance innovation 
performance on explanatory variables by considering that linear probability models 
provide good approximations for the estimates of discrete choice models (Wooldridge, 
2002). As will be seen in our results, signs and significances are the same for the discrete 
choice model and the linear probability model. In addition, given that the linear probability 
models provided us with good approximations for the ordered logit model at average 
values of its independent variables, we could approximately calculate the effect sizes of 
independent variables, thereby having a better assessment of the practical importance of 
project-level governance and monetary incentives.     
Because abnormal stock returns is a continuous dependent variable, generating 
estimates for the abnormal stock returns model was relatively more straightforward. 
Similarly, we used 3SLS regression to control for the endogeneity between project-level 
governance and monetary incentives. We simultaneously solved three models to calculate 
3SLS estimates. We used the sample with 220 strategic R&D alliances for testing the 
alliance innovation performance model and the sample with 116 strategic R&D alliances 
for testing the biotech firm’s abnormal stock returns model. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
Tables 4.1 and 4.3 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for the alliance 
innovation performance model, respectively; whereas, Tables 4.2 and 4.4 illustrate the 
descriptive statistics and correlations for the biotech firm’s abnormal market returns 
model, respectively. Only 15 percent of alliances were successful in developing new drugs, 
i.e. receiving market approvals from the regulatory bodies in the US and/or Europe. Fifty-
two percent of them terminated without any successful outcomes and 33 percent of them 
were either terminated with licensing-in of the compound by the pharmaceutical firm or 
still in progress in January 2011. On the other hand, the average abnormal stock return of a 
biotech firm was 8.2 percent following the alliance announcement. 
  
Table 4. 1 Descriptive statistics (alliance innovation performance model , n=220) 
Variable Mean/Freqs Std. Dev. Variable Mean/Freqs Std. Dev. 
Alliance innov. per. = 0 0.52 - Early clinical 0.20 - 
Alliance innov. per. = 1 0.33 - Late Research 0.16 - 
Alliance innov. per. = 2 0.15 - 1996 0.04 - 
Ln (Monetary incentives) 4.36 1.44 1997  0.02 - 
Project-level governance 0.35 0.18 1998 0.07 - 
Therapeutic areas 1.43 0.83 1999 0.12 - 
Public 0.70 0.46 2000 0.10 - 
Biotech’s age 10.83 6.61 2001 0.06 - 
Pharma’s R&D intensity 0.14 0.57 2002 0.07 - 
Ln (Committed payments) 2.79 1.19 2003 0.06 - 
Exclusivity 1.79 0.49 2004 0.06 - 
Equity 0.36 0.48 2005 0.08 - 
Cross-border 0.60 0.49 2006 0.11 - 
Technologies 1.41 0.69 2007 0.12 - 
Early Research 0.64 - 2008 0.07 - 
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Table 4. 2 Descriptive statistics (biotech’s abnormal stock returns model , n=116) 
Variables Mean/Freqs Std. Deviation Variables Mean/Freqs Std. Deviation 
Biotech’s ASR .082 .12 Late clinical .17 - 
Ln (Monetary Incentives) 4.55 1.41 1996 .03 - 
Project-level governance .38 .18 1997 .03 - 
Therapeutic areas 1.37 .68 1998 .03 - 
Biotech’s Age 13.22 6.51 1999 .09 - 
Pharma’s R&D Intensity .15 .06 2000 .10 - 
Ln (Committed 
payments) 
3.06 1.15 2001 .05 - 
Exclusivity 1.79 .50 2002 .05 - 
Equity .27 .44 2003 .05 - 
Crossborder .60 .49 2004 .07 - 
Technologies 1.34 .60 2005 .12 - 
Prior deals .41 .90 2006 .10 - 
Discovery .57 - 2007 .16 - 
Early clinical .26 - 2008 .11 - 
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Table 4.5 presents the results of the regressions. Model 1 and Model 2 capture the 
complementarities between project-level governance and monetary incentives in the large 
and small samples, respectively. We report unstandardized 3SLS coefficients and standard 
errors for all of the equations of both models.  Model 3 is a logit model and captures the 
effects of project-level governance and monetary incentives on alliance innovation 
performance. We report odds ratios and standard errors in the equation. Model 4 is the 
linear probability model for the alliance innovation performance. Finally, Model 5 captures 
the effects of project-level governance and monetary incentives on the abnormal stock 
returns of biotechnology firms. We report standardized OLS coefficients and standard 
errors for each independent variable in Model 5. 
The significant and positive reciprocal relationship between project-level governance 
and monetary incentives exists in both Model 1 and Model 2. The coefficients for project-
level governance in the monetary incentives equations are positive and significant in both 
models (p < 0.001 , β = 6.48 ; p < 0.05 , β = 4.41, respectively) and the coefficients for 
Table 4. 4  Correlations (biotech’s abnormal stock returns model , n=116) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Biotech’s ASR 1           
2. Ln (Monetary 
incentives) 
.241** 1          
3. Project-level 
governance 
.125 .341** 1         
4. Therapaeutic areas .057 .161 -.054 1        
5. Biotech’s age -.020 .100 .049 .007 1       
6. Pharma’s R&D 
Intensity 
.142 .148 .283** .111 .178 1      
7. Exclusivity -.032 -.164 -.221* -.130 .109 -.100 1     
8. Equity .131 -.098 -.092 .159 -.137 .078 -.101 1    
9. Crossborder -.066 .089 -.040 .080 .002 -.049 -.089 -.187* 1   
10. Technologies -.076 -.009 -.098 .181 -.220* -.081 .031 -.046 -.104 1  
11. Prior deals -.075 -.033 .124 -.077 .153 .042 .052 -.120 -.066 -.029 1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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monetary incentives in the project-level governance equations are positive and significant 
in both models (p < 0.05 , β =0.03 ; p < 0.05 , β = 0.04 , respectively). 
Hypothesis 1 argues that project-level governance and monetary incentives 
complement each other in explaining alliance innovation performance. Contrary to the 
predictions of Hypothesis 1, the odds ratio for project-level governance in the alliance 
innovation performance equation is significant and smaller than 1 in Model 3, and the 
coefficient for project-level governance is significant and negative in Model 4. Hence, 
these results suggest that as the degree of project-level governance increases, the odds of 
developing a successful product in the course of an R&D alliance becomes smaller. Thus, 
greater project-level governance, encouraged in part by higher monetary incentives, 
negatively influences alliance innovation performance. The odds ratio value 0.0002 
indicates that project-level governance decreases the odds of developing successful 
products. For a one unit increase in project-level governance, the probability of a high 
alliance innovation performance event occurring versus the occurrence of the combined 
moderate and low alliance innovation performance events is close to 0.  
Hypothesis 2 states that project-level governance and monetary incentives neutralize 
each other in explaining performance. Because the coefficient for project-level governance 
in the alliance innovation performance equation is significant and negative and the 
coefficient for monetary incentives in the alliance innovation performance equation is 
significant and positive, Hypothesis 2 is supported. For a one percent increase in monetary 
incentives, the odds of high alliance innovation performance versus the combined 
moderate and low alliance innovation performance categories are 4.09 times greater 
(80.4% probability). Hence, monetary incentives, encouraged in part by greater project-
level governance, positively influence alliance innovation performance.  
Nevertheless, the innovation performance effects of project-level governance and 
monetary incentives are both mixed. The negative, direct effect of project-level governance 
is offset by an indirect, positive effect because of the complementarities between the two 
mechanisms and the direct positive effect of monetary incentives on alliance innovation 
performance. On the other hand, the positive, direct effect of monetary incentives is offset 
by an indirect, negative effect, because of the complementarities between the two 
mechanisms and the direct, negative effect of project-level governance on alliance 
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innovation performance. Model 4 provides a good explanation for the effect sizes of 
project-level governance and monetary incentives. For instance, the formation of two joint 
functional committees such as joint development and commercialization committees 
decreases the probability of high performance approximately 0.33*(-2.95*100/2), 48.7 
percentage points because of the direct negative effect of project-level governance on 
alliance innovation performance. On the other hand, the formation of two committees 
increases the log of monetary incentives by 6.48*0.33 = 2.14 units, which in turn increases 
the probability of success 2.14 (0.46*100/2), 49.2 percentage points. Hence the total effect 
size is 0.05 percentage points (0.05%). 
Hypothesis 3 argues that project-level governance and monetary incentives neutralize 
each other in explaining a startup’s abnormal stock returns following alliance 
announcements. This hypothesis is not supported. The reason is that the coefficient for 
project-level governance is not significant, though the coefficient for monetary incentives 
is significant and positive. Hence, the market only responds to monetary incentives and it 
is good for startups to announce higher monetary incentives to receive positive reactions 
from the market. Figure 4.1 summarizes the main findings of the study 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the other variables, we first note that alliances formed at early research stages 
have lower alliance innovation performance than alliances formed at the late stages of 
*/*(+) ***/*(+) 
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Figure 4. 1 Summary of results 
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development. Moreover, cross-border alliances are more successful than alliances between 
two partners located in the U.S.  
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
In this study, we examined vertical alliances between startups and incumbents and our 
results revealed that project-level governance decreases the likelihood of successful 
alliance outcomes. Therefore, we showed that the strict governance of incumbents by 
alliance representatives, which is partly triggered by monetary incentives, is likely to cause 
alliances without successful development outcomes. On the other hand, monetary 
incentives increase the odds of having successful alliance outcomes. In R&D alliances 
where incumbents offer relatively higher monetary incentives to startups, it is more likely 
that marketable products can be developed. These findings indicate that the innovative 
performance of a partnership is positively associated with monetary incentives, while it is 
negatively associated with the project-level governance of daily activities by the incumbent 
partner. Nevertheless, the direct negative effect of project-level governance is offset by its 
indirect positive effect on innovation performance, because of the complementarities 
between monetary incentives and project-level governance. Hence, the results confirm the  
behavioral agency view which predicts a neutralizing impact of project-level governance 
and monetary incentives on alliance innovation performance.  
Monetary incentives in strategic R&D alliances also influence the abnormal stock 
returns accrued to startups following the announcement of alliances. In other words, our 
findings suggest that monetary incentives affect a startup’s value creation in its strategic 
alliance with an incumbent firm, i.e. the higher the monetary incentives, the higher the 
startup firm’s abnormal stock return will be following the alliance announcement. On the 
other hand, we found no significant effects of project-level governance on abnormal stock 
returns following alliance announcements. This highlights an interesting fact about alliance 
deals and their valuation. Given that project-level governance has a negative effect on 
alliance innovation performance, it is surprising that investors do not take this negative 
effect into account when they consider investing in the startup firm following the alliance 
announcement. Hence, it appears that the decision-makers in the market overlook the 
direct negative performance effects of project-level governance when they determine the 
potential value of alliances to startup firms. 
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Theoretical contributions 
This study makes a number of contributions to the alliance governance literature, the 
innovation management literature, and agency theory. The findings of this work extend the 
lines of research on the relation between alliance governance mechanisms and alliance 
performance. To the best of our knowledge, previous studies in the strategic alliances 
literature have not examined the relationship between the size of performance-based 
monetary incentives and alliance performance. Moreover, previous studies that examine 
the relationship between project-level governance of partner activities and performance do 
not pay enough attention to the complementarities between project-level governance and 
monetary incentives. By showing that project-level governance and monetary incentives 
offset each other in explaining alliance innovation performance and that their total effect 
will increase the odds of success only marginally, we reveal that these two mechanisms are 
limited in their effectiveness. This phenomenon occurs because higher monetary incentives 
and greater project-level governance lead to greater risk aversion of both the startup firms 
and the incumbents’ alliance representatives, thus hampering the development of novel 
solutions and increasing the odds of alliance terminations before reaching their goals. 
Our findings regarding the complementarities between project-level governance and 
monetary incentives and the negative effect of project-level governance on alliance 
performance are in contrast with the expectations of the relational view in alliances. 
Although, we take only the control role of project-level governance into account in our 
study, alliance representatives play a key role in developing relational governance by 
building interpersonal trust and cooperation (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994). Although it seems that formal role relationships dominate at the alliance 
formation stage, and  only shift minimally in the direction of relational governance. If the 
shift was present and greater, we would have seen the positive effect of project-level 
governance on performance.  
In addition, the findings of this work advance our understanding of the link between 
governance and firm performance. Research has demonstrated that startups benefit from 
engaging in alliances with other firms (Stuart, 2000). However, the firm-level performance 
implications of governance choices have been overlooked (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and 
Singh, Forthcoming). By empirically showing that monetary incentives directly influence 
firm performance, we address this gap in the literature. Our finding regarding the positive 
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effect of monetary incentives on a startup’s abnormal stock returns following the alliance 
announcement reveals a key determinant of the performance of a startup firm.    
This dissertation also provides empirical contributions to the strategic alliances 
literature. To conduct our test, we developed measures for project-level governance, 
monetary incentives, and alliance performance. Our measure for project-level governance 
takes into account the differences in controllers, i.e., members of core and peripheral 
committees, alliance managers, and project managers, by assigning weights to each of 
them. We believe that developing such a measure is necessary because of differences in the 
control responsibilities of alliance representatives. On the other hand, as we discussed, we 
used pre-commercialization milestone payments tied to the performance of startups as a 
measure for monetary incentives in the setting of biopharmaceutical alliances. 
Furthermore, different from prior studies that measure performance by self-assessment 
questionnaires, we measure performance by using archival data sources; an approach that 
we believe results in a more accurate depiction of performance levels. 
Moreover, by showing the impacts of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives on the performance of startup-incumbent, vertical R&D alliances, we make 
another contribution to the organization of innovation literature. The finding regarding the 
negative impact of project-level governance on alliance innovation performance is 
consistent with the literature that discusses dysfunctions of control in innovative task 
settings (Andrews and Smith, 1996; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Carson, 2007; Ettlie, 1983; 
Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Thompson, 1965). Furthermore, this finding is in line with 
the literature on motivation and creativity which reports the negative impacts of control on 
intrinsic task motivation, and in turn, on creative performance (Amabile, 1998; Kreps, 
1997; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Yet, these literature streams have overlooked the 
importance of monetary incentives in determining the degree of project-level control as 
well as performance. We found that monetary incentives compensate for performance risks 
transferred to startups. Furthermore, we showed that monetary incentives, encouraged in 
part by project-level governance, positively influence performance. Therefore, even though 
there is a direct and negative effect of control on innovation performance, it indirectly 
increases performance because it causes increases in the monetary incentives demanded by 
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startups. By demonstrating these effects, we extended the prior research and provide more 
insights into the control mechanisms used in innovative task settings.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to agency theory. Although agency theory explains 
in detail the circumstances that lead to the use of monitoring and monetary incentives to 
protect the interest of principals, there is limited empirical research that examines how 
these two mechanisms affect the principals’ performance. Contrary to the predictions of 
the complementarities position, the simultaneous utilization of monetary incentives and 
project-level governance leads to negligible performance improvements in the context of 
startup-incumbent R&D alliances.  Hence, the behavioral agency model that takes into 
account the biases and inaccuracies of the performance appraisals made by the principals’ 
controllers, as well as their greater risk aversion under the presence of higher monetary 
incentives, explains the relationship, between the two governance mechanisms and 
performance, better. Therefore, our study extends the agency theory research by showing 
that the behavioral agency view is superior to the complementarities position in explaining 
the antecedents of alliance innovation performance.  Furthermore, the research setting for 
testing agency theory has been predominantly the corporate governance setting. To the best 
of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt at contrasting classical and behavioral 
agency theories in the context of strategic R&D alliances.  
Managerial implications 
Several managerial implications emerge from this paper. First, this study provides 
important insights for the managers of large established firms. These managers should be 
cautious about the degree of project-level governance that they will exert on their partner. 
This is not only because intense project-level governance leads to higher monetary 
incentives and possibly higher future payments to their partners, but it is also likely to have 
a negative impact on alliance performance. Hence, they must very carefully weigh 
advantages of control against its disadvantages. Furthermore, they should avoid short-term 
formal reviews and evaluations, because these managerial actions will inhibit problem-
solving ability of their partners. They should allow their partners to make mistakes and not 
punish them immediately by terminating the partnership on the grounds of possibly biased 
and fallacious evaluations. This is because without enough opportunities to probe and 
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search for the “right answer”, it is very difficult for a startup to transform its scientific 
output into a marketable product.      
Second, managers of small startup firms must think about the dysfunctions of day-to-
day control by incumbents when they negotiate alliance deals. Following the strategy of 
compensating performance risks posed by over-control through monetary incentives will 
help them avoid a problematic deal. Furthermore, they should take into account the fact 
that higher monetary incentives will lead to higher abnormal stock market gains.    
Finally, when they conducting value analysis, deal analysts must think about the link 
between day-to-day governance and performance at both the alliance and firm level. 
Giving more emphasis to monetary incentives as compared to project-level governance 
might result in misevaluations of a startup’s value creation in its R&D alliance with an 
incumbent. Therefore, analysts should gather information about the deal structure by 
analyzing contracts, by asking the alliance management units of incumbents, or by 
projecting an estimate based on prior deals made by the incumbent partner. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study is not without limitations, and we note them as possible future research 
opportunities. Our research shares the same limitations of any single industry study. While 
we have no reason to believe that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is less generalizable 
than any other setting, similar studies in other industries would be valuable.  
We primarily focus on the formal control-based roles and responsibilities of alliance 
representatives. Even though it helps us in explaining the relationship between project-
level governance, monetary incentives, and performance, the roles and responsibilities of 
alliance representatives are more diverse than modeled here. Previous studies addressed 
the various informal roles of alliance representatives. For instance, Spekman et al (1998) 
list seven different roles for alliance managers, among them: vision creation, strategic 
sponsorship of the partner, advocacy of alliance within the firm, networking to provide 
resources for the alliance and facilitating the growth of an alliance. These roles are 
different from the formal control and management roles of alliances used in this study.  
Likewise, Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and Robinson (2003) highlight the internal and 
external championing roles of alliance managers in addition to their role of controlling 
partner behavior. Although steering committee members and functional committee 
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members of a partner firm are primarily responsible for the formal control of the alliance 
that does not mean that they would not do internal and external championing. Therefore, 
the investigation, from different theoretical perspectives, of the relation between 
committee members and alliance managers of an incumbent firm and a startup firm during 
an alliance might present fruitful areas of research that can improve our understanding of 
alliance governance mechanisms and ultimately alliance performance. Future research may 
look at how the internal and external championing roles of alliance representatives affect 
alliance performance from the lenses of a resource dependency perspective. Future studies, 
that can successfully identify the circumstances under which the alliance representatives of 
incumbents provide key resources to their partners, would shed light on different aspects of 
the day-to-day governance of strategic R&D alliances. 
We employed agency theory in this dissertation when we investigated the relationship 
between project-level governance and monetary incentives and their effects on 
performance. Alternatively, future studies can use stewardship theory or an integrated 
version of stewardship and agency theories. Stewardship theory challenges the 
assumptions of agency theory by noting that not all agents are self-interested and 
motivated by financial rewards. While our research showed that monetary incentives 
increase alliance innovation performance, it is unclear for us to what extent startups are 
opportunistic. In practice, we know that startups have stakes in the future of their projects 
and they know that opportunism will be harmful not only to their partners but also to 
themselves. Therefore, a better design of monitoring and incentive mechanisms can be 
achieved if the premises of stewardship theory can be combined with the premises of 
agency theory. 
Research on the relationship between the alliance representatives of an incumbent and 
its startup partner might further benefit from the theories of corporate governance. Recent 
research on social influence tactics used in boardrooms (Stern & Westphal, 2010) may 
help researchers explain different outcomes of project-level governance. We showed here 
that when a startup faces higher performance risk, because of greater project-level 
governance, it tends to request higher monetary incentives to compensate its risks. 
Alternatively, a startup could use social influence tactics to gain political support of some 
representatives of incumbent firm. One social influence tactic that can be used by a startup 
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firm is to explicitly or implicitly offer executive management positions in the startup, one 
of its affiliates, or close collaborators. Knowing that he or she will be an executive director 
in one of the startup firms, the representative would be less vigilant in its evaluation of 
alliance outcomes developed by the startup. Hence, social influence tactics may weaken 
the need for higher monetary incentives in cases where the degree of project-level 
governance is high.      
Our results reveal several downsides in formal management principles and formal 
governance. Furthermore, we observed, in our sample, that on average more than 50% of 
R&D alliances were terminated without successful outcomes. These facts cause 
controversy over the effectiveness of the formal management principles used in innovation 
alliances as well as the effectiveness of alliances as organizational modes for innovation. 
Particularly, the industry experts in the US biopharmaceutical industry have been 
questioning the effectiveness of drug discovery and development models, in particular the 
formal management principles used by large pharmaceutical firms and the R&D alliances 
these firms form with small firms to develop new drugs have come under scrutiny. In 
response, industry experts are suggesting novel industry-level organizational forms to 
overcome the drawbacks of formalization and alliances in general (Roth and Cuatrecasas, 
2010). We believe further research is necessary to compare the innovation rates of internal 
R&D, external R&D through alliances, and novel forms of external R&D to help industries 
in designing the most effective industrial organization for innovation. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 KEY FINDINGS 
The objective of this dissertation was to demonstrate the antecedents and performance 
consequences of two overlooked governance mechanisms in the strategic alliances 
literature. The results indicate, overall, that both project-level governance and 
performance-based monetary incentives are central to alliance governance in the context of 
strategic R&D alliances (see Table 5.1 for the summary of findings). Specifically, both of 
these mechanisms play key roles in explaining alliance performance. 
In Chapter 2, we find that, in a setting of vertical and horizontal strategic R&D 
alliances, project-level governance positively influences performance through its effect on 
contractual complexity. We argue that this is because of the involvement of alliance 
representatives in contract design which results in more complete contracts which are 
robust to both operational problems and the unforeseen circumstances that may arise ex 
post. Thus, we show empirically that the involvement of alliance representatives increases 
contractual complexity, which in turn positively influences performance. 
In Chapter 3, we find that there is a positive reciprocal relationship between project-
level governance and performance-based monetary incentives in the context of vertical 
R&D alliances. In Chapter 4, we show that that project-level governance decreases the 
odds of successful product development. Therefore, we showed that strict governance by 
the incumbent’s alliance representatives, which is partly triggered by higher monetary 
incentives, is likely to cause alliances without successful development outcomes. On the 
other hand, monetary incentives increase the odds of successful product development. In 
R&D alliances, where incumbents offer relatively higher monetary incentives to startups, it 
is more likely that marketable products can be developed. These findings indicate that the 
innovative performance of a partnership is positively associated with monetary incentives, 
while it is negatively associated with the project-level governance of daily activities by the 
incumbent partner.  
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Table 5. 1 Summary of findings 
Chapters Key Findings Secondary Findings 
Chapter 2 1)  Negative reciprocal relationship 
between project-level governance and 
equity, 2) Positive reciprocal 
relationship between project-level 
governance and contractual 
complexity, 3) Stage at signing 
determines the degree of project-level 
governance. Late stage deals have 
greater project-level governance. 4) 
Contractual complexity, encouraged in 
part by project-level governance, 
positively affects alliance innovation 
performance. 
1) Alliance technical scope is a 
key determinant of contractual 
complexity. 2) Stage at signing 
influences both equity and 
alliance performance. Late stage 
deals are more likely to have 
equity investments and more 
likely to develop marketable 
products. 
Chapter 3 Positive reciprocal relation between 
project-level governance and 
monetary incentives in vertical R&D 
alliances between startups and 
incumbents. Greater project-level 
governance by incumbents increases 
the required degree of monetary 
incentives offered to startups, and vice 
versa. 
Year effects and alliance 
technical scope determine the 
magnitude of monetary 
incentives in vertical R&D 
alliances between startups and 
incumbents.  
Chapter 4 1) Monetary incentives have positive 
impacts on both alliance innovation 
performance and abnormal returns. 2) 
Project-level governance has a 
negative effect on alliance innovation 
performance and no effect on 
abnormal stock returns following 
alliance announcements. Hence, given 
the positive reciprocal relation of 
project level-governance and 
monetary incentives, their interactive 
effect on alliance innovation 
performance is neutralizing. 
1) Late stage alliances are more 
likely to have positive alliance 
outcomes. 2) Likewise, 
committed payments from 
incumbents to startups at the 
onset of R&D alliances, i.e. 
upfront cash payments and 
equity investments, increase the 
likelihood of success. 3) Cross-
border alliances are more likely 
to be successful than nation-
level alliances. 4) Even though 
these factors impact alliance 
innovation performance, none of 
them influences abnormal 
returns. 
 
 
Monetary incentives of strategic R&D alliances also determine the abnormal stock 
returns of startups following alliance announcements. We found a direct positive effect of 
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monetary incentive on abnormal stock returns. In other words, our findings suggest that 
monetary incentives positively influence a startup’s value creation in its strategic alliance 
with an incumbent firm. On the other hand, we found no significant effects of project-level 
governance on abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements. Despite its 
insignificance, the effect of project-level governance on abnormal stock returns was 
negative. These findings highlight an interesting fact about alliance deals and their 
valuation: given that project-level governance has a negative effect on alliance innovation 
performance, it is surprising that investors do not take this negative effect into account 
when they make their investment decisions following alliance announcements. Hence, it 
appears that the market imperfectly judges the relationship between the governance and 
value creation potential of an alliance. 
This dissertation also reveals several other antecedents to startup-incumbent R&D 
alliance performance. Payments committed by incumbents for startups have a marginally 
significant and positive effect on alliance performance. Furthermore, the stage at signing is 
an important determinant of whether any marketable product could be developed in an 
alliance. Late stage alliances have higher chances for developing marketable products than 
early stage alliances. Our results also show that cross-border deals have relatively higher 
chances of being successful than nation-level deals, although the coefficient was 
marginally significant. Different from our expectations, we found no significant effects of 
prior deals, i.e. partner-specific alliance experience, on performance. 
Finally, the results of this dissertation provide important insights into the antecedents of 
project-level governance and monetary incentives. In Chapters 2 and 3, we show that the 
degree of project-level governance hinges upon the presence of other governance 
mechanisms. More importantly, project-level governance is not only influenced by other 
governance mechanisms, but also influences them. Our results show that there is a positive 
bi-directional relationship between project-level governance and contractual complexity. 
Similarly, project-level governance and monetary incentives complement each other. Yet, 
the relationship between project-level governance and equity is one of substitution, i.e. 
greater project-level governance eliminates the need for equity investments, and vice versa. 
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We also identified several exogenous antecedents of project-level governance and 
monetary incentives. We find that the stage at signing of an R&D alliance affects project-
level governance. Late stage deals have relatively greater project-level governance than 
early stage deals. Our results show that the technical scope of the alliance determines 
monetary incentives. Incumbents are willing to offer higher monetary incentives to startups 
for which the alliances have broad rather than narrow scopes. 
5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Strategic alliances literature 
This dissertation makes a number of contributions to the alliance governance literature, the 
innovation management literature, and agency theory. First, this work extends the research 
on the determinants of alliance governance modes and the relationship between alliance 
governance mechanisms and alliance performance. Previous studies have primarily 
focused on the determinants of governance mechanisms including formal ones such as 
equity investments (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Sing 1998; Oxley 1997; Pisano 1989) and 
contractual complexity (Reuer and Arino, 2007) as well as informal ones such as trust (Das 
and Teng, 2001, Puranam and Vanneste, 2009, Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Although 
these studies provide important insights into circumstances under which firms form equity 
joint ventures instead of non-equity contractual alliances, craft detailed instead of 
incomplete contracts and use trust-based instead of formal governance, little attention is 
paid to the factors that determine the degree of project-level governance by alliance 
representatives and the size of monetary incentives offered by one partner to the other.  
The literature points out the use of committee members and boundary spanners to 
control and coordinate alliance activities (Child, Faulkner, and Tallman 2005; Gerwin and 
Ferris, 2004), and in general to govern alliance assets (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009); 
however, empirical tests to identify the determinants of the day-to-day governance are 
scarce. Our finding that late-stage alliances have greater project-level governance than 
early-stage alliances is consistent with studies that emphasize the control and monitoring 
functions of committee members and alliance managers (Child, Faulkner, and Tallman 
2005; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004, Mayer and Teece, 2008).  Additionally and consistent with 
Gerwin and Ferris (2004), the global alliance governance structure, i.e. equity vs. 
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contractual, affects the need for micro-level governance. Complementary to their 
substitution view, we show that the relationship also exists in the opposite direction: 
greater project-level governance eliminates the need for macro-level governance 
mechanisms. 
Our findings regarding the complementarities between project-level governance and 
monetary incentives and the negative effect of project-level governance on alliance 
performance are in contrast with the expectations of a relational view in alliances. 
Although, we solely take into account the control role of project-level governance in our 
work, previous studies note that alliance representatives play key roles in developing 
relational governance by building interpersonal trust and cooperation (Hoetker and 
Mellewigt, 2009; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Yet, it seems that formal role relationships 
are dominant at the alliance formation stage, and later on, they are less likely to transform 
into a relational governance approach. If it was the case, we would expect to see a positive 
effect of project-level governance on performance and a reduction in the requested 
monetary incentives.  
This dissertation also contributes to the stream of strategic alliances literature germane 
to inter-organizational contracting processes. Argyres and Mayer (2007) discuss that the 
managers and technical personnel of a firm function as the repositories of the firm’s 
contract capabilities. They suggest that these personnel play crucial roles in designing 
contractual terms primarily pertaining to ex ante specification of contingencies and 
operational problems. Likewise, Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and Robinson (2003) and 
Slowinski and Sagal (2003) contend that alliance representatives responsible for the day-
to-day management of alliances can improve alliance performance when they provide 
input at the contract negotiation and design stages. Consistent with these ideas, our work 
demonstrates that indeed greater project-level governance increases contractual detail, 
which in turn positively affects the performance.  
Our findings regarding (1) the complementarities between project-level governance and 
monetary incentives in the context of startup-incumbent R&D alliances, and (2) the 
complementarities between project-level governance and contractual complexity and (3) 
the substitution effects between project-level governance and equity in the broader context 
of strategic R&D alliances contribute to previous research on the inter-relationships of 
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alliance control mechanisms. While the existing literature primarily investigated whether 
formal and informal governance mechanisms complement or substitute each other 
(Agarwal, Croson and Mahoney, 2010; Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Hoetker and 
Mellewigt, 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ryall and Sampson, 2009), we concentrated on 
the relation between project-level governance and the other formal control mechanisms. 
Hence, we extend the debate on the relationship between formal and informal governance 
mechanisms by investigating the relationships between governance mechanisms with 
similar degrees of formalization.      
Revealing the antecedents and consequences of monetary incentives is one of the most 
important contributions of this study to the strategic alliances literature. To best of our 
knowledge, this dissertation is the first to show the antecedents and consequences of the 
magnitude of pay-for-performance schemes in the context of strategic R&D alliances. 
Until now, investigations on monetary incentives have been limited and more importantly 
researchers have never distinguished between performance-based payments, such as 
milestone payments, and committed payments, such as upfront cash payments and equity 
investments. In this dissertation, we identified milestone-based payments offered to 
startups and consequently conducted a finer-grained analysis of them. 
Our results demonstrate the importance od distinguishing performance-based payments 
from committed payments. First, the drivers of performance-based payments and 
committed payments are different. As previous studies have shown, the magnitude of 
committed payments is determined by the relative bargaining power of partnering parties,  
and the quality of technology brought by startup firm to the alliance, i.e., a function of the 
stage at signing and hold-up problems determined by the license exclusivity and the 
magnitude of irreversible and specialized investments in alliances (Higgins, 2007; 
Sakakibara, 2010). Typically, an incumbent and a startup negotiate how much the 
incumbent will pay for the license, for the reimbursement of the previous research 
expenses incurred by the startup and for the purchase of a share  in the startups by taking 
into account the factors described above. In contrast, monetary incentives primarily depend 
on the performance risk faced by startup firms. Our results suggest that startup firms 
estimate their future performance risks, particularly those resulting from the strict day-to-
day governance by the incumbent, when they negotiate milestone-based payments.  
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Second, the performance effects of milestone-based payments and committed payments 
differ in their significances and effect sizes. Performance-based payments have a slightly 
greater impact on performance, i.e. the odds ratio is 2.85 for monetary incentives and 2.80 
for committed payments, and the coefficient is statistically more significant. Nevertheless, 
committed payments have only a direct and positive effect on performance, while 
monetary incentives have a positive direct and negative indirect effect on performance. 
Therefore, the presence of positive effects confirms the ideas of those against the 
transaction cost economics view of irreversible commitments. These opponents of TCE 
theory do not view initial investments to an alliance as a source of hold-up problems. For 
instance, Madhok and Tallmann (1998) argue that irreversible commitments by a firm in 
an alliance can also be perceived as a mechanism for a firm to give positive signals to its 
partners on its commitment; thus generating commitment and cooperation between 
partners, both of which are necessary for alliance success and survival. Their suggestion is 
different from TCE, because TCE does not focus on value maximizing. It instead focuses 
on the minimization of transaction costs. By revealing that early irreversible commitments 
by incumbents in R&D alliances are positively related to alliance success, our research 
provides more insights into R&D alliance deals than previous research that analyzed deals 
by combining committed payments and milestone-based payments under the ‘deal size’ 
construct such as Higgins (2007) and Adegbasan and Higgins (2011).    
In addition, the findings of this work advance our understanding of the link between 
governance and firm performance. Research has demonstrated that startups benefit from 
engaging in alliances with other firms (Stuart, 2000). However, the firm-level performance 
implications of governance choices have been overlooked (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, and 
Singh, Forthcoming). By empirically showing that monetary incentives directly influence 
firm performance, we address this gap in the literature. Our finding regarding the positive 
effect of monetary incentives on a startup’s abnormal stock returns reveals the importance 
of revenues generated in alliances in terms of a startup firm’s market value.    
This dissertation also provides empirical contributions to the strategic alliances 
literature. To conduct our test, we developed measures for project-level governance, 
monetary incentives, and alliance performance. Our  measure for project-level governance 
takes into account the differences in control levels of committee members, alliance 
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managers and project managers by assigning weights to each of them. We believe that 
developing such a measure is necessary because of the differences in control 
responsibilities of alliance representatives. On the other hand, as we discussed, we used 
pre-commercialization milestone payments tied to the performance of startups as a 
measure for monetary incentives in the setting of bio-pharma alliances. Furthermore, 
forming contrast to prior studies that measure performance by self-assessment 
questionnaires, we measured it by using archival data sources, resulting in a more accurate 
depiction of performance levels. 
Innovation management literature 
By identifying micro-level governance mechanisms stemming from project-level 
organization, we contribute to the literature on the organization of innovation. This 
literature has extensively studied the organization of new product development projects, 
within the context of a single firm (see the meta analysis paper of Gerwin and Barrowman 
(2002) for an extensive review). Although some research on the organization of single firm 
new product development has involved the relations of firms with external agents during 
product development (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992), the research was still from the 
perspective of a focal firm. Nevertheless, a literature on the organization of collaborative 
innovation projects, between two or more firms, has recently emerged as a consequence of 
the prevalence of inter-firm R&D alliances (Carson, 2007; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004; 
Tiwana, 2008; Van den Ende, Jaspers and Gerwin, 2008). By examining the interplay 
between micro-level governance of an alliance determined by its project organization and 
its macro-level governance, we bridged different levels of governance and in turn 
advanced the bourgeoning literature on the organization of inter-firm development 
projects. 
Moreover, by showing the impacts of project-level governance and monetary 
incentives on the performance of startup-incumbent vertical R&D alliances, we make 
another contribution to the organization of innovation literature. The finding regarding the 
negative impact of project-level governance on alliance innovation performance is 
consistent with the literature that discusses dysfunctions of control in innovative task 
settings (Andrews and Smith, 1996; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Carson, 2007; Ettlie, 1983; 
Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Thompson, 1965). Furthermore, it is in line with the 
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literature on motivation and creativity which reports negative impacts of control on 
intrinsic task motivation, and in turn, on creative performance (Amabile, 1998; Kreps, 
1997; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Yet, these studies have overlooked the magnitude of 
monetary incentives. We found that monetary incentives compensate for the performance 
risks transferred to startups. Furthermore, we showed that monetary incentives, encouraged 
in part by project-level governance, positively influence performance. Therefore, even 
though there is a direct and negative effect of control on innovation performance, this 
effect can be compensated by monetary incentives offered to startups. By demonstrating 
this, we extended prior research and provided a deeper insight into the control mechanisms 
used in innovative task settings.  
Agency theory 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to agency theory. There is a growing controversy 
among agency theorists over the relationship between monitoring and monetary incentives, 
particularly in the corporate governance setting. There are currently two opposing 
positions on the relationship: 1) a substitution position, and 2) a complementarities 
position. Proponents of the substitution position argue that when appropriate levels of 
monetary incentives are offered to agents, there is less need for a principal’s monitoring, 
and vice versa (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). On the other hand, 
proponents of the complementarities view argue that monitoring and monetary incentives 
complement each other (Hoskisson, Castleton and Withers, 2009; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). One 
of the basic arguments is that the higher the control, the more performance risks are 
transferred to agents, which in turn leads to requests for higher monetary incentives by 
them. However, over-incentivizing increases the need for control (Hoskisson, Castleton, 
and Withers, 2009). Another argument is that if effort and outcome relationships are not 
well understood in a principal-agency setting, monitoring and incentives are likely to 
operate as complements (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 
2007; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). As mentioned, the empirical setting of the 
previous studies on this controversial issue has been corporate governance, particularly 
CEO compensation. We contribute to this debate by extending research to the strategic 
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R&D alliance setting and showing that monitoring and monetary incentives complement 
each other in this novel setting. 
 
5.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Several managerial implications emerge from this dissertation. As can be seen in Table 
5.2, these implications can be grouped under four headings. First, managers, in general, 
should be aware of the contract design roles of alliance representatives, because their input 
is key to the formulation of contractual details and ultimately to the final performance of 
strategic R&D alliances. Furthermore, managers should take into account the 
complementarities and substitutions between different governance mechanisms when they 
design the governance structure of R&D alliances. The presence of two governance 
mechanism that substitute each other might be counter-productive. Likewise, the absence 
of one of the two complementary governance mechanisms might prevent the effective 
implementation of the present governance mechanism. For instance, monetary incentives 
will lose their effectiveness under the absence of necessary ex post monitoring 
mechanisms, such as committee members and alliance managers.   
Second, this study provides important insights for the managers of large established 
firms. They should be cautious about the degree of project-level governance they exert on 
their partner in their strategic R&D alliances. This is not only because strict project-level 
governance leads to higher monetary incentives and possible higher future payments to 
their partners, but it is also because strict governance negatively impacts alliance 
innovation performance. Furthermore, they should avoid short-sighted controls through 
formal reviews and evaluations because these managerial actions will inhibit the problem-
solving ability of their partners. If the incumbent wants to facilitate the transformation of 
their partners’ scientific output of into marketable products, then they should allow their 
partners to make mistakes and not immediately punish them by terminating the partnership 
without allowing the startup to probe and search for the “right answer”. 
Third, managers of small startup firms must take into account the possible dysfunctions 
of day-to-day control by incumbents when they negotiate alliance deals. By invoking the 
strategy of compensating for performance risks, caused by over-control, through the use of 
monetary incentives the startup can avoid a problematic deal. Furthermore, they should 
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consider the fact that higher monetary incentives will lead to higher abnormal stock market 
gains for the startup.    
   
Table 5. 2 Summary of implications for practice 
Audience Practical Implications 
Managers of firms engaged 
in R&D alliances (in 
general) 
Use alliance representatives not only for the  ex post control of 
strategic R&D alliances but also for designing contracts, because 
their early involvement in contracting and deal-making improves 
alliance performance. (Chapter 2) 
Awareness of the complementarities or substitutions between micro-
level and macro-level, as well as ex ante and ex post governance 
mechanisms. (Chapter 2,3,4)  
 
Managers of incumbents 
engaged in vertical R&D 
alliances with startups 
Strict day-to-day governance by an incumbent will cause not only 
negative performance effects on alliance innovation performance, but 
also higher monetary incentives and consequently higher payments 
from the incumbent to the partner. (Chapters 3and 4) 
Think twice before terminating an alliance after vigilant evaluation of 
failed test results by alliance committees. Do not forget that 
development activities involve significant amounts of trial-and-error. 
(Chapter 4)  
 
Managers of startups 
engaged in vertical R&D 
alliances with incumbents 
Do not forget to bargain for monetary incentives by considering the 
degree to which the startup firm will be exposed to day-to-to 
governance by the incumbent partner. (Chapter 3) 
Think about the relation between monetary incentives offered to the 
startup firm by the incumbent partner and abnormal stock returns 
following the alliance announcement. The higher the monetary 
incentives, the higher the abnormal stock returns will be. (Chapter 4) 
 
Alliance deal analysts Take into account organizational choices that determine the degree of 
project-level governance by incumbents when determining the value 
creation potential of the strategic alliance for the startup firm. 
(Chapter 4) 
Request information about partners’ choice over formal alliance 
representation roles, if the partners have not disclosed the transaction 
to the public. This information is relatively less confidential than 
other types of information in alliance contracts, leading to a high 
chance of availability.  
Alternatively, look at prior deals of the incumbent firm, and try to 
estimate how it organizes the day-to-day control of partnerships. 
(Chapter 4) 
 
Finally, deal analysts must think about the link between day-to-day governance and 
performance when they conduct value analysis. Giving more emphasis to monetary 
incentives compared to project-level governance might result in the wrong prediction of a 
startup’s value creation in its R&D alliance with an incumbent. Therefore, analysts should 
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gather information about deal structure from contracts, and if not possible, from asking 
alliance management units or projecting an estimate based on prior deals of the incumbent 
partner. 
5.4   LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation is not without limitations, and we note them as possible future research 
opportunities. Our research shares the same limitations of any single industry study. While 
we have no reason to believe that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is less generalizable 
than any other setting, similar studies in other industries would be valuable.  
Throughout this dissertation, we focus primarily on the formal control-based roles and 
responsibilities of alliance representatives. Even though this choice helps us in explaining 
the relationship between project-level governance and other formal mechanisms and in 
showing the impact of project-level governance on performance, the roles and 
responsibilities of alliance representatives might be more diverse in practice than modeled 
here. Previous studies have addressed various, less formal roles of alliance representatives. 
For instance, Spekman et al (1998) list seven different roles for alliance managers. Among 
them, vision creation, strategic sponsorship of the partner, advocacy of the alliance within 
the firm, networking to provide resources for the alliance and facilitating the growth of an 
alliance; these roles are different from formal alliance control roles that we depicted in this 
dissertation.  Likewise, Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and Robinson (2003) note the internal 
and external championing roles of alliance managers in addition to their role of controlling 
partner behavior. Although steering committee members and functional committee 
members of a partnering firm are primarily responsible for formal control of the alliance, 
that does not mean that they would not also engage in internal and external championing. 
Therefore, the investigation of the relationships between alliance representatives of an 
incumbent firm and a startup firm during an alliance, from different theoretical 
perspectives, might represent fruitful areas of research that can improve our understanding 
of alliance governance mechanisms and ultimately alliance performance. Future research 
may look at how the internal and external championing roles of alliance representatives 
affect alliance performance from a resource dependency perspective. Future studies that 
can successfully identify the circumstances in which the alliance representatives of 
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incumbents provide key resources to their partners will shed light on different aspects of 
the day-to-day governance of strategic R&D alliances. 
We could not investigate partners’ decision regarding which partner will chair the 
committees. Having the right to chair meetings may moderate the effect of project-level 
governance on monetary incentives and performance.  We noticed from the alliance 
contracts that one partner may appoint its representative as the single chairman, both 
partners may appoint their representatives as chairmen or the partners may opt for a 
rotating chairman option. Future research may investigate how this choice affects other 
governance mechanisms and performance. 
Different decision-making styles used in these committees require further research. 
When gathering data from alliance contracts, we realized that partners included terms that 
assign decision-making rights to a single party, if that party possesses the necessary 
knowledge to make decisions. In other words, although joint committees typically operate 
under a consensual decision-making principle, in some special cases they delegate the 
authority to a single party that has the relevant expertise in the domain of the decision. 
Future studies can compare the effectiveness of this decision-making style with more 
traditional consensus-based decision making styles. 
When we examined the relation between project-level governance and contractual 
complexity, we measured contractual complexity as the number of pages in an alliance 
contract. Finer-grained measures might be used to better understand the nature of the 
relationship between the two mechanisms. Future research might examine which clauses 
are added to the contract when greater project-level governance takes place, and to what 
degree project-level governance becomes stricter depending on the presence of specific 
clauses in a contract.    
We employed agency theory in this dissertation when we investigated the relationship 
between project-level governance and performance-based monetary incentives and their 
effects on performance. Alternatively, future studies can integrate agency theory with other 
theories to explain the link between the two governance mechanisms and performance. 
Indeed, previous studies  integrated agency theory with other paradigms in the context of 
corporate governance to explain CEO pay (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998, Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). The strategic alliances literature can also benefit from this approach. 
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Stewardship theory can be an appropriate candidate, because it challenges the 
assumptions of agency theory by noting that not all agents are self-interested and 
motivated by financial rewards (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). While our 
research showed that monetary incentives increase alliance innovation performance, it is 
unclear to what extent startups are opportunistic. In practice, it might be the case that 
startups have less of a tendency to act opportunistically because they have stakes in the 
future of their projects and they know that opportunism will not only be harmful to their 
partners, but also to them. Therefore, a better design of monitoring and incentive 
mechanisms can be achieved if the premise of stewardship theory can be combined with 
the premise of agency theory. 
The bourgeoning literature on the relationship between alliance representatives of an 
incumbent and its startup partner might benefit further from the theories tested in the 
corporate governance setting. Recent research on social influence tactics used in 
boardrooms (Stern & Westphal, 2010) may help researchers explain the different outcomes 
of project-level governance. While we showed, in this dissertation, that when a startup 
faces higher performance risk, because of greater project-level governance, it tends to 
request higher monetary incentives to compensate its risks. Alternatively, it can use social 
influence tactics to gain the political support of some representatives at the incumbent 
firm. One social influence tactic that can be used by a startup firm is to explicitly or 
implicitly offer executive management positions in the startup or at one of its affiliates or 
close collaborators. Knowing that he or she will be an executive director in one of the 
startup firms, the representative would be less vigilant in its evaluation of alliance 
outcomes developed by the startup. Hence, social influence tactics may weaken the need 
for higher monetary incentives in cases for which the degree of project-level governance is 
high.      
Our results reveal both upsides and downsides of formal management principles. On 
the one hand, monetary incentives positively influence alliance innovation performance. 
On the other hand, project-level governance negatively influences alliance innovation 
performance. Furthermore, we observed in our sample that on average more than 50% of 
R&D alliances were terminated without successful outcomes. These facts cause 
controversy over the effectiveness of formal management principles used in innovation 
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alliances as well as the effectiveness of alliances as an organizational mode of innovation. 
Particularly, the experts of the US biopharmaceutical industry have long been questioning 
the effectiveness of the drug R&D models; in particular the formal management principles 
used by large pharmaceutical firms and the R&D alliances these firms form with small 
firms to develop new drugs. As a result, these biopharmaceutical experts have been 
offering novel industry-level organizational forms to overcome the drawbacks of 
formalization and alliances in general (Roth and Cuatrecasas, 2010). We believe that 
further research is necessary to compare the innovation rates of internal R&D, external 
R&D through alliances, and novel forms of external R&D to help firms find effective ways 
to organize for innovation. 
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SUMMARY 
Alliances are collaborative agreements between two or more independent firms to achieve 
various strategic purposes. In the R&D context, firms engage in strategic alliances to 
jointly develop new technologies and products. In these inter-organizational relationships, 
alliance governance plays a central role in determining alliance performance, because it 
aligns the partners’ incentives. Prior research examined the influence of different forms of 
alliance mechanisms on alliance and firm-level performance. Yet, few studies have 
examined the antecedents and performance outcomes of two of these different governance 
mechanisms: 1) day-to-day project-level governance by firms’ alliance representatives and 
2) performance-based monetary incentives.  
The potential upsides of these two governance mechanisms are that they mitigate moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems faced by the partners. On the other hand, the 
potential downsides are that they can result in over-control or biased-control, both of 
which might negatively affect innovation performance, particularly that of the partner 
responsible for developing the innovation. Hence, managers face a challenge when they 
decide on the extent to which they should use these two governance mechanisms in R&D 
alliances. In order to address this challenge, we examine the antecedents of these 
governance mechanisms, the relationship between them, and their impacts on alliance and 
firm-level performance in the U.S. biotechnology setting. 
In Chapter 2, we discuss the three main roles of project-level governance: 1) contract 
design, 2) contract enforcement, and 3) contract adaptation. The tests on a sample of 316 
strategic R&D alliances of US-based biotechnology firms with established pharmaceutical 
firms as well as other biotechnology firms reveal that project-level governance 
complements contractual complexity and substitutes equity in the context of strategic R&D 
alliances. Furthermore, the results show that late stage alliance deals have greater project-
level governance than early stage alliance deals. Finally, the findings demonstrate that 
higher contractual complexity, encouraged in part by greater project-level governance, has 
a positive impact on alliance innovation performance. 
In Chapter 3, in contrast to the second chapter, we focus solely on startup-incumbent 
alliances, i.e. those between biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms. We  aim to 
explain the relationship between project-level governance exercised on startups by the 
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controllers appointed by the incumbents and performance-based monetary incentives 
offered by incumbents to startups. By drawing upon two competing positions in agency 
theory, i.e. the substitution and complementarities positions, we develop two alternative 
hypotheses. The tests on a sample of 220 strategic R&D alliances show that there is a 
positive reciprocal relationship between project-level governance and performance-based 
monetary incentives in the context of startup-incumbent strategic R&D alliances. 
In Chapter 4, we examine performance outcomes of project-level governance and 
performance-based monetary incentives in the same setting as Chapter 3. The results show 
that monetary incentives have direct positive effects on alliance innovation performance 
and startups’ abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements. On the other hand, 
project-level governance performed by the controllers appointed by the incumbents has a 
negative effect on alliance innovation performance, and has no significant effect on the 
startups’ abnormal stock returns following alliance announcements. Hence, the results 
suggest that project-level governance and monetary incentives offset each others’ effects 
on alliance innovation performance in the context of startup-incumbent alliances. An 
implication of this finding is that offering greater monetary incentives to startups has only 
a minimal positive effect on development success, if the incumbents simultaneously opt for 
intense project-level governance. Hence, the results support behavioral agency theory 
which predicts that project-level governance increases risk aversion of startups, and, in 
turn, reduce alliance innovation performance. Moreover, we extend the literature on 
innovation management by showing that under higher performance-based payments, the 
negative effects of control were offset.  
The findings of this dissertation make noteworthy contributions to the alliance 
governance and innovation management literatures as well as to agency theory. 
Furthermore, this thesis has important practical implications for managers who are 
responsible for designing governance structures for R&D alliances. Finally, deal analysts 
and investors can benefit from the findings of this study. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Allianties zijn samenwerkingsverbanden tussen twee of meer onafhankelijke 
ondernemingen om bepaalde strategische doelen te verwezenlijken. In de R&D context 
nemen ondernemingen deel in strategische allianties om gezamenlijk nieuwe technologieën 
en producten te ontwikkelen. In deze inter-organisatorische relaties heeft de besturing van 
de alliantie een belangrijk effect op de alliantieprestaties, aangezien het de partners 
informatie verschaft over elkaars activiteiten en de incentives van de partners met elkaar in 
lijn brengt. Eerder onderzoek heeft de invloed van verschillende alliantiemechanismen 
onderzocht op alliantie- en ondernemingsniveau. Weinig onderzoekers hebben de 
antecedenten en effecten op prestaties van twee besturingsmechanismen onderzocht: 1) 
besturing van de alliantie op projectniveau, en 2) op prestaties gebaseerde financiële 
beloningen. 
De potentiële positieve kanten van deze twee besturingsmechanismen zijn dat ze de 
partners informatie verschaffen over elkaars activiteiten en de beloonde partij stimuleren 
om de juiste prestaties te leveren (en daarmee het ‘moral hazard’ en ‘adverse selection’ 
problemen verminderen). Aan de andere kant is het potentiële nadeel dat ze kunnen 
resulteren in over-controle of subjectieve controle, welke beide een negatieve invloed 
kunnen hebben op de prestaties van de alliantie, en meer in het bijzonder op de partner die 
verantwoordelijk is voor de ontwikkeling van de innovatie. Managers staan voor de 
uitdaging te beslissen in welke mate zij gebruikmaken van deze twee 
besturingsmechanismen in R&D allianties. In dit proefschrift worden daarom de 
antecedenten van deze twee besturingsmechanismen, de relaties ertussen, en hun impact op 
de prestaties van de alliantie en van de ondernemingen onderzocht. 
In hoofdstuk 2 bespreken we de drie algemene functies van besturing van allianties op 
projectniveau: 1) het ontwerp van de contracten, (2) het toezien op de naleving van de 
contracten, en 3) de aanpassing van de contracten. Het onderzoek uit dit hoofdstuk, 
gebaseerd op een steekproef van 316 strategische R&D allianties tussen biotechnologie 
ondernemingen gevestigd in de Verenigde Staten en farmaceutische ondernemingen, laat 
zien dat besturing op projectniveau complementair is aan contractuele complexiteit en een 
vervanging vormt van het investeren in het partnerbedrijf als geheel. Bovendien laten de 
resultaten zien dat alliantie-deals in een laat stadium een sterkere besturing op 
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projectniveau hebben dan deals in een vroeg stadium. Ten slotte laten de resultaten zien dat 
grotere contractuele complexiteit, deels aangemoedigd door sterkere besturing op 
projectniveau, een positieve impact heeft op de innovatieprestaties van een alliantie. 
In hoofdstuk 3 richten wij ons, in tegenstelling tot in hoofdstuk 2, enkel op allianties 
tussen start-ups en gevestigde ondernemingen, dat wil zeggen, allianties tussen 
biotechnologie ondernemingen en farmaceutische ondernemingen. We willen hiermee de 
relatie verklaren tussen enerzijds besturing op projectniveau van projecten uitgevoerd door 
start-ups door managers die zijn aangesteld door de gevestigde onderneming, en anderzijds 
de prestatie-gebaseerde financiële beloningen door die gevestigde ondernemingen aan de 
start-ups. Door gebruik te maken van twee concurrerende posities in de agency theorie, 
namelijk de substitutie- en complementariteitsposities, hebben wij twee alternatieve 
hypotheses ontwikkeld. Een toets op een steekproef van 220 strategische R&D allianties 
laat zien dat er een positieve wederkerige relatie bestaat tussen besturing op projectniveau 
en prestatie-gebaseerde financiële beloningen in R&D allianties tussen start-ups en 
gevestigde ondernemingen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de effecten van besturing op projectniveau en van 
prestatiegebaseerde financiële beloningen op de prestaties van de alliantie in dezelfde 
setting als in hoofdstuk 3. De resultaten laten zien dat financiële beloningen een direct 
positief effect hebben op de prestaties van een alliantie en op de beurskoersen van start-ups 
in vergelijking met de markt na de aankondiging van de alliantie. Aan de andere kant heeft 
besturing op projectniveau door de gevestigde ondernemingen een negatief effect op de 
prestaties van de alliantie en heeft geen significant effect op de beurskoers van startups als 
gevolg van de aankondiging door de alliantie. De resultaten suggereren dat de besturing op 
projectniveau en financiële beloningen elkaar compenseren wat betreft de effecten op 
prestaties van allianties tussen start-ups en gevestigde ondernemingen. Een implicatie van 
deze bevinding is dat het aanbieden van grote financiële beloningen aan start-ups slechts 
een klein positief effect heeft op de prestaties, omdat de gevestigde partij gewoonlijk 
gelijktijdig kiest voor intensieve besturing op projectniveau. De resultaten ondersteunen de 
‘behavioral agency theory’, welke voorspelt dat besturing op projectniveau de risicoaversie 
van start-ups verhoogt, wat op zijn beurt de prestaties van allianties vermindert. Bovendien 
dragen we bij aan de literatuur op het gebied van innovatiemanagement door te laten zien 
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dat hoge prestatiegebaseerde beloningen de negatieve effecten van controle kunnen 
compenseren.  
De bevindingen in dit proefschrift vormen een belangwekkende bijdrage aan de 
alliantie-governance en innovatiemanagement literatuur, maar ook aan de agency theorie. 
Verder heeft deze thesis belangrijke praktische implicaties voor managers die 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor het ontwerpen van besturingsstructuren voor R&D allianties. 
Tot slot kunnen ‘deal analisten’ en beleggers profiteren van de bevindingen in dit 
onderzoek.  
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AND PERFORMANCE IN STRATEGIC R&D ALLIANCES
A growing number of firms rely on strategic R&D alliances to develop new products. In
these alliances, firms use various kinds of governance mechanisms for incentive align ment.
Project-level governance, i.e., the daily control of alliance activities by firms’ alliance re pre -
 sen tatives such as steering committee members, alliance managers, and project managers,
and performance-based monetary incentives, i.e., potential payments tied to the perfor -
mance of partners, are two governance mechanisms, increasingly used in practice yet over -
looked in the strategic alliances literature. In this dissertation, I examine the antece dents
and performance outcomes of these two governance mechanisms in the biopharmaceutical
industry setting.
The results of this dissertation suggest that project-level governance and monetary
incentives offset each others’ effects on alliance innovation performance in the context of
startup-incumbent alliances. In other words, offering  greater monetary incentives to start -
ups has minimal positive effect on the development success, if incumbents exercise intense
project-level governance by their controllers at the same time. On the other hand, the
results suggest that greater monetary incentives result in higher abnormal stock returns to
startup firms following alliance announcements. I also find that greater project-level
gover nance positively influences the contractual detail, which in turn increases the like -
lihood of development success. Finally, I reveal several other exogenous and endo genous
antecedents of both governance mechanisms.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by
ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
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